Address the P1 review finding on PR #1085: --members lets one call remove
up to 30 USER/DEPT/CONVERSATION/TAG members, where departments, chats,
and role groups can indirectly affect many more users, yet the remove
branches called the MCP tool right after argument parsing with Safety
confirmation=not_required.
- drive permission remove, doc permission remove, and wiki member remove
now declare confirmation=user_required. DeclareLeafMetadata installs
the ConfirmSafety gate automatically (deferred to the first
deps.Caller.CallTool so flag validation still fails first), so an
unconfirmed invocation exits with the typed confirmation_required
error and performs zero MCP calls; --yes, an interactive yes, or
--dry-run previews remain the supported paths.
- Pass framework confirmation errors through WrapErrorWithOperation
verbatim (new apperrors.IsConfirmationRequired). Text classification
misrouted them: command paths containing "permission" (drive/doc
permission remove) were re-reported as AUTH_PERMISSION_DENIED while
other paths (wiki member remove) lost their reason and degraded to
UNCLASSIFIED.
- Tests: TestPermissionMemberRemoveRequiresConfirmationBeforeToolCall
covers all three entry points for both --members and legacy --users —
unconfirmed rejects with zero MCP calls, --yes dispatches exactly one
call with the complete precise arguments, --dry-run previews without
calls. Existing remove tests inject root --yes for the assembly
assertions; blank --users still fails validation before confirmation.
Address the P2 review finding on PR #1085: NO_PERMISSION is a generic
code name also returned by non-document tools — attendance
get-self-setting (bossAttendStatNotify) and event-subscription attempts
have both been observed returning it — so keying drive permission
apply-* guidance on it would mislead those products, defeating the goal
of the P1 scoping fix. Only the drive-specific forbidden.* domain codes
(forbidden.no.auth / forbidden.accessDenied) and the role-threshold
message wording remain document signals; a bare NO_PERMISSION still
classifies as AUTH_PERMISSION_DENIED but now keeps the product-neutral
suggestion, and NO_PERMISSION combined with document wording still gets
apply guidance.
Add regression tests for the non-document NO_PERMISSION case and update
the changelog fragment; changed-code coverage stays at 100%.
Address the two P1 review findings on PR #1085:
- Permission suggestions: the drive permission apply-* guidance is now
limited to document/wiki-specific errors (node access codes
NO_PERMISSION / forbidden.no.auth / forbidden.accessDenied and the
role-threshold wording). Permission failures from other products keep
their product-specific suggestion (e.g. the mail mailbox hint) or fall
back to a product-neutral hint instead of being told to run document
permission commands that cannot fix their problem.
- Null rendering: the null->{} adaptation is limited to the four tools
with a confirmed empty-response-means-success contract
(update_permission / remove_permission / update_member /
remove_member). Every other tool keeps its raw null output so the
shared machine-output contract stays unchanged.
Update tests and the changelog fragment accordingly; changed-code
coverage stays at 100%.
- --notify now defaults to false and is omitted from the server request
unless passed explicitly (help updated accordingly)
- forbidden.accessDenied / permission-denied bodies classify as
AUTH_PERMISSION_DENIED with apply-permission guidance
- user/member validation failures intercepted before RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND
with --members corpId suggestion
- business error display appends backend code/logId for traceability;
literal null tool responses render as {}
- drive/doc permission list + wiki member list declare cursor pagination
(next-token) in Contract; cobra.NoArgs hardening on permission leaves
- cross-platform coverage tests and release fragments updated
zengyouling.zyl