diff --git a/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card.go b/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card.go
index b0081cf7..229184f1 100644
--- a/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card.go
+++ b/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card.go
@@ -186,6 +186,25 @@ type approvalOrchestrator struct {
 	// (e.g. a DingTalk online sheet) on top of the local approvals JSON. nil =
 	// local-file audit only.
 	audit auditSink
+	// allowedScopes is the role's capability allowlist (product names). When
+	// non-empty, an action whose product is not listed is refused before it ever
+	// reaches the gate, keeping the role in its lane. Empty = no restriction.
+	allowedScopes []string
+}
+
+// scopeAllows reports whether the role may use the given product. An empty
+// allowlist means no restriction (allow all).
+func (o *approvalOrchestrator) scopeAllows(product string) bool {
+	if len(o.allowedScopes) == 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+	product = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(product))
+	for _, s := range o.allowedScopes {
+		if strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s)) == product {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
 }
 
 // recordAudit writes the request's current (terminal) state to the audit sink,
@@ -280,6 +299,15 @@ func (o *approvalOrchestrator) handleReply(ctx context.Context, requester, convI
 		return cleaned, false
 	}
 
+	// Role scope: an action outside the role's capability allowlist is refused
+	// up front (never reaches the gate or the owner). The requester is told it is
+	// out of lane — this is a capability boundary, not an approval, so it is fine
+	// to surface to them.
+	if !o.scopeAllows(pa.Product) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "[connect][approval] 越权拦截：角色无 %q 能力，拒绝动作 %s\n", pa.Product, summary)
+		return fmt.Sprintf("（该数字员工没有「%s」能力，无法执行此操作：%s）", pa.Product, summary), false
+	}
+
 	// 写类才拦：route the gate-or-not decision through the read/write classifier
 	// instead of gating every detected marker. A definitively read-class action
 	// is safe and bypasses the gate (the marker is stripped and the reply goes
diff --git a/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card_test.go b/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card_test.go
index fceb6185..9c3bfc49 100644
--- a/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card_test.go
+++ b/internal/helpers/connect_approval_card_test.go
@@ -601,6 +601,41 @@ func TestDeferredExecution_HoldsAndRetries(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestScopeEnforcement: an action outside the role's allowlist is refused up
+// front (the requester is told, nothing reaches the gate); an in-scope action
+// proceeds; an empty allowlist allows everything.
+func TestScopeEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	gate := newApprovalGate("ctscope")
+	runner := &fakeRunner{}
+	o := newTextApprovalOrchestrator(gate, runner, "owner", &fakeNotifier{})
+	o.allowedScopes = []string{"todo"} // HR-style: only todo
+
+	// doc.create is out of scope → refused, NOT gated, requester told.
+	out, handled := o.handleReply(context.Background(), "requester", "c1", `[[ACTION:doc.create name="周报"]]`, nil)
+	if handled {
+		t.Fatal("out-of-scope action must not be handled by the gate")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "没有") || !strings.Contains(out, "doc") {
+		t.Fatalf("requester should be told it's out of scope, got %q", out)
+	}
+	if len(gate.list()) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("out-of-scope action must not create an approval request")
+	}
+
+	// todo.create is in scope → proceeds (owner self-request auto-executes).
+	o.handleReply(context.Background(), "owner", "c2", `[[ACTION:todo.create title="排期"]]`, func(_ context.Context, _, _ string) error { return nil })
+	if len(gate.list()) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("in-scope action should be processed, got %d requests", len(gate.list()))
+	}
+
+	// scopeAllows: empty allowlist = allow all.
+	o.allowedScopes = nil
+	if !o.scopeAllows("anything") {
+		t.Fatal("empty allowlist must allow all products")
+	}
+}
+
 // TestAutoFlushDeferred verifies the background retry: silent while the identity
 // is still wrong (no spam), and it drains + notifies once execution works.
 func TestAutoFlushDeferred(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/internal/helpers/connect_role.go b/internal/helpers/connect_role.go
index 28b007c2..de462f86 100644
--- a/internal/helpers/connect_role.go
+++ b/internal/helpers/connect_role.go
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ func applyRoleConfig(opts connectAgentOptions, role *RoleConfig) connectAgentOpt
 	if len(role.KnowledgeSources) > 0 {
 		opts.KnowledgeSources = append(opts.KnowledgeSources, role.KnowledgeSources...)
 	}
+	if len(opts.RoleScopes) == 0 && len(role.AllowedScopes) > 0 {
+		opts.RoleScopes = append([]string(nil), role.AllowedScopes...)
+	}
 	return opts
 }
 
diff --git a/internal/helpers/connect_stream.go b/internal/helpers/connect_stream.go
index e498a661..5dda0821 100644
--- a/internal/helpers/connect_stream.go
+++ b/internal/helpers/connect_stream.go
@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ type connectAgentOptions struct {
 	// "Sheet1"). Empty AuditSheetNode = local approvals JSON only.
 	AuditSheetNode string
 	AuditSheetTab  string
+	// RoleScopes is the role's capability allowlist (RoleConfig.AllowedScopes),
+	// e.g. ["todo", "approval"]. When non-empty the approval gate refuses an
+	// action whose product is not in the list, so a role stays in its lane (an
+	// HR assistant can't touch code/drive). Empty = no scope restriction.
+	RoleScopes []string
 }
 
 // isStreamBridgeChannel reports whether a channel is wired through the Go-native
diff --git a/internal/helpers/devapp_connect.go b/internal/helpers/devapp_connect.go
index bfc68b12..89ec4a70 100644
--- a/internal/helpers/devapp_connect.go
+++ b/internal/helpers/devapp_connect.go
@@ -282,9 +282,13 @@ func launchConnector(cmd *cobra.Command, runner executor.Runner, channel, client
 				audit = &sheetAuditSink{runner: runner, nodeID: opts.AuditSheetNode, sheetID: opts.AuditSheetTab}
 				fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "[connect] 操作审计已开启：在线表格 node=%s tab=%s（每个操作追加一行）\n", opts.AuditSheetNode, opts.AuditSheetTab)
 			}
+			if len(opts.RoleScopes) > 0 {
+				fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "[connect] 角色能力边界：仅允许 [%s]（其它产品的执行动作会被拒）\n", strings.Join(opts.RoleScopes, ", "))
+			}
 			if sender := newDingtalkApprovalCardSender(clientID, clientSecret, opts.ApprovalCardTemplate); sender != nil {
 				orch := newApprovalOrchestrator(gate, sender, runner, opts.OwnerUserID)
 				orch.audit = audit
+				orch.allowedScopes = opts.RoleScopes
 				extras.approval = orch
 				fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "[connect] 确认闸已开启：主人=%s（执行类请求先卡片审批，[同意]/[拒绝]按钮）\n", opts.OwnerUserID)
 			} else {
@@ -297,6 +301,7 @@ func launchConnector(cmd *cobra.Command, runner executor.Runner, channel, client
 				notifier := newAICardClient(clientID, clientSecret, "")
 				orch := newTextApprovalOrchestrator(gate, runner, opts.OwnerUserID, notifier)
 				orch.audit = audit
+				orch.allowedScopes = opts.RoleScopes
 				extras.approval = orch
 				// Background auto-retry: a deferred backlog (e.g. queued while the
 				// dws login was not yet the owner) drains by itself once the identity