release_version was interpolated into an awk regex, where '.' matches any
character. Version 1.0.1-beta.1 therefore also admitted
.changes/released/1x0x1-betaX1/, letting the archive drift from the
CHANGELOG version while every other seal assertion still passed and
breaking the documented audit trail.
Compare the archive prefix with index() and split the basename off with
substr(), matching the literal-comparison idiom already used throughout
check-changelog-pr.sh. Only the basename, whose character class is fixed,
stays a pattern.
Git records no diff entry for a directory itself, so adding
.changes/foo/bar.md only surfaced the nested path, which the single-level
trigger regex skipped. The entry validation and the renderer were both
bypassed, letting a nested directory reach main and break every later
fragment render with 'unexpected directory'.
Trigger the top-level tree validation on any .changes change outside
.changes/released/ (which keeps its own immutability and release-seal
checks), and assert .changes itself is still a tree so replacing it with a
blob or symlink cannot empty the child listing unnoticed.
Re-rendering stays keyed on fragment changes so a README-only edit does
not fail on an empty fragment set.
Bind each accepted marker to the exact workflow run attempt, immutable artifact, source comment, and current PR head so a historical successful run cannot authorize a different payload.
The fragment gate only ran validation when the changed path matched the
legal fragment name pattern, so `.changes/Foo.md`, `.changes/notes.txt`
and a symlinked fragment slipped through untouched and then broke the
next PR that added a legal fragment. The trigger now fires on any
top-level `.changes/` change other than README.md and rejects every
entry that is not README.md, released/, or a 100644 blob named
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.md$.
The renderer had the same hole from the other side: `find -type f`
is false for symlinks, so a symlinked fragment was silently dropped
from the rendered notes, and the `[a-z0-9]*.md` glob only constrained
the first character so `chat reply.md` passed. It now walks every
top-level entry and fails on symlinks, unexpected directories,
non-regular files and illegal names. Both scripts pin LC_ALL=C so the
ASCII ranges cannot match uppercase under a different collation.
Adds regression coverage for illegal names, non-markdown entries,
symlinks and executable modes on both the gate and the renderer.
Address P1 lint finding: structured eval-dispatch comments could be
forged by unauthorized users. Add three-layer consumer-side validation:
1. comment.user.login == 'github-actions[bot]' (platform-enforced identity)
2. comment.performed_via_github_app.slug == 'github-actions' (App signature)
3. payload.run_id verified against actual successful workflow run via API
Also adds:
- eval_poll_validate.py: consumer validation module (in-repo, auditable)
- test_eval_poll_validate.py: unit tests proving forged comments are rejected
- Go security contract test updated to assert run_id and validate reference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
玉澜