Bind each accepted marker to the exact workflow run attempt, immutable artifact, source comment, and current PR head so a historical successful run cannot authorize a different payload.
Address P1 lint finding: structured eval-dispatch comments could be
forged by unauthorized users. Add three-layer consumer-side validation:
1. comment.user.login == 'github-actions[bot]' (platform-enforced identity)
2. comment.performed_via_github_app.slug == 'github-actions' (App signature)
3. payload.run_id verified against actual successful workflow run via API
Also adds:
- eval_poll_validate.py: consumer validation module (in-repo, auditable)
- test_eval_poll_validate.py: unit tests proving forged comments are rejected
- Go security contract test updated to assert run_id and validate reference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The GitHub Actions runner cannot reach internal Aone CI API (structural
network isolation). Replace the curl-to-internal step with a structured
HTML comment (<!-- eval-dispatch: {...} -->) that an internal Devix
polling service picks up every 3 minutes to trigger the Aone CI pipeline.
This eliminates the EVAL_TRIGGER_URL/EVAL_TRIGGER_TOKEN secrets dependency
from the GitHub side — those can be removed once verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Users listed in .github/eval-allowlist.txt (default branch, PR-reviewed)
may dispatch /eval for their own PRs only; write/maintain/admin retain
dispatch for any PR. Fail-closed on permission API 404/network errors.
chichuan