The Coverage context was the PR critical path (~17 min end to end):
coverage-current re-ran the whole suite serially (-p 1, ~13 min) and
coverage-baseline re-ran it again at the merge-base (~13 min) although
that profile is a pure function of the base commit.
- coverage-current now owns only the scoped (standard-tier) profile;
full-suite candidate profiles come from a 5-way shard matrix
(app/cli/generators/helpers/remaining) that keeps -p 1 inside each
shard on isolated runners. scripts/ci/test-packages.sh list-coverage
defines the shards and verify proves the union equals the previous
single-run package set exactly once.
- the aggregate Coverage job reassembles the disjoint shard profiles
into coverage.txt before make coverage-gate, failing closed when a
shard file is missing, so gate semantics (100% changed-code +
scope-matched overall non-regression) are byte-compatible.
- coverage-baseline restores the merge-base full-suite profile from an
exact-key cache (merge-base SHA + resolved Go version) written by the
last green main push; any miss falls back to recomputing in the
merge-base worktree. Exact key only - no prefix fallback, a near-miss
profile would compare the candidate against the wrong commit.
- new contract tests pin the shard matrix, the assembly step, the
exact-key cache pair, and the absence of restore-keys; the package
plan test also covers the coverage shard partition.
Bind each accepted marker to the exact workflow run attempt, immutable artifact, source comment, and current PR head so a historical successful run cannot authorize a different payload.
Address P1 finding: extract_payload now strictly requires the parsed JSON
to be a dict, and validates each field's type and format:
- pr_number: string of digits
- pr_head_sha: 40-char lowercase hex string
- products: alphanumeric with commas/dots/hyphens/underscores only
- run_id: string of digits
- cases_ref: string (may be empty)
validate_run_id also guards against non-string input.
Added tests for: integer/array/string/null JSON, numeric field types,
invalid SHA format, injection in products, missing required fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address P1 lint finding: structured eval-dispatch comments could be
forged by unauthorized users. Add three-layer consumer-side validation:
1. comment.user.login == 'github-actions[bot]' (platform-enforced identity)
2. comment.performed_via_github_app.slug == 'github-actions' (App signature)
3. payload.run_id verified against actual successful workflow run via API
Also adds:
- eval_poll_validate.py: consumer validation module (in-repo, auditable)
- test_eval_poll_validate.py: unit tests proving forged comments are rejected
- Go security contract test updated to assert run_id and validate reference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- /eval on one's own PR may omit sha=: the guard auto-pins the
dispatch-time head (commenter == PR author leaves no third-party
swap window); dispatching another author's PR still requires the
explicit reviewed SHA (keeps the P1-2 TOCTOU remedy where the
threat lives)
- cases= is now validated structurally per git check-ref-format
semantics (leading/trailing//double slashes, '..', dot-leading
components, .lock suffixes) and rejects '-'-leading values to
prevent git fetch option injection (review P2)
Users listed in .github/eval-allowlist.txt (default branch, PR-reviewed)
may dispatch /eval for their own PRs only; write/maintain/admin retain
dispatch for any PR. Fail-closed on permission API 404/network errors.
race:remaining was SIGTERM'd (exit 143) mid test/smoke after mock_mcp with
no FAIL/DATA RACE; NewRootCommand public-tree smoke under -race is too heavy
to share that shard. Mirror the cli split and give smoke a 15m budget.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
chichuan