feat: forward agent version and extension context

.changes/85384225-agent-version-ext.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+---
+category: Added
+---
+
+- **Agent version and extended context passthrough** (Aone 85384225) — adds
+  validated `DWS_AGENT_VER` and sensitive JSON `DWS_AGENT_EXT` metadata to
+  ordinary non-plugin MCP requests without forwarding it to A2A, OAuth,
+  Discovery, or third-party plugins.

.env.example

@@ -19,3 +19,12 @@
 
 # Cache directory (optional, defaults to ~/.dws/cache)
 # DWS_CACHE_DIR=
+
+# Agent integration metadata (optional; ordinary non-plugin MCP requests only)
+# DWS_AGENT_PRODUCT=example-agent
+# DWS_AGENT_HOST=cloud
+# DWS_AGENT_VER=0.1.5
+# DWS_AGENT_EXT='{"umt":"example-redacted","miniwua":"example-redacted","ua":"ExampleAgent/0.1.5"}'
+# The outer single quotes above are shell syntax and are not part of the value.
+# DWS_AGENT_EXT is sensitive caller-declared JSON (max 8 KiB); never put real
+# tokens in committed files or use this metadata alone for authentication.

docs/reference.md

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 | `DWS_CONFIG_DIR` | Override default config directory / 覆盖默认配置目录 |
 | `DWS_AGENT_PRODUCT` | Optional, caller-declared Agent product sent as `x-dws-agent-product` (for example `qwenwork`) for downstream logs/BI and used as the IM `clawType` display label when `--ai-tag` is enabled. `--ai-tag` defaults to `true`, so a configured Product changes the displayed label by default. With `--ai-tag=false`, native `chat message send` / `reply` calls send an empty `clawType`, while shortcut calls omit the argument. Surrounding ASCII spaces/tabs are trimmed; the remaining value must be at most 64 bytes and match `^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$`. Unset or empty values omit the Header and use the edition's IM display default. This client never uses Product to change the separate HTTP `claw-type` PAT/routing label. / 可选、由调用方声明的 Agent 产品标识，经校验后作为 `x-dws-agent-product` 发送，并用于 IM 小尾巴；`--ai-tag` 默认为 `true`，因此配置 Product 后默认会改变展示标签。使用 `--ai-tag=false` 时，原生 `chat message send` / `reply` 发送空的 `clawType`，shortcut 调用则省略该参数。未设置时省略请求头且 IM 使用发行版默认值；本客户端不会用 Product 修改独立的 HTTP `claw-type` |
 | `DWS_AGENT_HOST` | Optional, caller-declared Agent runtime form sent as `x-dws-agent-host` (for example `cloud` or `desktop`) for downstream logs/BI. Surrounding ASCII spaces/tabs are trimmed; the remaining value must be at most 64 bytes and match `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$`; unset values are omitted. This client does not use Host for PAT, authentication, Discovery, or MCP endpoint selection. / 可选、由调用方声明的 Agent 运行形态，经校验后作为 `x-dws-agent-host` 发送给下游日志/BI；本客户端不使用该值进行 PAT、鉴权、Discovery 或 MCP 端点选择，未设置时省略 |
+| `DWS_AGENT_VER` | Optional caller-declared Agent version / 可选、由调用方声明的 Agent 版本。After trimming surrounding ASCII spaces/tabs, the value must be at most 64 bytes and match `^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]*$`; a non-empty valid value is sent as `x-dws-agent-ver`, while unset or empty values omit the Header. / 去除首尾 ASCII 空格和 Tab 后，值不得超过 64 字节且必须匹配上述格式；合法非空值通过 `x-dws-agent-ver` 发送，未设置或空值则省略请求头 |
+| `DWS_AGENT_EXT` | Optional caller-declared Agent extended context / 可选、由调用方声明的 Agent 扩展上下文。The value must be a UTF-8 JSON object no larger than 8 KiB, is compacted before being sent as the sensitive `x-dws-agent-ext` Header, and may use the recommended keys `umt`, `miniwua`, and `ua`; unknown keys remain supported. Unset or empty values omit the Header. / 值必须是 UTF-8 JSON 对象且不得超过 8 KiB，压缩后通过敏感请求头 `x-dws-agent-ext` 发送；推荐使用 `umt`、`miniwua`、`ua`，同时允许未知扩展键。未设置或空值则省略请求头 |
 | `DWS_<PRODUCT>_MCP_URL` | Override a product MCP endpoint for local development / 本地开发时覆盖指定产品 MCP endpoint |
 | `DWS_CLIENT_ID` | OAuth client ID (DingTalk AppKey) |
 | `DWS_CLIENT_SECRET` | OAuth client secret (DingTalk AppSecret) |
@@ -14,6 +16,47 @@
 | `DWS_ALLOW_HTTP_ENDPOINTS` | Set `1` to allow HTTP for loopback during dev / 设为 `1` 允许回环地址 HTTP，仅用于开发调试 |
 | `DWS_DISABLE_KEYCHAIN` | macOS only. Set `1` to skip system Keychain for the encryption key and use file-based storage (same scheme as Linux). For sandboxed runtimes (e.g. Codex App) that block Keychain APIs. Weakens at-rest protection — DEK and ciphertext live in the same directory. / 仅 macOS。设为 `1` 时跳过系统 Keychain，密钥以文件形式存储（与 Linux 一致）。用于 Keychain API 被拦截的沙盒环境（如 Codex App）。代价是 DEK 与密文同目录，保护强度低于默认方案 |
 
+### Agent Version and Extended Context / Agent 版本与扩展上下文
+
+`DWS_AGENT_VER` and `DWS_AGENT_EXT` are sent only on the CLI's ordinary,
+non-plugin MCP requests. They do not change the standard HTTP `User-Agent` or
+the separate `X-Cli-Version` that identifies the DWS CLI version, and they are
+not forwarded to A2A, OAuth, Discovery, or third-party plugin requests.
+
+`DWS_AGENT_EXT` is one JSON-object Header rather than a set of Headers. The
+recommended keys are `umt`, `miniwua`, and `ua`, but the open-source CLI keeps
+the object extensible and does not enforce a key allowlist. For example, using
+fictional, redacted values:
+
+```bash
+DWS_AGENT_VER=0.1.5
+DWS_AGENT_EXT='{"umt":"example-redacted","miniwua":"example-redacted","ua":"ExampleAgent/0.1.5"}'
+```
+
+The shell's outer single quotes group the JSON and are not part of the
+environment-variable value. The CLI trims surrounding ASCII spaces/tabs,
+omits either Header when its value is empty, and compacts EXT to a single-line
+JSON object. A representative current payload is about 657 bytes, well below
+the 8 KiB limit; integrations must still enforce the limit because values can
+grow. EXT may contain sensitive device or runtime signals: the CLI masks it in
+configuration and logs, and removes it on a cross-host redirect.
+
+Both values are declared by the caller and are therefore forgeable. They can
+support compatibility checks, diagnostics, and observability, but they are not
+credentials or attestations and must never be sufficient on their own to
+authenticate a caller or authorize access.
+
+`DWS_AGENT_VER` 与 `DWS_AGENT_EXT` 仅随 CLI 发起的普通非插件 MCP 请求发送，不会
+改变标准 HTTP `User-Agent`，也不会覆盖标识 DWS CLI 自身版本的 `X-Cli-Version`；
+二者不会进入 A2A、OAuth、Discovery 或第三方插件请求。EXT 使用单个 JSON 对象
+请求头，不拆成多个子请求头；推荐键为 `umt`、`miniwua`、`ua`，但开源 CLI 不限制
+扩展键。Shell 示例中的外层单引号只用于保护 JSON，不属于环境变量值。当前典型负载
+约为 657 字节，远低于 8 KiB 上限，但集成方仍须遵守大小限制。EXT 可能包含敏感的
+设备或运行时信号，配置展示和日志会对其脱敏，跨主机重定向时也会移除该请求头。
+
+这两个值都由调用方自行声明，可以被伪造；它们可用于兼容性判断、诊断和可观测性，
+但不是凭据或可信证明，不能单独用于身份认证或访问授权。
+
 ### Agent Product, Host, and `claw-type` / Agent 产品、运行形态与 `claw-type`
 
 `DWS_AGENT_PRODUCT` and `DWS_AGENT_HOST` are caller-declared observation

internal/app/agent_host_test.go

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func TestResolveIdentityHeadersOmitsAbsentOrInvalidAgentHost(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRootRejectsInvalidAgentHostBeforeEditionHook(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRootRejectsInvalidAgentHostBeforeEditionHook(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
 	const invalidValue = "DO_NOT_ECHO"
 	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentHost, invalidValue)

internal/app/agent_metadata.go

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package app
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	apperrors "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/errors"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/executor"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/transport"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/configmeta"
+)
+
+const (
+	envDWSAgentVersion     = "DWS_AGENT_VER"
+	envDWSAgentExt         = "DWS_AGENT_EXT"
+	maxAgentVersionBytes   = 64
+	maxAgentExtensionBytes = 8 * 1024
+)
+
+var agentVersionPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]*$`)
+
+type agentMetadataSnapshot struct {
+	version    string
+	ext        string
+	versionErr error
+	extErr     error
+}
+
+type agentMetadataSnapshotContextKey struct{}
+
+func (snapshot agentMetadataSnapshot) validationError() error {
+	if snapshot.versionErr != nil {
+		return snapshot.versionErr
+	}
+	return snapshot.extErr
+}
+
+func contextWithAgentMetadataSnapshot(ctx context.Context, snapshot agentMetadataSnapshot) context.Context {
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, agentMetadataSnapshotContextKey{}, snapshot)
+}
+
+func agentMetadataSnapshotFromContext(ctx context.Context) (agentMetadataSnapshot, bool) {
+	if ctx == nil {
+		return agentMetadataSnapshot{}, false
+	}
+	snapshot, ok := ctx.Value(agentMetadataSnapshotContextKey{}).(agentMetadataSnapshot)
+	return snapshot, ok
+}
+
+func init() {
+	configmeta.Register(configmeta.ConfigItem{
+		Name:        envDWSAgentVersion,
+		Category:    configmeta.CategoryExternal,
+		Description: "调用 DWS 的 Agent 版本；仅作为 x-dws-agent-ver 透传到非插件 MCP 请求",
+		Example:     "1.2.3-beta.1+build.7",
+	})
+	configmeta.Register(configmeta.ConfigItem{
+		Name:        envDWSAgentExt,
+		Category:    configmeta.CategoryExternal,
+		Description: "调用 DWS 的 Agent 扩展上下文 JSON；仅作为 x-dws-agent-ext 透传到非插件 MCP 请求",
+		Example:     `{"umt":"<token>","miniwua":"<token>","ua":"agent/1.0"}`,
+		Sensitive:   true,
+	})
+}
+
+// parseAgentVersion normalizes and validates the caller-declared Agent
+// version. Only surrounding ASCII spaces and tabs are trimmed. An unset or
+// ASCII-whitespace-only value means "do not emit".
+func parseAgentVersion(raw string) (string, error) {
+	value := strings.Trim(raw, " \t")
+	if value == "" {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	if len(value) > maxAgentVersionBytes || !agentVersionPattern.MatchString(value) {
+		return "", invalidAgentVersionError()
+	}
+	return value, nil
+}
+
+// parseAgentExt validates one generic JSON object and returns its compact
+// one-line representation. Raw control characters other than horizontal tab
+// are rejected before JSON parsing; escaped JSON control characters remain
+// valid because they are safe on the HTTP header wire.
+func parseAgentExt(raw string) (string, error) {
+	if len(raw) > maxAgentExtensionBytes || !utf8.ValidString(raw) {
+		return "", invalidAgentExtError()
+	}
+	for _, r := range raw {
+		if unicode.IsControl(r) && r != '\t' {
+			return "", invalidAgentExtError()
+		}
+	}
+
+	value := strings.Trim(raw, " \t")
+	if value == "" {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+
+	var compact bytes.Buffer
+	if err := json.Compact(&compact, []byte(value)); err != nil {
+		return "", invalidAgentExtError()
+	}
+	compactBytes := compact.Bytes()
+	if len(compactBytes) > maxAgentExtensionBytes || len(compactBytes) < 2 || compactBytes[0] != '{' {
+		return "", invalidAgentExtError()
+	}
+	return compact.String(), nil
+}
+
+func invalidAgentVersionError() error {
+	return apperrors.NewValidation(
+		"DWS_AGENT_VER must be at most 64 bytes and match ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._+-]*$",
+		apperrors.WithReason("invalid_agent_version"),
+	)
+}
+
+func invalidAgentExtError() error {
+	return apperrors.NewValidation(
+		"DWS_AGENT_EXT must be a UTF-8 JSON object of at most 8192 bytes without raw control characters",
+		apperrors.WithReason("invalid_agent_ext"),
+	)
+}
+
+// readAgentMetadataSnapshot reads both environment variables from one
+// os.Environ snapshot, then parses them once. Normal CLI execution retains the
+// validated result through the invocation so hooks and transport observe the
+// same pair even in an embedding process that mutates its environment.
+func readAgentMetadataSnapshot() agentMetadataSnapshot {
+	var rawVersion, rawExt string
+	for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
+		key, value, _ := strings.Cut(entry, "=")
+		switch key {
+		case envDWSAgentVersion:
+			rawVersion = value
+		case envDWSAgentExt:
+			rawExt = value
+		}
+	}
+	version, versionErr := parseAgentVersion(rawVersion)
+	ext, extErr := parseAgentExt(rawExt)
+	return agentMetadataSnapshot{
+		version:    version,
+		ext:        ext,
+		versionErr: versionErr,
+		extErr:     extErr,
+	}
+}
+
+// removeAgentMetadataHeaders removes every case variant so edition or
+// credential hooks cannot smuggle MCP-only metadata into shared transports.
+func removeAgentMetadataHeaders(headers map[string]string) {
+	for key := range headers {
+		if strings.EqualFold(key, transport.HeaderAgentVersion) ||
+			strings.EqualFold(key, transport.HeaderAgentExt) {
+			delete(headers, key)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// applyAgentMetadataHeaders applies validated environment values as the final
+// authority for non-plugin MCP requests. Invalid values are omitted on
+// library paths that bypass root validation; normal CLI execution rejects
+// them before hooks or network access.
+func applyAgentMetadataHeaders(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
+	return applyAgentMetadataSnapshot(headers, readAgentMetadataSnapshot())
+}
+
+func applyAgentMetadataSnapshot(headers map[string]string, snapshot agentMetadataSnapshot) map[string]string {
+	removeAgentMetadataHeaders(headers)
+
+	if (snapshot.versionErr != nil || snapshot.version == "") && (snapshot.extErr != nil || snapshot.ext == "") {
+		return headers
+	}
+	if headers == nil {
+		headers = make(map[string]string)
+	}
+	if snapshot.versionErr == nil && snapshot.version != "" {
+		headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion] = snapshot.version
+	}
+	if snapshot.extErr == nil && snapshot.ext != "" {
+		headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt] = snapshot.ext
+	}
+	return headers
+}
+
+// resolveMCPRequestHeaders adds Agent version and extension metadata only to
+// the built-in DingTalk MCP request path. Shared identity consumers (notably
+// A2A) continue to use resolveIdentityHeaders and never receive these fields.
+func resolveMCPRequestHeaders() map[string]string {
+	return resolveMCPRequestHeadersWithSnapshot(readAgentMetadataSnapshot())
+}
+
+func resolveMCPRequestHeadersWithSnapshot(snapshot agentMetadataSnapshot) map[string]string {
+	return applyAgentMetadataSnapshot(resolveIdentityHeaders(), snapshot)
+}
+
+// resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation resolves one immutable Header snapshot
+// for an invocation. The helper-only mcp-meta server performs endpoint
+// discovery rather than an ordinary MCP product call, so caller-declared
+// Agent metadata must not cross that boundary.
+func resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation(invocation executor.Invocation, snapshots ...agentMetadataSnapshot) map[string]string {
+	headers := resolveIdentityHeaders()
+	if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(invocation.CanonicalProduct), mcpMetaServerID) {
+		return headers
+	}
+	snapshot := readAgentMetadataSnapshot()
+	if len(snapshots) > 0 {
+		snapshot = snapshots[0]
+	}
+	return applyAgentMetadataSnapshot(headers, snapshot)
+}
+
+// pluginRequestHeaders returns a private, sanitized copy of plugin-owned
+// Headers. Third-party plugins never receive DWS-owned Agent metadata, even if
+// their manifest tries to declare the reserved Header names itself.
+func pluginRequestHeaders(pluginAuth *PluginAuth) map[string]string {
+	if pluginAuth == nil || len(pluginAuth.ExtraHeaders) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	headers := make(map[string]string, len(pluginAuth.ExtraHeaders))
+	for key, value := range pluginAuth.ExtraHeaders {
+		headers[key] = value
+	}
+	removeAgentMetadataHeaders(headers)
+	if len(headers) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return headers
+}

internal/app/agent_metadata_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,743 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"maps"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/audit"
+	apperrors "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/errors"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/executor"
+	outputpkg "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/output"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/pipeline"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/testseam"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/transport"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/agentproduct"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/configmeta"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/edition"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/mcptypes"
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+)
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageParseAgentVersion(t *testing.T) {
+	var nilContext context.Context
+	if _, ok := agentMetadataSnapshotFromContext(nilContext); ok {
+		t.Fatal("nil context unexpectedly contained Agent metadata")
+	}
+	wantSnapshot := agentMetadataSnapshot{version: "context-version", ext: "{}"}
+	if got, ok := agentMetadataSnapshotFromContext(contextWithAgentMetadataSnapshot(context.Background(), wantSnapshot)); !ok || got != wantSnapshot {
+		t.Fatalf("context Agent metadata = %#v, %v; want %#v", got, ok, wantSnapshot)
+	}
+
+	valid := []struct {
+		name string
+		raw  string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{name: "unset", raw: "", want: ""},
+		{name: "ASCII whitespace only", raw: " \t ", want: ""},
+		{name: "semantic version", raw: "1.2.3", want: "1.2.3"},
+		{name: "pre-release and build", raw: " v1.2.3-rc.1+build_7 ", want: "v1.2.3-rc.1+build_7"},
+		{name: "maximum length", raw: strings.Repeat("a", maxAgentVersionBytes), want: strings.Repeat("a", maxAgentVersionBytes)},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range valid {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := parseAgentVersion(tc.raw)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("parseAgentVersion() error = %v", err)
+			}
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("parseAgentVersion() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	invalid := []struct {
+		name string
+		raw  string
+	}{
+		{name: "leading punctuation", raw: "-1.2.3"},
+		{name: "internal space", raw: "1.2 3"},
+		{name: "slash", raw: "1.2/3"},
+		{name: "line feed", raw: "1.2.3\n"},
+		{name: "carriage return", raw: "1.2.3\r"},
+		{name: "NUL", raw: "1.2\x003"},
+		{name: "Unicode", raw: "版本1"},
+		{name: "too long", raw: strings.Repeat("a", maxAgentVersionBytes+1)},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range invalid {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := parseAgentVersion(tc.raw)
+			if err == nil || got != "" {
+				t.Fatalf("parseAgentVersion(%q) = %q, %v; want validation error", tc.raw, got, err)
+			}
+			assertAgentMetadataValidationError(t, err, "invalid_agent_version", tc.raw)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageParseAgentExt(t *testing.T) {
+	boundary := `{"x":"` + strings.Repeat("a", maxAgentExtensionBytes-8) + `"}`
+	if len(boundary) != maxAgentExtensionBytes {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid boundary fixture size: %d", len(boundary))
+	}
+
+	valid := []struct {
+		name string
+		raw  string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{name: "unset", raw: "", want: ""},
+		{name: "ASCII whitespace only", raw: " \t ", want: ""},
+		{name: "empty object", raw: "{}", want: "{}"},
+		{name: "compact generic object", raw: " \t{ \"umt\": \"masked\",\t \"nested\": { \"ok\": true }, \"unknown\": [1, 2] }\t ", want: `{"umt":"masked","nested":{"ok":true},"unknown":[1,2]}`},
+		{name: "Unicode value", raw: `{"ua":"千问办公/1.0"}`, want: `{"ua":"千问办公/1.0"}`},
+		{name: "escaped control remains safe", raw: `{"ua":"line\nnext"}`, want: `{"ua":"line\nnext"}`},
+		{name: "maximum length", raw: boundary, want: boundary},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range valid {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := parseAgentExt(tc.raw)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("parseAgentExt() error = %v", err)
+			}
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("parseAgentExt() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	invalidUTF8 := string([]byte{'{', '"', 'x', '"', ':', '"', 0xff, '"', '}'})
+	invalid := []struct {
+		name string
+		raw  string
+	}{
+		{name: "too long raw input", raw: strings.Repeat(" ", maxAgentExtensionBytes+1)},
+		{name: "invalid UTF-8", raw: invalidUTF8},
+		{name: "array", raw: `[]`},
+		{name: "string", raw: `"value"`},
+		{name: "number", raw: `1`},
+		{name: "boolean", raw: `true`},
+		{name: "null", raw: `null`},
+		{name: "malformed object", raw: `{"secret":"DO_NOT_ECHO"`},
+		{name: "trailing value", raw: `{} {}`},
+		{name: "line feed", raw: "{\n}"},
+		{name: "carriage return", raw: "{\r}"},
+		{name: "NUL", raw: "{\x00}"},
+		{name: "vertical tab", raw: "{\v}"},
+		{name: "form feed", raw: "{\f}"},
+		{name: "DEL", raw: "{\x7f}"},
+		{name: "C1 control", raw: "{\u0085}"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range invalid {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := parseAgentExt(tc.raw)
+			if err == nil || got != "" {
+				t.Fatalf("parseAgentExt() = %q, %v; want validation error", got, err)
+			}
+			assertAgentMetadataValidationError(t, err, "invalid_agent_ext", tc.raw)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func assertAgentMetadataValidationError(t *testing.T, err error, reason, raw string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var appErr *apperrors.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &appErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want *errors.Error", err)
+	}
+	if appErr.Category != apperrors.CategoryValidation || appErr.Reason != reason {
+		t.Fatalf("error = category %q reason %q, want validation/%s", appErr.Category, appErr.Reason, reason)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(raw, "DO_NOT_ECHO") && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "DO_NOT_ECHO") {
+		t.Fatalf("error must not echo invalid value: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageAgentMetadataConfigRegistrationAndMasking(t *testing.T) {
+	items := configmeta.All()
+	var versionItem, extItem *configmeta.ConfigItem
+	for i := range items {
+		switch items[i].Name {
+		case envDWSAgentVersion:
+			versionItem = &items[i]
+		case envDWSAgentExt:
+			extItem = &items[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if versionItem == nil || extItem == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Agent metadata config registration missing: version=%v ext=%v", versionItem != nil, extItem != nil)
+	}
+	if versionItem.Category != configmeta.CategoryExternal || versionItem.Sensitive {
+		t.Fatalf("version config metadata = %#v", *versionItem)
+	}
+	if extItem.Category != configmeta.CategoryExternal || !extItem.Sensitive {
+		t.Fatalf("extension config metadata = %#v", *extItem)
+	}
+
+	const canary = `{"umt":"SENSITIVE_CANARY"}`
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, canary)
+	got, ok := configmeta.Resolve(envDWSAgentExt)
+	if !ok || got == "" || strings.Contains(got, "SENSITIVE_CANARY") || got == canary {
+		t.Fatalf("sensitive extension was not masked: value=%q ok=%v", got, ok)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "9.8.7")
+	command := newConfigListCommand()
+	var output strings.Builder
+	command.SetOut(&output)
+	command.SetArgs([]string{"--category", string(configmeta.CategoryExternal), "--show-values", "--json"})
+	if err := command.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("config list failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	rawOutput := output.String()
+	if !json.Valid([]byte(rawOutput)) {
+		t.Fatalf("config list emitted invalid JSON: %q", rawOutput)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(rawOutput, envDWSAgentVersion) || !strings.Contains(rawOutput, envDWSAgentExt) {
+		t.Fatalf("config list omitted Agent metadata variables: %s", rawOutput)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(rawOutput, "SENSITIVE_CANARY") || strings.Contains(rawOutput, canary) {
+		t.Fatalf("config list leaked Agent extension: %s", rawOutput)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageResolveMCPRequestHeadersScopesAndFinalizesAgentMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentHost, "")
+	t.Setenv(agentproduct.EnvName, "")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, " 1.2.3-rc.1 ")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, " { \"umt\": \"masked\", \"unknown\": true } ")
+
+	oldEdition := edition.Get()
+	t.Cleanup(func() { edition.Override(oldEdition) })
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{
+		MergeHeaders: func(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
+			headers["X-Dws-Agent-Ver"] = "merge-must-not-win"
+			headers["X-Dws-Agent-Ext"] = `{"source":"merge"}`
+			return headers
+		},
+		EnterpriseCredentialHeaders: func(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
+			headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion] = "credential-must-not-win"
+			headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt] = `{"source":"credential"}`
+			return headers
+		},
+	})
+
+	for name, headers := range map[string]map[string]string{
+		"shared identity": resolveIdentityHeaders(),
+		"A2A export":      MCPIdentityHeaders(),
+	} {
+		if hasHeaderFold(headers, transport.HeaderAgentVersion) || hasHeaderFold(headers, transport.HeaderAgentExt) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s leaked MCP-only metadata: %#v", name, headers)
+		}
+	}
+
+	headers := resolveMCPRequestHeaders()
+	if got := headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion]; got != "1.2.3-rc.1" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want 1.2.3-rc.1", transport.HeaderAgentVersion, got)
+	}
+	if got := headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt]; got != `{"umt":"masked","unknown":true}` {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q", transport.HeaderAgentExt, got)
+	}
+	if got := headers[transport.HeaderVersion]; got != version {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want CLI version %q", transport.HeaderVersion, got, version)
+	}
+	if _, ok := headers["User-Agent"]; ok {
+		t.Fatal("Agent extension must not create or replace the standard User-Agent header")
+	}
+	for _, key := range []string{"umt", "miniwua", "ua", "x-dws-agent-umt", "x-dws-agent-miniwua", "x-dws-agent-ua"} {
+		if hasHeaderFold(headers, key) {
+			t.Fatalf("Agent extension was split into an extra header %q: %#v", key, headers)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Library paths are best-effort: one invalid value is omitted without
+	// suppressing the other valid field or preserving hook-injected values.
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, `{"secret":"DO_NOT_ECHO"`)
+	headers = resolveMCPRequestHeaders()
+	if got := headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion]; got != "1.2.3-rc.1" {
+		t.Fatalf("valid version was suppressed: %q", got)
+	}
+	if hasHeaderFold(headers, transport.HeaderAgentExt) {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid extension or hook value leaked: %#v", headers)
+	}
+
+	// Exercise the nil-map and empty-input library paths. An absent environment
+	// must not allocate a map, while an EXT-only value must allocate one and
+	// remain a single compact Header.
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, "")
+	if got := applyAgentMetadataHeaders(nil); got != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("empty metadata allocated headers: %#v", got)
+	}
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, " { } ")
+	headers = applyAgentMetadataHeaders(nil)
+	if got := headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt]; got != "{}" {
+		t.Fatalf("EXT-only metadata = %q, want {}", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRootRejectsInvalidAgentMetadataBeforeEditionHook(t *testing.T) {
+	oldEdition := edition.Get()
+	t.Cleanup(func() { edition.Override(oldEdition) })
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		env    string
+		value  string
+		reason string
+	}{
+		{name: "version", env: envDWSAgentVersion, value: "DO_NOT ECHO", reason: "invalid_agent_version"},
+		{name: "extension", env: envDWSAgentExt, value: `{"secret":"DO_NOT_ECHO"`, reason: "invalid_agent_ext"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+			t.Setenv(envDWSAgentHost, "")
+			t.Setenv(agentproduct.EnvName, "")
+			t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "")
+			t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, "")
+			t.Setenv(tc.env, tc.value)
+
+			headerHookCalled := false
+			afterHookCalled := false
+			edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{
+				MergeHeaders: func(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
+					headerHookCalled = true
+					return headers
+				},
+				EnterpriseCredentialHeaders: func(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
+					headerHookCalled = true
+					return headers
+				},
+				AfterPersistentPreRun: func(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+					afterHookCalled = true
+					return nil
+				},
+			})
+
+			root := NewRootCommand()
+			root.SetOut(io.Discard)
+			root.SetErr(io.Discard)
+			root.SetArgs([]string{"version"})
+			err := root.Execute()
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("root command accepted invalid %s", tc.env)
+			}
+			if headerHookCalled || afterHookCalled {
+				t.Fatalf("edition hook ran before %s validation", tc.env)
+			}
+			assertAgentMetadataValidationError(t, err, tc.reason, tc.value)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageAgentMetadataProcessEntryValidationPrecedesRootConstruction(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		args []string
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{name: "default JSON", args: []string{"version"}, want: true},
+		{name: "long JSON", args: []string{"version", "--format", "JSON"}, want: true},
+		{name: "long table", args: []string{"--format=table", "version"}, want: false},
+		{name: "short attached JSON", args: []string{"version", "-fjson"}, want: true},
+		{name: "short table", args: []string{"version", "-f", "table"}, want: false},
+		{name: "last wins", args: []string{"--format", "table", "version", "-f=json"}, want: true},
+		{name: "terminator", args: []string{"version", "--format", "table", "--", "--format", "json"}, want: false},
+		{name: "missing value", args: []string{"version", "--format"}, want: false},
+	} {
+		t.Run("presentation/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if got := processArgsRequestJSON(tc.args); got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("processArgsRequestJSON(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.args, got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentHost, "")
+	t.Setenv(agentproduct.EnvName, "")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "")
+	sensitiveRaw := "{\"umt\":\"must-not-leak\"}\n"
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, sensitiveRaw)
+	oldEdition := edition.Get()
+	t.Cleanup(func() { edition.Override(oldEdition) })
+	extensionHookCalls := 0
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{
+		Name: "presentation-test",
+		RegisterExtraCommands: func(*cobra.Command, edition.ToolCaller) {
+			extensionHookCalls++
+		},
+		VisibleProducts: func() []string {
+			extensionHookCalls++
+			return nil
+		},
+		StaticServers: func() []edition.ServerInfo {
+			extensionHookCalls++
+			return nil
+		},
+	})
+
+	oldArgs := os.Args
+	os.Args = []string{"dws", "version"}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { os.Args = oldArgs })
+
+	rootConstructed := false
+	preParseCalled := false
+	testseam.Swap(t, &rootNewRootCommandWithEngine, func(context.Context, *pipeline.Engine) *cobra.Command {
+		rootConstructed = true
+		return &cobra.Command{Use: "dws"}
+	})
+	testseam.Swap(t, &rootRunPreParse, func(*cobra.Command, *pipeline.Engine) error {
+		preParseCalled = true
+		return nil
+	})
+
+	stderrFile, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "agent-metadata-stderr-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	oldStderr := os.Stderr
+	os.Stderr = stderrFile
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		os.Stderr = oldStderr
+		_ = stderrFile.Close()
+	})
+
+	if code := Execute(); code == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("process entry accepted invalid Agent metadata")
+	}
+	if rootConstructed || preParseCalled {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid Agent metadata reached root hooks: constructed=%v preParse=%v", rootConstructed, preParseCalled)
+	}
+	if extensionHookCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid Agent metadata executed %d extension hooks", extensionHookCalls)
+	}
+	if err := stderrFile.Sync(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sync stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	stderrOutput, err := os.ReadFile(stderrFile.Name())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(stderrOutput), "must-not-leak") || strings.Contains(string(stderrOutput), sensitiveRaw) {
+		t.Fatalf("process validation error leaked raw EXT: %q", stderrOutput)
+	}
+	if !json.Valid(stderrOutput) || !strings.Contains(string(stderrOutput), `"reason": "invalid_agent_ext"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("default JSON error presentation = %q", stderrOutput)
+	}
+
+	stdoutFile, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "agent-metadata-stdout-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create stdout capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	oldStdout := os.Stdout
+	os.Stdout = stdoutFile
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		os.Stdout = oldStdout
+		_ = stdoutFile.Close()
+	})
+	emitEarlyAgentMetadataValidationError(invalidAgentExtError(), []string{"drive", "+list", "--format", "json"})
+	if err := stdoutFile.Sync(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sync stdout capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	unifiedOutput, err := os.ReadFile(stdoutFile.Name())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read stdout capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !json.Valid(unifiedOutput) || !strings.Contains(string(unifiedOutput), `"outcome": "failure"`) ||
+		!strings.Contains(string(unifiedOutput), `"subtype": "invalid_agent_ext"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("unified JSON error presentation = %q", unifiedOutput)
+	}
+	if extensionHookCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("presentation-only root executed %d extension hooks", extensionHookCalls)
+	}
+
+	if err := stderrFile.Truncate(0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("truncate fallback stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := stderrFile.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rewind fallback stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	testseam.Swap(t, &rootEmitResult, func(*cobra.Command, outputpkg.CommandResult) (int, error) {
+		return 0, errors.New("injected result emission failure")
+	})
+	emitEarlyAgentMetadataValidationError(invalidAgentExtError(), []string{"drive", "+list", "--format", "json"})
+	if err := stderrFile.Sync(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sync fallback stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	fallbackOutput, err := os.ReadFile(stderrFile.Name())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read fallback stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !json.Valid(fallbackOutput) || !strings.Contains(string(fallbackOutput), `"reason": "invalid_agent_ext"`) ||
+		strings.Contains(string(fallbackOutput), "must-not-leak") {
+		t.Fatalf("fallback validation error presentation = %q", fallbackOutput)
+	}
+
+	if err := stderrFile.Truncate(0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("truncate stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := stderrFile.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rewind stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	emitEarlyAgentMetadataValidationError(invalidAgentExtError(), []string{"version", "--format", "table"})
+	if err := stderrFile.Sync(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sync human stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	humanOutput, err := os.ReadFile(stderrFile.Name())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read human stderr capture: %v", err)
+	}
+	if json.Valid(humanOutput) || !strings.Contains(string(humanOutput), "DWS_AGENT_EXT") ||
+		strings.Contains(string(humanOutput), "must-not-leak") {
+		t.Fatalf("human validation error presentation = %q", humanOutput)
+	}
+
+	var capturedRunner *runtimeRunner
+	testseam.Swap(t, &rootNewCommandRunnerWithFlags, func(flags *GlobalFlags) executor.Runner {
+		capturedRunner = newCommandRunnerWithFlags(flags).(*runtimeRunner)
+		return capturedRunner
+	})
+	cachedSnapshot := agentMetadataSnapshot{version: "9.8.7", ext: `{"ua":"cached"}`}
+	_ = newRootCommandWithMode(
+		contextWithAgentMetadataSnapshot(context.Background(), cachedSnapshot),
+		nil,
+		false,
+		true,
+		true,
+	)
+	if capturedRunner == nil || capturedRunner.agentMetadata == nil || *capturedRunner.agentMetadata != cachedSnapshot {
+		t.Fatalf("root runner Agent metadata = %#v, want %#v", capturedRunner, cachedSnapshot)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageAgentMetadataExcludedFromServiceDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentHost, "")
+	t.Setenv(agentproduct.EnvName, "")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "3.0.0")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, `{"umt":"test-value"}`)
+
+	headers := resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation(executor.Invocation{
+		CanonicalProduct: mcpMetaServerID,
+		Tool:             mcpMetaURLTool,
+	})
+	if hasHeaderFold(headers, transport.HeaderAgentVersion) || hasHeaderFold(headers, transport.HeaderAgentExt) {
+		t.Fatalf("service-discovery request leaked Agent metadata: %#v", headers)
+	}
+
+	headers = resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation(executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "doc", Tool: "read"})
+	if headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion] != "3.0.0" || headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt] == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("ordinary MCP request omitted Agent metadata: %#v", headers)
+	}
+	cached := agentMetadataSnapshot{version: "3.1.0", ext: "{}"}
+	headers = resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation(executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "doc", Tool: "read"}, cached)
+	if headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion] != "3.1.0" || headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt] != "{}" {
+		t.Fatalf("ordinary MCP request ignored its validated snapshot: %#v", headers)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageAgentMetadataMCPAndPluginScoping(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentHost, "")
+	t.Setenv(agentproduct.EnvName, "")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "2.0.0")
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentExt, `{"ua":"test-agent/2.0"}`)
+
+	oldEdition := edition.Get()
+	t.Cleanup(func() { edition.Override(oldEdition) })
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{})
+
+	pluginAuthMu.Lock()
+	oldPluginRegistry := pluginAuthRegistry
+	pluginAuthRegistry = make(map[string]*PluginAuth)
+	pluginAuthMu.Unlock()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		pluginAuthMu.Lock()
+		pluginAuthRegistry = oldPluginRegistry
+		pluginAuthMu.Unlock()
+	})
+	dynamicMu.Lock()
+	oldDynamicEndpoints := dynamicEndpoints
+	oldDynamicProducts := dynamicProducts
+	oldDynamicAliases := dynamicAliases
+	oldDynamicToolEndpoints := dynamicToolEndpoints
+	dynamicEndpoints = nil
+	dynamicProducts = nil
+	dynamicAliases = nil
+	dynamicToolEndpoints = nil
+	dynamicMu.Unlock()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		dynamicMu.Lock()
+		dynamicEndpoints = oldDynamicEndpoints
+		dynamicProducts = oldDynamicProducts
+		dynamicAliases = oldDynamicAliases
+		dynamicToolEndpoints = oldDynamicToolEndpoints
+		dynamicMu.Unlock()
+	})
+
+	testseam.Swap(t, &runnerPreflightDocDownload, func(*runtimeRunner, context.Context, *transport.Client, string, executor.Invocation) error {
+		return nil
+	})
+	type capturedRequest struct {
+		headers map[string]string
+		token   string
+	}
+	var captured []capturedRequest
+	testseam.Swap(t, &runnerCallTool, func(client *transport.Client, _ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+		copyHeaders := make(map[string]string, len(client.ExtraHeaders))
+		for key, value := range client.ExtraHeaders {
+			copyHeaders[key] = value
+		}
+		captured = append(captured, capturedRequest{headers: copyHeaders, token: client.AuthToken})
+		return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"value": "ok"}}, nil
+	})
+
+	created := newCommandRunnerWithFlags(&GlobalFlags{}).(*runtimeRunner)
+	if hasHeaderFold(created.transport.ExtraHeaders, transport.HeaderAgentVersion) ||
+		hasHeaderFold(created.transport.ExtraHeaders, transport.HeaderAgentExt) {
+		t.Fatalf("new runner resolved Agent metadata before invocation validation: %#v", created.transport.ExtraHeaders)
+	}
+
+	// runSingle must not cache ambient MCP metadata on the shared base transport.
+	// Use mock mode to exercise the path without authentication or network I/O.
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "2.0.1")
+	refreshRunner := &runtimeRunner{
+		transport:   transport.NewClient(nil),
+		globalFlags: &GlobalFlags{Mock: true},
+		auditSink:   audit.NopSink{},
+	}
+	refreshInvocation := executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "refresh", Tool: "tool", Params: map[string]any{}}
+	if _, err := refreshRunner.runSingle(context.Background(), refreshInvocation, false); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mock runSingle failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if hasHeaderFold(refreshRunner.transport.ExtraHeaders, transport.HeaderAgentVersion) {
+		t.Fatalf("runSingle mutated the shared transport Header map: %#v", refreshRunner.transport.ExtraHeaders)
+	}
+	t.Setenv(envDWSAgentVersion, "2.0.0")
+
+	r := &runtimeRunner{
+		transport:   transport.NewClient(nil),
+		globalFlags: &GlobalFlags{Token: "test-token"},
+		auditSink:   audit.NopSink{},
+		agentMetadata: &agentMetadataSnapshot{
+			version: "2.0.0",
+			ext:     `{"ua":"test-agent/2.0"}`,
+		},
+	}
+	builtIn := executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "built-in", Tool: "tool", Params: map[string]any{}}
+	if _, err := r.executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", builtIn); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("built-in invocation failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	pluginDescriptor := mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{
+		Key:      "third-party",
+		Endpoint: "https://plugin.example.test",
+		CLI:      mcptypes.CLIOverlay{ID: "third-party"},
+		AuthHeaders: map[string]string{
+			"X-Plugin":        "yes",
+			"X-Dws-Agent-Ver": "plugin-must-not-forge-version",
+			"X-Dws-Agent-Ext": `{"source":"plugin"}`,
+		},
+	}
+	registerPluginHTTPServer(pluginDescriptor)
+	registeredPlugin, pluginOwned := LookupPluginAuth("third-party")
+	if !pluginOwned || registeredPlugin == nil || registeredPlugin.Token != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("anonymous HTTP plugin ownership = %#v, %v", registeredPlugin, pluginOwned)
+	}
+	registerPluginHTTPServer(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{
+		Key:      "anonymous-empty",
+		Endpoint: "https://anonymous.example.test",
+		CLI:      mcptypes.CLIOverlay{ID: "anonymous-empty"},
+	})
+	if emptyPlugin, owned := LookupPluginAuth("anonymous-empty"); !owned || emptyPlugin == nil || emptyPlugin.Token != "" || len(emptyPlugin.ExtraHeaders) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("headerless HTTP plugin ownership = %#v, %v", emptyPlugin, owned)
+	}
+	originalPluginHeaders := maps.Clone(registeredPlugin.ExtraHeaders)
+	pluginInvocation := executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "third-party", Tool: "tool", Params: map[string]any{}}
+	if _, err := r.executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://plugin.example.test", pluginInvocation); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("plugin invocation failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if len(captured) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("captured %d calls, want 2", len(captured))
+	}
+	if captured[0].headers[transport.HeaderAgentVersion] != "2.0.0" || captured[0].headers[transport.HeaderAgentExt] != `{"ua":"test-agent/2.0"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("built-in MCP metadata = %#v", captured[0].headers)
+	}
+	if hasHeaderFold(captured[1].headers, transport.HeaderAgentVersion) || hasHeaderFold(captured[1].headers, transport.HeaderAgentExt) {
+		t.Fatalf("plugin request leaked Agent metadata: %#v", captured[1].headers)
+	}
+	if got := captured[1].headers["X-Plugin"]; got != "yes" {
+		t.Fatalf("plugin-owned header = %q, want yes", got)
+	}
+	if captured[1].token != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("anonymous plugin unexpectedly received default OAuth token")
+	}
+	if !maps.Equal(registeredPlugin.ExtraHeaders, originalPluginHeaders) {
+		t.Fatalf("plugin Header sanitization mutated registry state: got %#v want %#v", registeredPlugin.ExtraHeaders, originalPluginHeaders)
+	}
+	if got := pluginRequestHeaders(nil); got != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("nil plugin auth produced Headers: %#v", got)
+	}
+	if got := pluginRequestHeaders(&PluginAuth{ExtraHeaders: map[string]string{
+		"X-DWS-AGENT-VER": "forged",
+		"X-DWS-AGENT-EXT": `{"forged":true}`,
+	}}); got != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reserved-only plugin Headers survived sanitization: %#v", got)
+	}
+
+	// Keep the execution-boundary auth guard independently testable: even if a
+	// future token provider returns an empty token without an error, built-in MCP
+	// calls must fail before preflight or transport while anonymous plugins remain
+	// valid above.
+	resolveCalled := false
+	testseam.Swap(t, &runnerResolveAuthToken, func(*runtimeRunner, context.Context) (string, error) {
+		resolveCalled = true
+		return "", nil
+	})
+	callsBefore := len(captured)
+	unauthenticated := &runtimeRunner{
+		transport:   transport.NewClient(nil),
+		globalFlags: &GlobalFlags{},
+		auditSink:   audit.NopSink{},
+	}
+	if _, err := unauthenticated.executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "built-in-unauthenticated", Tool: "tool"}); err == nil || !isAuthError(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("unauthenticated built-in request = %v, want auth error", err)
+	}
+	if !resolveCalled {
+		t.Fatal("unauthenticated request did not exercise the token resolver")
+	}
+	if len(captured) != callsBefore {
+		t.Fatalf("unauthenticated built-in request reached transport: calls %d -> %d", callsBefore, len(captured))
+	}
+}
+
+func hasHeaderFold(headers map[string]string, want string) bool {
+	for key := range headers {
+		if strings.EqualFold(key, want) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}

internal/app/agent_product_test.go

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ func TestApplyAgentProductHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRootRejectsInvalidAgentProductBeforeEditionHook(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRootRejectsInvalidAgentProductBeforeEditionHook(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
 	const invalidValue = "DO_NOT ECHO"
 	t.Setenv(agentproduct.EnvName, invalidValue)

internal/app/auth_registry.go

@@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ package app
 
 import "sync"
 
-// PluginAuth holds authentication credentials for a plugin-owned
-// streamable-http MCP server. Each server is keyed by its canonical
-// product ID (CLI.ID) so that different servers can use independent
-// tokens without interfering with each other or with the default
-// DingTalk OAuth token.
+// PluginAuth marks ownership of a plugin-owned streamable-http MCP server and
+// holds its optional authentication credentials. Every accepted HTTP plugin,
+// including an anonymous one, has a non-nil record keyed by canonical product
+// ID (CLI.ID) so execution never falls back to built-in DingTalk OAuth.
 type PluginAuth struct {
 	// Token is the Bearer token extracted from the plugin's
 	// "Authorization" header (e.g. a third-party API key).
@@ -39,27 +38,25 @@ var (
 	pluginAuthRegistry = make(map[string]*PluginAuth)
 )
 
-// RegisterPluginAuth stores authentication credentials for a plugin
-// server keyed by its canonical product ID. The runner looks up these
-// credentials at execution time to inject the correct Bearer token
-// instead of the default DingTalk OAuth token.
+// RegisterPluginAuth stores ownership and optional authentication credentials
+// for a plugin server keyed by its canonical product ID.
 func RegisterPluginAuth(productID string, auth *PluginAuth) {
 	pluginAuthMu.Lock()
 	defer pluginAuthMu.Unlock()
 	pluginAuthRegistry[productID] = auth
 }
 
-// ClearPluginAuth removes credentials for a plugin product. Registration uses
-// this before applying an accepted descriptor so a descriptor without custom
-// auth cannot inherit stale credentials from an earlier root construction.
+// ClearPluginAuth removes the ownership and credential record for a plugin
+// product.
 func ClearPluginAuth(productID string) {
 	pluginAuthMu.Lock()
 	defer pluginAuthMu.Unlock()
 	delete(pluginAuthRegistry, productID)
 }
 
-// LookupPluginAuth returns the authentication credentials registered
-// for the given product ID, or nil if none exists.
+// LookupPluginAuth returns plugin ownership and optional authentication
+// credentials for the product ID. The bool denotes ownership, not whether a
+// Bearer token is present.
 func LookupPluginAuth(productID string) (*PluginAuth, bool) {
 	pluginAuthMu.RLock()
 	defer pluginAuthMu.RUnlock()

internal/app/coverage_more_test.go

@@ -61,11 +61,16 @@ func appRPCServer(t *testing.T, initOK, listOK bool) *httptest.Server {
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePluginAuthCoverage(t *testing.T) {
-	registerPluginAuthFromHeaders(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{Key: "fallback", Endpoint: "%", AuthHeaders: map[string]string{"Authorization": "token"}})
-	registerPluginAuthFromHeaders(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{Key: "server", Endpoint: "https://x.test", CLI: mcptypes.CLIOverlay{ID: "cli"}, AuthHeaders: map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer token", "X": "Y"}})
-	registerPluginAuthFromHeaders(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{Key: "none"})
-	if got, ok := LookupPluginAuth("cli"); !ok || got == nil || got.Token != "token" {
-		t.Fatalf("registered plugin auth = %#v, %v", got, ok)
+	fallback := pluginAuthFromServerDescriptor(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{Key: "fallback", Endpoint: "%", AuthHeaders: map[string]string{"Authorization": "token"}})
+	if fallback == nil || fallback.Token != "token" || len(fallback.TrustedDomains) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("fallback plugin auth = %#v", fallback)
+	}
+	got := pluginAuthFromServerDescriptor(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{Key: "server", Endpoint: "https://x.test", CLI: mcptypes.CLIOverlay{ID: "cli"}, AuthHeaders: map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer token", "X": "Y"}})
+	if got == nil || got.Token != "token" || got.ExtraHeaders["X"] != "Y" || len(got.TrustedDomains) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("plugin auth = %#v", got)
+	}
+	if anonymous := pluginAuthFromServerDescriptor(mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{Key: "none"}); anonymous == nil || anonymous.Token != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("anonymous plugin ownership = %#v", anonymous)
 	}
 }
 

internal/app/identity_export.go

@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@
 
 package app
 
-// MCPIdentityHeaders returns the same header map used for MCP HTTP requests
-// (agent identity, env trace headers, edition MergeHeaders). Intended for
-// non-MCP transports such as the A2A gateway client.
+// MCPIdentityHeaders returns the shared identity header map used by non-MCP
+// transports such as the A2A gateway client. MCP-only Agent version and
+// extension metadata are intentionally excluded.
 func MCPIdentityHeaders() map[string]string {
 	return resolveIdentityHeaders()
 }

internal/app/root.go

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ var (
 	rootPluginSyncSkills            = plugin.SyncSkills
 	rootAuthLoadTokenData           = authpkg.LoadTokenData
 	rootNewCommandRunnerWithFlags   = newCommandRunnerWithFlags
+	rootEmitResult                  = output.EmitResult
 )
 
 // Execute runs the root command and returns the process exit code.
@@ -136,6 +137,16 @@ func Execute() (exitCode int) {
 	restoreArgs := rootNormalizeProcessProfileArgs()
 	defer restoreArgs()
 
+	// Validate MCP Agent metadata before constructing the command tree.
+	// Construction may invoke edition registration/static-server hooks and load
+	// plugin PreParse handlers, so PersistentPreRunE alone is too late for the
+	// process entry point. Retain this exact pair for the eventual invocation.
+	agentMetadata := readAgentMetadataSnapshot()
+	if err := agentMetadata.validationError(); err != nil {
+		emitEarlyAgentMetadataValidationError(err, os.Args[1:])
+		return apperrors.ExitCode(err)
+	}
+
 	timing := NewTimingCollector()
 	defer func() {
 		rootStopAllStdioClients() // Ensure child processes are terminated on exit
@@ -147,6 +158,7 @@ func Execute() (exitCode int) {
 
 	// Attach timing collector to context for use by child components
 	ctx := WithTimingCollector(context.Background(), timing)
+	ctx = contextWithAgentMetadataSnapshot(ctx, agentMetadata)
 	ctx, resultStore = output.WithResultStore(ctx)
 	var signalState *processSignalState
 	var stopSignals func()
@@ -260,6 +272,70 @@ func Execute() (exitCode int) {
 	return 0
 }
 
+// emitEarlyAgentMetadataValidationError preserves each built-in command's
+// legacy-vs-unified output contract without running extension hooks. The
+// presentation-only tree contains reviewed open-source commands and flags but
+// deliberately omits edition registration, plugin loading, and visibility
+// hooks; callers therefore still fail before any external hook executes.
+func emitEarlyAgentMetadataValidationError(err error, args []string) {
+	format := processArgsFormat(args)
+	presentationRoot := newRootPresentationCommand()
+	_ = presentationRoot.PersistentFlags().Set("format", format)
+	if target, _, findErr := presentationRoot.Find(args); findErr == nil && target != nil && output.UsesUnifiedResult(target) {
+		target.SetOut(os.Stdout)
+		target.SetErr(os.Stderr)
+		result := output.FailureWithExitCode(errorInfoFromExecutionError(err), apperrors.ExitCode(err))
+		if _, emitErr := rootEmitResult(target, result); emitErr == nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(format), "json") {
+		_ = apperrors.PrintJSON(os.Stderr, err)
+		return
+	}
+	_ = apperrors.PrintHumanAt(os.Stderr, err, apperrors.VerbosityNormal)
+}
+
+// processArgsRequestJSON preserves the CLI's machine-readable error contract
+// for validation that must occur before Cobra and its presentation flags exist.
+// The global format defaults to JSON; an explicit non-JSON format switches to
+// the human diagnostic path. Last occurrence wins, matching pflag semantics.
+func processArgsRequestJSON(args []string) bool {
+	return strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(processArgsFormat(args)), "json")
+}
+
+func processArgsFormat(args []string) string {
+	format := "json"
+	for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
+		arg := args[index]
+		if arg == "--" {
+			break
+		}
+		if value, ok := strings.CutPrefix(arg, "--format="); ok {
+			format = value
+			continue
+		}
+		if value, ok := strings.CutPrefix(arg, "-f="); ok {
+			format = value
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-f") && len(arg) > len("-f") {
+			format = strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "-f")
+			continue
+		}
+		if arg != "--format" && arg != "-f" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if index+1 >= len(args) {
+			format = ""
+			break
+		}
+		index++
+		format = args[index]
+	}
+	return format
+}
+
 // errorInfoFromExecutionError projects the repository error model into the unified
 // failure body. Exit code and category are derived from the same error value,
 // preventing the wire and process status from drifting apart.
@@ -633,12 +709,25 @@ func NewRootCommandWithEngine(rootCtx context.Context, engine *pipeline.Engine)
 }
 
 func newRootCommandWithEngine(rootCtx context.Context, engine *pipeline.Engine, loadRuntimeExtensions bool, declarationOnly bool) *cobra.Command {
+	return newRootCommandWithMode(rootCtx, engine, loadRuntimeExtensions, declarationOnly, false)
+}
+
+func newRootPresentationCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	return newRootCommandWithMode(context.Background(), nil, false, true, true)
+}
+
+func newRootCommandWithMode(rootCtx context.Context, engine *pipeline.Engine, loadRuntimeExtensions bool, declarationOnly bool, presentationOnly bool) *cobra.Command {
 	if rootCtx == nil {
 		rootCtx = context.Background()
 	}
 	flags := &GlobalFlags{}
 	authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile(preparseProfileFlag(os.Args[1:]))
 	runner := rootNewCommandRunnerWithFlags(flags)
+	if snapshot, ok := agentMetadataSnapshotFromContext(rootCtx); ok {
+		if runtime, ok := runner.(*runtimeRunner); ok {
+			runtime.agentMetadata = &snapshot
+		}
+	}
 
 	root := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:               "dws",
@@ -672,15 +761,29 @@ func newRootCommandWithEngine(rootCtx context.Context, engine *pipeline.Engine,
 			// --output sink instead opens at Run entry (after Cobra's own
 			// validation), so validation failures still cannot strand a
 			// temporary file.
-			// Validate caller-provided identity labels before any edition hook
-			// or command network activity can run. Header-only library callers
-			// use the best-effort path in resolveIdentityHeaders instead.
+			// Validate caller-provided identity and MCP metadata before command
+			// execution hooks or network activity. The process entry point additionally
+			// validates Agent metadata before command-tree construction; direct Cobra
+			// embedding retains this execution-boundary guard.
 			if _, err := parseAgentHost(os.Getenv(envDWSAgentHost)); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 			if _, err := parseAgentProduct(os.Getenv(agentproduct.EnvName)); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
+			agentMetadata, cached := agentMetadataSnapshotFromContext(cmd.Context())
+			if !cached {
+				agentMetadata = readAgentMetadataSnapshot()
+			}
+			if err := agentMetadata.validationError(); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if runtime, ok := runner.(*runtimeRunner); ok {
+				// Retain the exact validated pair for this command execution so a
+				// concurrently mutating embedding environment cannot change what is
+				// later applied after edition and credential hooks.
+				runtime.agentMetadata = &agentMetadata
+			}
 			if shouldDetectNestedSkillLayout(cmd) {
 				if found, err := detectNestedMultiSkillLayout(); err == nil && found {
 					fmt.Fprintln(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "⚠️  检测到旧升级器留下的嵌套 Skill；请运行 dws skill setup --mode multi 查看迁移计划并确认")
@@ -777,10 +880,12 @@ func newRootCommandWithEngine(rootCtx context.Context, engine *pipeline.Engine,
 	// PAT authorization commands (open-source core)
 	pat.RegisterCommands(root, patCaller)
 
-	if fn := edition.Get().RegisterExtraCommands; fn != nil {
-		caller := newToolCallerAdapter(runner, flags)
-		fn(root, caller)
-		deduplicateCommands(root)
+	if !presentationOnly {
+		if fn := edition.Get().RegisterExtraCommands; fn != nil {
+			caller := newToolCallerAdapter(runner, flags)
+			fn(root, caller)
+			deduplicateCommands(root)
+		}
 	}
 	if loadRuntimeExtensions {
 		// Resolve plugins only after the complete distribution command tree is
@@ -791,7 +896,9 @@ func newRootCommandWithEngine(rootCtx context.Context, engine *pipeline.Engine,
 			addPluginCommandsSafe(root, pluginCmds)
 		}
 	}
-	hideNonDirectRuntimeCommands(root)
+	if !presentationOnly {
+		hideNonDirectRuntimeCommands(root)
+	}
 	configureRootHelp(root)
 	// Set custom flag error handler for better UX
 	root.SetFlagErrorFunc(flagErrorWithSuggestions)
@@ -1755,17 +1862,16 @@ func distributionRootOwns(root *cobra.Command, name string) bool {
 func registerPluginHTTPServer(srv mcptypes.ServerDescriptor) {
 	AppendDynamicServer(srv)
 	productID := firstNonEmptyPluginString(srv.CLI.ID, srv.Key)
-	ClearPluginAuth(productID)
-	if len(srv.AuthHeaders) > 0 {
-		registerPluginAuthFromHeaders(srv)
-	}
+	// Register ownership for every accepted HTTP plugin, including anonymous
+	// plugins. Execution must never fall back to the built-in DingTalk OAuth or
+	// Agent-metadata path merely because a plugin has no Authorization Header.
+	RegisterPluginAuth(productID, pluginAuthFromServerDescriptor(srv))
 }
 
-// registerPluginAuthFromHeaders extracts authentication credentials from
-// a server descriptor's AuthHeaders and registers them in the global
-// PluginAuth registry. The runner uses this registry at execution time
-// to inject the correct Bearer token for third-party MCP servers.
-func registerPluginAuthFromHeaders(srv mcptypes.ServerDescriptor) {
+// pluginAuthFromServerDescriptor extracts plugin-owned credentials and custom
+// Headers. A non-nil result also acts as the HTTP plugin ownership marker for
+// anonymous plugins.
+func pluginAuthFromServerDescriptor(srv mcptypes.ServerDescriptor) *PluginAuth {
 	authToken := ""
 	extraHeaders := make(map[string]string)
 	for key, value := range srv.AuthHeaders {
@@ -1776,20 +1882,18 @@ func registerPluginAuthFromHeaders(srv mcptypes.ServerDescriptor) {
 			extraHeaders[key] = value
 		}
 	}
-	if authToken == "" {
-		return
-	}
 	var trustedDomains []string
 	if parsed, err := url.Parse(srv.Endpoint); err == nil {
 		host := parsed.Hostname()
-		trustedDomains = []string{host, "*." + host}
+		if host != "" {
+			trustedDomains = []string{host, "*." + host}
+		}
 	}
-	productID := firstNonEmptyPluginString(srv.CLI.ID, srv.Key)
-	RegisterPluginAuth(productID, &PluginAuth{
+	return &PluginAuth{
 		Token:          authToken,
 		ExtraHeaders:   extraHeaders,
 		TrustedDomains: trustedDomains,
-	})
+	}
 }
 
 // newPipelineEngine creates and configures the pipeline engine with

internal/app/runner.go

@@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ func newCommandRunnerWithFlags(flags *GlobalFlags) executor.Runner {
 		httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: time.Duration(flags.Timeout) * time.Second}
 	}
 	transportClient := transport.NewClient(httpClient)
-	transportClient.ExtraHeaders = resolveIdentityHeaders()
 	transportClient.FileLogger = FileLoggerInstance()
 	return &runtimeRunner{
 		transport:          transportClient,
@@ -156,12 +155,14 @@ type runtimeRunner struct {
 	enforceContentScan bool
 	includeScanReport  bool
 	auditSink          audit.Sink
+	agentMetadata      *agentMetadataSnapshot
 }
 
 var (
 	runnerResolveMultiProfileSelections = resolveMultiProfileSelections
 	runnerResolveProfile                = authpkg.ResolveProfile
 	runnerGetCachedRuntimeToken         = getCachedRuntimeToken
+	runnerResolveAuthToken              = (*runtimeRunner).resolveAuthToken
 	runnerPreflightDocDownload          = (*runtimeRunner).preflightDocDownload
 	runnerCallTool                      = (*transport.Client).CallTool
 	runnerStdioEnsureInitialized        = (*transport.StdioClient).EnsureInitialized
@@ -237,7 +238,6 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) runSingle(ctx context.Context, invocation executor.Invoc
 	if r.transport == nil {
 		return r.fallback.Run(ctx, invocation)
 	}
-	r.transport.ExtraHeaders = resolveIdentityHeaders()
 
 	// Mock mode: skip endpoint resolution, use a placeholder endpoint.
 	if r.globalFlags != nil && r.globalFlags.Mock {
@@ -543,9 +543,9 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 		emitAudit(auditSink, execID, invokeStart, invocation, endpoint, retErr, version)
 	}()
 
-	// Check if this product has plugin-level auth credentials registered.
-	// If so, use the plugin's token instead of the default DingTalk OAuth token.
-	// This allows third-party MCP servers (e.g. Bailian) to use their own API keys.
+	// Check whether this product belongs to an HTTP plugin. Every accepted
+	// plugin has an ownership record; credentials within that record are
+	// optional. Plugin requests never fall back to the default DingTalk OAuth.
 	pluginAuth, hasPluginAuth := LookupPluginAuth(invocation.CanonicalProduct)
 
 	authToken := ""
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 		authToken = pluginAuth.Token
 	} else if !invocation.DryRun && (r.globalFlags == nil || !r.globalFlags.Mock) {
 		var tokenErr error
-		authToken, tokenErr = r.resolveAuthToken(ctx)
+		authToken, tokenErr = runnerResolveAuthToken(r, ctx)
 		if tokenErr != nil {
 			return executor.Result{}, tokenResolutionError(tokenErr)
 		}
@@ -603,9 +603,10 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 		}, nil
 	}
 
-	// Fail-fast: reject unauthenticated requests before making network calls.
-	// This provides a clear error message instead of cryptic HTTP 400 from MCP.
-	if strings.TrimSpace(authToken) == "" {
+	// Preserve a final execution-boundary guard even though the built-in token
+	// resolver normally returns either a non-empty token or an error. HTTP
+	// plugins are ownership-scoped separately and may intentionally be anonymous.
+	if !hasPluginAuth && strings.TrimSpace(authToken) == "" {
 		return executor.Result{}, apperrors.NewAuth(
 			"未登录，请先执行 dws auth login",
 			apperrors.WithReason("not_authenticated"),
@@ -616,12 +617,20 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 
 	var tc *transport.Client
 	if hasPluginAuth {
-		// Use plugin-level auth: inject the plugin's token and trust its domains.
-		tc = r.transport.WithAuth(authToken, pluginAuth.ExtraHeaders)
+		// Plugin ownership is authoritative even when the plugin is anonymous.
+		// Copy and sanitize manifest headers so plugins cannot opt themselves into
+		// DWS-owned Agent metadata by declaring the reserved names directly.
+		tc = r.transport.WithAuth(authToken, pluginRequestHeaders(pluginAuth))
 		tc.TrustedDomains = pluginAuth.TrustedDomains
 	} else {
-		// Default path: use DingTalk OAuth token with identity headers.
-		tc = r.transport.WithAuth(authToken, resolveIdentityHeaders())
+		// Default path: use DingTalk OAuth token with identity headers. Agent
+		// metadata is resolved exactly once per invocation and is excluded from
+		// helper-only service-discovery requests.
+		if r.agentMetadata != nil {
+			tc = r.transport.WithAuth(authToken, resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation(invocation, *r.agentMetadata))
+		} else {
+			tc = r.transport.WithAuth(authToken, resolveMCPRequestHeadersForInvocation(invocation))
+		}
 	}
 
 	callCtx := ctx
@@ -1069,6 +1078,10 @@ func resolveIdentityHeaders() map[string]string {
 	} else {
 		delete(headers, agentproduct.HeaderName)
 	}
+	// Agent version and extension are intentionally MCP-request-only. Remove
+	// every case variant potentially supplied by an edition or credential hook
+	// so shared consumers such as A2A cannot inherit them.
+	removeAgentMetadataHeaders(headers)
 	return headers
 }
 

internal/auth/agent_metadata_headers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type agentMetadataHeaderRoundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
+
+func (f agentMetadataHeaderRoundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	return f(req)
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthRequestsExcludeAgentMetadataHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DWS_AGENT_VER", "1.2.3-test")
+	t.Setenv("DWS_AGENT_EXT", `{"umt":"test-umt","miniwua":"test-wua","ua":"test-agent"}`)
+
+	assertExcluded := func(t *testing.T, header http.Header) {
+		t.Helper()
+		for _, name := range []string{"x-dws-agent-ver", "x-dws-agent-ext"} {
+			if values := header.Values(name); len(values) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("OAuth request header %q = %q, want absent", name, values)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	newCaptureClient := func(responseBody string) (*http.Client, <-chan http.Header) {
+		seen := make(chan http.Header, 1)
+		client := &http.Client{Transport: agentMetadataHeaderRoundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+			seen <- req.Header.Clone()
+			return &http.Response{
+				StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
+				Header:     http.Header{"Content-Type": {"application/json"}},
+				Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(responseBody)),
+				Request:    req,
+			}, nil
+		})}
+		return client, seen
+	}
+
+	t.Run("JSON token request", func(t *testing.T) {
+		client, seen := newCaptureClient(`{}`)
+		provider := &OAuthProvider{httpClient: client}
+		if _, err := provider.postJSON(context.Background(), "https://oauth.test/token", map[string]string{
+			"code":      "test-code",
+			"grantType": "authorization_code",
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("postJSON() error = %v", err)
+		}
+		assertExcluded(t, <-seen)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("device code request", func(t *testing.T) {
+		client, seen := newCaptureClient(`{"success":true,"result":{"deviceCode":"test-device-code","userCode":"TEST-CODE","verificationUri":"https://example.test/device","expiresIn":900,"interval":1}}`)
+		provider := NewDeviceFlowProvider(t.TempDir(), newDeviceFlowTestLogger())
+		provider.clientID = "test-client-id"
+		provider.httpClient = client
+		provider.SetBaseURL("https://oauth.test")
+		if _, err := provider.requestDeviceCode(context.Background()); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("requestDeviceCode() error = %v", err)
+		}
+		assertExcluded(t, <-seen)
+	})
+}

internal/logging/redact.go

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ import (
 var sensitiveKeys = map[string]bool{
 	"authorization":       true,
 	"x-user-access-token": true,
+	"dws_agent_ext":       true,
+	"x-dws-agent-ext":     true,
 	"client_secret":       true,
 	"client-secret":       true,
 	"token":               true,

internal/logging/redact_test.go

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ func TestIsSensitiveKey(t *testing.T) {
 		{"authorization", true},
 		{"x-user-access-token", true},
 		{"X-User-Access-Token", true},
+		{"DWS_AGENT_EXT", true},
+		{"dws_agent_ext", true},
+		{"x-dws-agent-ext", true},
+		{"X-Dws-Agent-Ext", true},
+		{"DWS_AGENT_VER", false},
+		{"x-dws-agent-ver", false},
 		{"client_secret", true},
 		{"client-secret", true},
 		{"token", true},
@@ -128,17 +134,24 @@ func TestSanitizeArguments_Empty(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRedactHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	headers := http.Header{
-		"Authorization": {"Bearer token123456"},
-		"Content-Type":  {"application/json"},
-	}
+	headers := make(http.Header)
+	headers.Set("Authorization", "Bearer test-credential-value")
+	headers.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	headers.Set("DWS_AGENT_EXT", `{"umt":"test-umt-value"}`)
+	headers.Set("x-dws-agent-ext", `{"ua":"test-agent-value"}`)
 	attrs := RedactHeaders(headers)
-	if len(attrs) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected 2 attrs, got %d", len(attrs))
+	if len(attrs) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 4 attrs, got %d", len(attrs))
 	}
 	for _, attr := range attrs {
-		if attr.Key == "header.authorization" && !strings.Contains(attr.Value.String(), "***") {
-			t.Fatalf("authorization should be redacted: %s", attr.Value.String())
+		switch attr.Key {
+		case "header.authorization", "header.dws_agent_ext", "header.x-dws-agent-ext":
+			if !strings.Contains(attr.Value.String(), "***") {
+				t.Fatalf("%s should be redacted: %s", attr.Key, attr.Value.String())
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(attr.Value.String(), "test-") {
+				t.Fatalf("%s leaked its original value: %s", attr.Key, attr.Value.String())
+			}
 		}
 		if attr.Key == "header.content-type" && attr.Value.String() != "application/json" {
 			t.Fatalf("content-type should not be redacted: %s", attr.Value.String())

internal/transport/agent_metadata_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package transport
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageAgentMetadataReachesEveryMCPMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		agentVersion = "1.2.3-test+7"
+		agentExt     = `{"umt":"test-umt","nested":{"enabled":true}}`
+		cliVersion   = "9.8.7-cli"
+		userAgent    = "dws-user-agent-test/1.0"
+	)
+
+	seen := make(map[string]int)
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var request requestEnvelope
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&request); err != nil {
+			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		seen[request.Method]++
+		if got := r.Header.Get(HeaderAgentVersion); got != agentVersion {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s = %q, want %q", request.Method, HeaderAgentVersion, got, agentVersion)
+		}
+		if got := r.Header.Get(HeaderAgentExt); got != agentExt {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s = %q, want %q", request.Method, HeaderAgentExt, got, agentExt)
+		}
+		if got := r.Header.Get(HeaderVersion); got != cliVersion {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s = %q, want %q", request.Method, HeaderVersion, got, cliVersion)
+		}
+		if got := r.Header.Get("User-Agent"); got != userAgent {
+			t.Errorf("%s User-Agent = %q, want preset value %q", request.Method, got, userAgent)
+		}
+
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		switch request.Method {
+		case "initialize":
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":"%s","capabilities":{}}}`, supportedProtocolVersions[0])
+		case "tools/list":
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"tools":[]}}`)
+		case "tools/call":
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"result":{"content":{"success":true}}}`)
+		default:
+			http.Error(w, "unexpected method", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		}
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	client := NewClient(server.Client())
+	client.ExtraHeaders = map[string]string{
+		HeaderAgentVersion: agentVersion,
+		HeaderAgentExt:     agentExt,
+		HeaderVersion:      cliVersion,
+		"User-Agent":       userAgent,
+	}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if _, err := client.Initialize(ctx, server.URL); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Initialize() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := client.ListTools(ctx, server.URL); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ListTools() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := client.CallTool(ctx, server.URL, "test_tool", map[string]any{"value": "safe"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CallTool() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	for _, method := range []string{"initialize", "tools/list", "tools/call"} {
+		if got := seen[method]; got != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("%s request count = %d, want 1", method, got)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/transport/client.go

@@ -68,10 +68,12 @@ const (
 	defaultRetryMaxDelay = 5 * time.Second
 
 	// Security headers
-	HeaderSource      = "X-Cli-Source"
-	HeaderVersion     = "X-Cli-Version"
-	HeaderExecutionId = "X-Cli-Execution-Id"
-	SourceValue       = "dws-cli"
+	HeaderSource       = "X-Cli-Source"
+	HeaderVersion      = "X-Cli-Version"
+	HeaderExecutionId  = "X-Cli-Execution-Id"
+	HeaderAgentVersion = "x-dws-agent-ver"
+	HeaderAgentExt     = "x-dws-agent-ext"
+	SourceValue        = "dws-cli"
 )
 
 // Supported MCP protocol versions, ordered from newest to oldest.
@@ -256,20 +258,43 @@ func NewClient(httpClient *http.Client) *Client {
 
 // safeRedirectPolicy prevents credential headers from being forwarded
 // when a response redirects to a different host (e.g. API 302 → CDN).
-// Strips Authorization, x-user-access-token on cross-host redirects;
-// other headers like X-Cli-* pass through.
+// Credentials and Agent extension context are bound to the initial origin:
+// once a redirect chain leaves that origin they remain stripped for every
+// subsequent hop, including a redirect back to the initial origin.
+// Non-sensitive headers like X-Cli-* and x-dws-agent-ver pass through.
 func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 	if len(via) >= 10 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
 	}
-	if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
-		// Cross-host redirect: strip sensitive headers to prevent credential leakage
+	if redirectChainLeftInitialOrigin(req, via) {
+		req.Header.Del(HeaderAgentExt)
 		req.Header.Del("Authorization")
 		req.Header.Del("x-user-access-token")
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
+func redirectChainLeftInitialOrigin(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) bool {
+	if len(via) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	initialURL := via[0].URL
+	if !sameOrigin(req.URL, initialURL) {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, previous := range via[1:] {
+		if !sameOrigin(previous.URL, initialURL) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func sameOrigin(left, right *url.URL) bool {
+	return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
+		strings.EqualFold(left.Host, right.Host)
+}
+
 // WithAuth returns a shallow copy of c with the given auth token and extra
 // headers. The returned client shares the underlying HTTP client but is safe
 // to use concurrently with the original.

internal/transport/redirect_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package transport
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageSafeRedirectPolicyAgentMetadataHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	newRequest := func(t *testing.T, rawURL string) *http.Request {
+		t.Helper()
+		req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		req.Header.Set(HeaderAgentVersion, "1.2.3-test")
+		req.Header.Set(HeaderAgentExt, `{"ua":"test-agent-value"}`)
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer test-token")
+		req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", "test-token")
+		return req
+	}
+
+	assertHeaders := func(t *testing.T, request *http.Request, wantExt bool) {
+		t.Helper()
+		if got := request.Header.Get(HeaderAgentVersion); got != "1.2.3-test" {
+			t.Fatalf("agent version = %q, want retained", got)
+		}
+		gotExt := request.Header.Get(HeaderAgentExt)
+		if wantExt && gotExt == "" {
+			t.Fatal("agent extension was removed")
+		}
+		if !wantExt && gotExt != "" {
+			t.Fatalf("agent extension leaked across origins: %q", gotExt)
+		}
+		for _, key := range []string{"Authorization", "x-user-access-token"} {
+			got := request.Header.Get(key)
+			if wantExt && got == "" {
+				t.Fatalf("same-origin redirect removed %s", key)
+			}
+			if !wantExt && got != "" {
+				t.Fatalf("credential %s leaked across origins", key)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Run("same origin retains version and extension", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		previous := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/start")
+		redirected := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/next")
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirected, []*http.Request{previous}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		assertHeaders(t, redirected, true)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("cross host strips extension and retains version", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		previous := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/start")
+		redirected := newRequest(t, "https://cdn.example.test/asset")
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirected, []*http.Request{previous}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		assertHeaders(t, redirected, false)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("scheme downgrade on same host strips extension", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		previous := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/start")
+		redirected := newRequest(t, "http://api.example.test/next")
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirected, []*http.Request{previous}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		assertHeaders(t, redirected, false)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("extension remains stripped after returning to initial origin", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		initial := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/start")
+		crossOrigin := newRequest(t, "https://cdn.example.test/asset")
+		redirectedBack := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/final")
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirectedBack, []*http.Request{initial, crossOrigin}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		assertHeaders(t, redirectedBack, false)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("extension remains stripped on later cross-origin hop", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		initial := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/start")
+		crossOrigin := newRequest(t, "https://cdn.example.test/asset")
+		redirected := newRequest(t, "https://cdn.example.test/final")
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirected, []*http.Request{initial, crossOrigin}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		assertHeaders(t, redirected, false)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("initial request is unchanged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		request := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/start")
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(request, nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		assertHeaders(t, request, true)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("redirect limit is enforced", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+		request := newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/final")
+		via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
+		for index := range via {
+			via[index] = newRequest(t, "https://api.example.test/"+strings.Repeat("x", index+1))
+		}
+
+		if err := safeRedirectPolicy(request, via); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("safeRedirectPolicy() error = nil, want redirect limit error")
+		}
+	})
+}

pkg/cli/identity.go

@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ package cli
 
 import "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/app"
 
-// MCPIdentityHeaders returns HTTP headers aligned with MCP tool calls
-// (identity + edition merge). Overlays may pass this to auxiliary clients.
+// MCPIdentityHeaders returns the shared identity and edition headers that
+// overlays may pass to auxiliary clients. MCP-request-only metadata such as
+// DWS_AGENT_VER and DWS_AGENT_EXT is intentionally excluded.
 func MCPIdentityHeaders() map[string]string {
 	return app.MCPIdentityHeaders()
 }

pkg/cli/identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageMCPIdentityHeadersExcludeMCPOnlyMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv("DWS_AGENT_VER", "1.2.3")
+	t.Setenv("DWS_AGENT_EXT", `{"ua":"test-agent/1.2.3"}`)
+
+	headers := MCPIdentityHeaders()
+	if headers == nil {
+		t.Fatal("MCPIdentityHeaders() returned nil")
+	}
+	for key := range headers {
+		if strings.EqualFold(key, "x-dws-agent-ver") || strings.EqualFold(key, "x-dws-agent-ext") {
+			t.Fatalf("shared identity export leaked MCP-only Header %q", key)
+		}
+	}
+}