ci: tighten PR coverage gate

fix(auth): unify token resolution and recover rejected tokens

.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@
 
 ## Verification
 
+For an exact in-place `CHANGELOG.md`-only pull request, the full-suite checks
+may be marked `N/A`, but the targeted CHANGELOG check is required. For every
+other pull request, mark the targeted check `N/A` and complete the applicable
+full-suite checks.
+
+- [ ] Exact `CHANGELOG.md`-only check (otherwise `N/A`):
+  `./scripts/policy/check-changelog-pr.sh --fast-path "$(git merge-base HEAD origin/main)" HEAD`
 - [ ] `make build`
 - [ ] `make lint`
 - [ ] `make test`

.github/workflows/ai-behavior-check.yml

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
-name: AI Behavior Check
+name: Code Admission — AI Behavior
 
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, labeled, unlabeled]
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -11,7 +14,7 @@ permissions:
 
 jobs:
   ai-behavior-check:
-    name: AI Behavior Policy Evaluator
+    name: AI Behavior
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 5
     steps:
@@ -21,75 +24,107 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/github-script@v7
         with:
           script: |
-            const sha = context.payload.pull_request.head.sha;
+            const pullRequest = context.payload.pull_request;
+            const sha = context.eventName === 'push' ? context.sha : pullRequest.head.sha;
             const setStatus = (state, description) =>
               github.rest.repos.createCommitStatus({
                 owner: context.repo.owner,
                 repo: context.repo.repo,
                 sha,
                 state,
-                context: 'AI Behavior Check',
+                context: 'AI Behavior',
                 description,
               });
 
             await setStatus('pending', 'Evaluating AI-generated PR boundaries');
 
-            const labels = context.payload.pull_request.labels.map(({ name }) => name);
-            if (!labels.includes('ai-generated')) {
-              await setStatus('success', 'Not labeled ai-generated');
-              core.notice('Not an ai-generated PR; no AI-only policy applied.');
+            if (context.eventName === 'push') {
+              await setStatus('success', 'Not applicable to the protected main push');
+              core.notice('AI Behavior is a PR policy; the main push context is sealed.');
               return;
             }
 
-            const files = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
-              owner: context.repo.owner,
-              repo: context.repo.repo,
-              pull_number: context.issue.number,
-              per_page: 100,
-            });
+            try {
+              const expectedHead = pullRequest.head.sha;
+              const expectedBase = pullRequest.base.sha;
+              const currentPull = async (phase) => {
+                const { data: pull } = await github.rest.pulls.get({
+                  owner: context.repo.owner,
+                  repo: context.repo.repo,
+                  pull_number: context.issue.number,
+                });
+                if (pull.head.sha !== expectedHead || pull.base.sha !== expectedBase) {
+                  throw new Error(
+                    `Pull request revision changed during ${phase}: ` +
+                    `expected base/head ${expectedBase}/${expectedHead}, ` +
+                    `got ${pull.base.sha}/${pull.head.sha}`
+                  );
+                }
+                return pull;
+              };
+
+              const before = await currentPull('pre-policy check');
+              const labels = before.labels.map(({ name }) => name);
+              if (!labels.includes('ai-generated')) {
+                await setStatus('success', 'Not labeled ai-generated');
+                core.notice('Not an ai-generated PR; no AI-only policy applied.');
+                return;
+              }
+
+              const files = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
+                owner: context.repo.owner,
+                repo: context.repo.repo,
+                pull_number: context.issue.number,
+                per_page: 100,
+              });
+              await currentPull('post-policy check');
+
+              const maxChangedFiles = 30;
+              if (files.length > maxChangedFiles) {
+                await setStatus(
+                  'failure',
+                  `Changes ${files.length} files; limit is ${maxChangedFiles}`
+                );
+                core.setFailed(
+                  `AI-generated PR changes ${files.length} files; limit is ${maxChangedFiles}.`
+                );
+                return;
+              }
+
+              const isProtectedPath = (filename) =>
+                typeof filename === 'string' &&
+                (
+                  filename.startsWith('.github/workflows/') ||
+                  filename.startsWith('scripts/policy/') ||
+                  filename.startsWith('scripts/release/') ||
+                  filename === 'test/fixtures/cli-interface-baseline.txt' ||
+                  filename === '.goreleaser.yaml' ||
+                  filename === 'Makefile'
+                );
+              const protectedPaths = [...new Set(
+                files
+                  .flatMap(({ filename, previous_filename }) => [filename, previous_filename])
+                  .filter(isProtectedPath)
+              )];
+
+              if (protectedPaths.length > 0) {
+                await setStatus('failure', 'Modifies protected release/CI infrastructure');
+                core.setFailed(
+                  'AI-generated PR modifies protected release/CI infrastructure:\n' +
+                  protectedPaths.map((filename) => `  - ${filename}`).join('\n') +
+                  '\nSplit these changes into a human-owned PR with explicit review.'
+                );
+                return;
+              }
 
-            const maxChangedFiles = 30;
-            if (files.length > maxChangedFiles) {
               await setStatus(
-                'failure',
-                `Changes ${files.length} files; limit is ${maxChangedFiles}`
+                'success',
+                `Passed with ${files.length} changed files (limit ${maxChangedFiles})`
               );
-              core.setFailed(
-                `AI-generated PR changes ${files.length} files; limit is ${maxChangedFiles}.`
+              core.notice(
+                `AI behavior check passed (${files.length} changed files; limit ${maxChangedFiles}).`
               );
-              return;
+            } catch (error) {
+              await setStatus('error', 'Could not evaluate the exact pull request revision');
+              throw error;
             }
-
-            const isProtectedPath = (filename) =>
-              typeof filename === 'string' &&
-              (
-                filename.startsWith('.github/workflows/') ||
-                filename.startsWith('scripts/policy/') ||
-                filename.startsWith('scripts/release/') ||
-                filename === 'test/fixtures/cli-interface-baseline.txt' ||
-                filename === '.goreleaser.yaml' ||
-                filename === 'Makefile'
-              );
-            const protectedPaths = [...new Set(
-              files
-                .flatMap(({ filename, previous_filename }) => [filename, previous_filename])
-                .filter(isProtectedPath)
-            )];
-
-            if (protectedPaths.length > 0) {
-              await setStatus('failure', 'Modifies protected release/CI infrastructure');
-              core.setFailed(
-                'AI-generated PR modifies protected release/CI infrastructure:\n' +
-                protectedPaths.map((filename) => `  - ${filename}`).join('\n') +
-                '\nSplit these changes into a human-owned PR with explicit review.'
-              );
-              return;
-            }
-
-            await setStatus(
-              'success',
-              `Passed with ${files.length} changed files (limit ${maxChangedFiles})`
-            );
-            core.notice(
-              `AI behavior check passed (${files.length} changed files; limit ${maxChangedFiles}).`
-            );

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -18,48 +18,136 @@ jobs:
     name: Lint
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: read
+    outputs:
+      changelog_only: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only }}
+      changelog_changed: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.changelog_changed }}
+      platform_sensitive: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.platform_sensitive }}
     steps:
+      - name: Classify pull request scope
+        id: classify
+        uses: actions/github-script@v7
+        with:
+          script: |
+            let changelogOnly = false;
+            let changelogChanged = false;
+            let platformSensitive = context.eventName === 'push';
+            let files = [];
+
+            if (context.eventName === 'pull_request') {
+              const expectedHead = context.payload.pull_request.head.sha;
+              const expectedBase = context.payload.pull_request.base.sha;
+              const assertCurrentRevision = async (phase) => {
+                const { data: pull } = await github.rest.pulls.get({
+                  owner: context.repo.owner,
+                  repo: context.repo.repo,
+                  pull_number: context.issue.number,
+                });
+                if (pull.head.sha !== expectedHead || pull.base.sha !== expectedBase) {
+                  throw new Error(
+                    `Pull request revision changed during ${phase}: ` +
+                    `expected base/head ${expectedBase}/${expectedHead}, ` +
+                    `got ${pull.base.sha}/${pull.head.sha}`
+                  );
+                }
+                return pull;
+              };
+
+              const before = await assertCurrentRevision('pre-classification');
+              files = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
+                owner: context.repo.owner,
+                repo: context.repo.repo,
+                pull_number: context.issue.number,
+                per_page: 100,
+              });
+              const after = await assertCurrentRevision('post-classification');
+              if (
+                before.changed_files !== files.length ||
+                after.changed_files !== files.length
+              ) {
+                throw new Error(
+                  `Pull request file list is incomplete: API reports ` +
+                  `${after.changed_files} changed files, pagination returned ${files.length}`
+                );
+              }
+
+              changelogOnly =
+                files.length === 1 &&
+                files[0].filename === 'CHANGELOG.md' &&
+                files[0].status === 'modified' &&
+                !files[0].previous_filename;
+              changelogChanged = files.some(
+                ({ filename, previous_filename }) =>
+                  filename === 'CHANGELOG.md' ||
+                  previous_filename === 'CHANGELOG.md'
+              );
+
+              const isPlatformSensitive = (filename) =>
+                typeof filename === 'string' &&
+                (
+                  filename.startsWith('internal/auth/') ||
+                  filename.startsWith('internal/keychain/') ||
+                  /_(darwin|windows|linux|unix)\.go$/.test(filename) ||
+                  filename.startsWith('scripts/release/') ||
+                  filename.startsWith('scripts/install') ||
+                  filename.startsWith('Formula/') ||
+                  filename.startsWith('build/npm/') ||
+                  filename === '.goreleaser.yaml' ||
+                  filename === '.github/workflows/release.yml'
+                );
+              platformSensitive = files.some(
+                ({ filename, previous_filename }) =>
+                  isPlatformSensitive(filename) ||
+                  isPlatformSensitive(previous_filename)
+              );
+            }
+
+            core.setOutput('changelog_only', String(changelogOnly));
+            core.setOutput('changelog_changed', String(changelogChanged));
+            core.setOutput('platform_sensitive', String(platformSensitive));
+            await core.summary
+              .addHeading('Code Admission scope')
+              .addRaw(`- Event: \`${context.eventName}\`\n`)
+              .addRaw(`- Exact modified CHANGELOG only: \`${changelogOnly}\`\n`)
+              .addRaw(`- CHANGELOG touched: \`${changelogChanged}\`\n`)
+              .addRaw(`- Native-platform risk paths touched: \`${platformSensitive}\`\n`)
+              .addRaw(`- Changed files: \`${files.length}\`\n`)
+              .write();
+
+      - name: Record CHANGELOG-only fast path
+        if: steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only == 'true'
+        run: echo "Lint is satisfied by the trusted CHANGELOG-only Policy path." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
       - name: Check out repository
+        if: steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
       - name: Format Check
+        if: steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: |
           unformatted="$(find cmd internal test scripts/policy -name '*.go' -print0 | xargs -0r gofmt -l)"
           test -z "$unformatted" || (printf '%s\n' "$unformatted" && exit 1)
 
       - name: Go Vet
+        if: steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: go vet ./...
 
-      # golangci-lint temporarily disabled: v1.64.8 built with Go 1.24 is incompatible with Go 1.25
-      # - name: golangci-lint
-      #   uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v6
-      #   with:
-      #     version: v1.64.8
-      #     args: ./...
-
-  actionlint:
-    name: Actionlint
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    steps:
-      - name: Check out repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: Set up Go
-        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
-        with:
-          go-version-file: go.mod
-
       - name: Check GitHub Actions workflows
+        if: steps.classify.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: go run github.com/rhysd/actionlint/cmd/actionlint@v1.7.12
 
   test-race:
     name: "Test (race: ${{ matrix.shard }})"
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     strategy:
@@ -116,6 +204,8 @@ jobs:
 
   test-release-scripts:
     name: Test (release scripts)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
@@ -133,25 +223,85 @@ jobs:
       - name: Test release scripts
         run: go test -v -count=1 -timeout=5m ./test/scripts
 
+  test-cross-platform:
+    name: Test (cross-platform compile)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Go
+        uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        with:
+          go-version-file: go.mod
+
+      - name: Compile supported operating systems
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          for target in darwin/amd64 darwin/arm64 windows/amd64 windows/arm64; do
+            goos="${target%/*}"
+            goarch="${target#*/}"
+            output="$RUNNER_TEMP/dws-${goos}-${goarch}"
+            if [ "$goos" = windows ]; then
+              output="${output}.exe"
+            fi
+            printf 'compile %s/%s\n' "$goos" "$goarch"
+            CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS="$goos" GOARCH="$goarch" \
+              go build -o "$output" ./cmd
+          done
+
   test:
     name: Test
     needs:
+      - lint
       - test-race
       - test-release-scripts
-    if: ${{ always() }}
+      - test-cross-platform
+      - test-darwin
+      - test-windows
+    if: ${{ always() && needs.lint.result == 'success' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 5
     permissions: {}
     steps:
       - name: Verify test shards
         env:
+          CHANGELOG_ONLY: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only }}
+          PLATFORM_SENSITIVE: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive }}
           RACE_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-race.result }}
           RELEASE_SCRIPTS_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-release-scripts.result }}
+          CROSS_PLATFORM_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-cross-platform.result }}
+          DARWIN_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-darwin.result }}
+          WINDOWS_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-windows.result }}
         run: |
           failed=0
+          if [ "$CHANGELOG_ONLY" = true ]; then
+            for shard in \
+              "race shards:$RACE_RESULT" \
+              "release scripts:$RELEASE_SCRIPTS_RESULT" \
+              "cross-platform compile:$CROSS_PLATFORM_RESULT" \
+              "macOS native:$DARWIN_RESULT" \
+              "Windows native:$WINDOWS_RESULT"
+            do
+              name="${shard%%:*}"
+              result="${shard#*:}"
+              printf '%s: %s\n' "$name" "$result"
+              if [ "$result" != skipped ]; then
+                failed=1
+              fi
+            done
+            test "$failed" -eq 0
+            exit
+          fi
+
           for shard in \
             "race shards:$RACE_RESULT" \
-            "release scripts:$RELEASE_SCRIPTS_RESULT"
+            "release scripts:$RELEASE_SCRIPTS_RESULT" \
+            "cross-platform compile:$CROSS_PLATFORM_RESULT"
           do
             name="${shard%%:*}"
             result="${shard#*:}"
@@ -160,10 +310,28 @@ jobs:
               failed=1
             fi
           done
+
+          native_expected=skipped
+          if [ "$PLATFORM_SENSITIVE" = true ]; then
+            native_expected=success
+          fi
+          for native in \
+            "macOS native:$DARWIN_RESULT" \
+            "Windows native:$WINDOWS_RESULT"
+          do
+            name="${native%%:*}"
+            result="${native#*:}"
+            printf '%s: %s\n' "$name" "$result"
+            if [ "$result" != "$native_expected" ]; then
+              failed=1
+            fi
+          done
           test "$failed" -eq 0
 
   test-darwin:
     name: Test (macOS auth/keychain)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' && needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive == 'true' }}
     runs-on: macos-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
@@ -180,6 +348,8 @@ jobs:
 
   test-windows:
     name: Test (Windows)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' && needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive == 'true' }}
     runs-on: windows-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
@@ -202,6 +372,8 @@ jobs:
 
   coverage-darwin:
     name: Coverage (macOS)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' && needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive == 'true' }}
     runs-on: macos-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
     steps:
@@ -244,6 +416,8 @@ jobs:
 
   coverage-windows:
     name: Coverage (Windows)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' && needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive == 'true' }}
     runs-on: windows-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
     steps:
@@ -288,6 +462,8 @@ jobs:
 
   coverage-current:
     name: Coverage (current)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
     steps:
@@ -321,6 +497,8 @@ jobs:
 
   coverage-supporting:
     name: Coverage (supporting)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
@@ -358,6 +536,8 @@ jobs:
 
   coverage-baseline:
     name: Coverage (baseline)
+    needs: lint
+    if: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
     steps:
@@ -421,20 +601,35 @@ jobs:
   coverage:
     name: Coverage
     needs:
+      - lint
       - coverage-current
       - coverage-supporting
       - coverage-baseline
-    if: ${{ always() }}
+      - coverage-darwin
+      - coverage-windows
+    if: ${{ always() && needs.lint.result == 'success' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Verify coverage profile jobs
         env:
+          CHANGELOG_ONLY: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only }}
+          PLATFORM_SENSITIVE: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive }}
           CURRENT_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-current.result }}
           SUPPORTING_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-supporting.result }}
           BASELINE_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-baseline.result }}
+          DARWIN_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-darwin.result }}
+          WINDOWS_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-windows.result }}
         run: |
           failed=0
+          expected=success
+          native_expected=skipped
+          if [ "$CHANGELOG_ONLY" = true ]; then
+            expected=skipped
+          elif [ "$PLATFORM_SENSITIVE" = true ]; then
+            native_expected=success
+          fi
+
           for profile in \
             "current:$CURRENT_RESULT" \
             "supporting:$SUPPORTING_RESULT" \
@@ -443,24 +638,42 @@ jobs:
             name="${profile%%:*}"
             result="${profile#*:}"
             printf '%s: %s\n' "$name" "$result"
-            if [ "$result" != "success" ]; then
+            if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+              failed=1
+            fi
+          done
+
+          for native in \
+            "macOS native:$DARWIN_RESULT" \
+            "Windows native:$WINDOWS_RESULT"
+          do
+            name="${native%%:*}"
+            result="${native#*:}"
+            printf '%s: %s\n' "$name" "$result"
+            if [ "$CHANGELOG_ONLY" = true ]; then
+              native_expected=skipped
+            fi
+            if [ "$result" != "$native_expected" ]; then
               failed=1
             fi
           done
           test "$failed" -eq 0
 
       - name: Check out repository
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
           ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
       - name: Resolve authoritative coverage base
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         env:
           PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
           PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
@@ -478,33 +691,40 @@ jobs:
           echo "COVERAGE_BASE_REF=$base_ref" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
       - name: Download current coverage profile
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
         with:
           name: coverage-current-profile
           path: .
 
       - name: Download supporting coverage profiles
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
         with:
           name: coverage-supporting-profiles
           path: .
 
       - name: Download baseline coverage profile
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
         with:
           name: coverage-baseline-profile
           path: .
 
       - name: Enforce coverage gate
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         env:
-          COVERAGE_TARGET: "80"
+          COVERAGE_TARGET: "100"
           COVERAGE_ENFORCE_OVERALL: "false"
-        run: COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_PROFILE=coverage-shortcut.txt make coverage-gate BASE_REF="$COVERAGE_BASE_REF"
+          COVERAGE_OVERALL_TOLERANCE: "0"
+        run: COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE=coverage-shortcut.txt make coverage-gate BASE_REF="$COVERAGE_BASE_REF"
 
       - name: Generate coverage report
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: go tool cover -html=coverage.txt -o coverage.html
 
       - name: Upload coverage artifact
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
         with:
           name: coverage-report
@@ -516,44 +736,114 @@ jobs:
             coverage.html
 
   policy:
-    name: Policy Check
+    name: Policy
+    needs: lint
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
+      - name: Verify pull request merge revision
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+        env:
+          PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          test "$(git rev-parse HEAD^1)" = "$PR_BASE_SHA" || {
+            echo "checked-out merge first parent does not match event base" >&2
+            exit 1
+          }
+          test "$(git rev-parse HEAD^2)" = "$PR_HEAD_SHA" || {
+            echo "checked-out merge second parent does not match event head" >&2
+            exit 1
+          }
+
+      - name: Validate changed CHANGELOG content
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+        env:
+          CLASSIFIED_CHANGELOG_CHANGED: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_changed }}
+          CHANGELOG_ONLY: ${{ needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only }}
+          PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          merge_changelog_changed=false
+          if git diff --no-ext-diff --find-renames --name-status \
+            "$PR_BASE_SHA" HEAD |
+            awk -F '\t' '
+              {
+                for (field = 2; field <= NF; field++) {
+                  if ($field == "CHANGELOG.md") found = 1
+                }
+              }
+              END { exit !found }
+            '
+          then
+            merge_changelog_changed=true
+          fi
+          test "$merge_changelog_changed" = "$CLASSIFIED_CHANGELOG_CHANGED" || {
+            echo "Files API and synthetic merge tree disagree on CHANGELOG scope" >&2
+            exit 1
+          }
+          if [ "$merge_changelog_changed" != true ]; then
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          mode=--content-only
+          if [ "$CHANGELOG_ONLY" = true ]; then
+            mode=--fast-path
+          fi
+          ./scripts/policy/check-changelog-pr.sh \
+            "$mode" "$PR_BASE_SHA" HEAD
+
+      - name: Record CHANGELOG-only fast path
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only == 'true'
+        run: |
+          echo "Only the base-equivalent CHANGELOG validator ran; full Policy resumes on main." \
+            >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
       - name: Build
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make build
 
       - name: Policy
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make policy
 
   interface-integrity:
     name: Interface Integrity
+    needs: lint
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
           ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
       - name: Build
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make build
 
       - name: Resolve authoritative compatibility merge-base
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         env:
           PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
           PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
@@ -578,6 +868,7 @@ jobs:
           echo "COMPATIBILITY_STABLE_REF=$stable_ref" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
       - name: Check historical commands and help compatibility
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: |
           make authoritative-interface-integrity \
             BASE_REF="$COMPATIBILITY_BASE_REF"
@@ -587,143 +878,89 @@ jobs:
           fi
 
       - name: Check complete Schema compatibility
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make schema-compatibility BASE_REF="$COMPATIBILITY_BASE_REF"
 
       - name: Check skill command references
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make skill-command-integrity
 
+      - name: Record CHANGELOG-only fast path
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only == 'true'
+        run: echo "Interface Integrity is unaffected by an exact CHANGELOG-only diff." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
   cli-smoke:
     name: CLI Smoke
+    needs: lint
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
       - name: Build
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make build
 
       - name: Check public top-level commands
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make cli-smoke
 
+      - name: Record CHANGELOG-only fast path
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only == 'true'
+        run: echo "CLI Smoke is unaffected by an exact CHANGELOG-only diff." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
   mock-mcp-smoke:
-    name: Mock MCP Smoke
+    name: Mock MCP
+    needs: lint
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
       - name: Check HTTP and stdio MCP transport
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: make mock-mcp-smoke
 
+      - name: Record CHANGELOG-only fast path
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only == 'true'
+        run: echo "Mock MCP is unaffected by an exact CHANGELOG-only diff." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
   edition-tests:
-    name: Edition Contract Tests
+    name: Edition
+    needs: lint
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Set up Go
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-go@v5
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
 
       - name: Run edition contract tests
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only != 'true'
         run: go test -v -count=1 ./pkg/editiontest/...
 
-  ci-gate:
-    name: CI Gate
-    needs:
-      - lint
-      - actionlint
-      - test
-      - test-darwin
-      - test-windows
-      - coverage
-      - coverage-darwin
-      - coverage-windows
-      - policy
-      - interface-integrity
-      - cli-smoke
-      - mock-mcp-smoke
-      - edition-tests
-    if: ${{ always() }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    permissions: {}
-    steps:
-      - name: Verify required checks
-        env:
-          LINT_RESULT: ${{ needs.lint.result }}
-          ACTIONLINT_RESULT: ${{ needs.actionlint.result }}
-          TEST_RESULT: ${{ needs.test.result }}
-          TEST_DARWIN_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-darwin.result }}
-          TEST_WINDOWS_RESULT: ${{ needs.test-windows.result }}
-          COVERAGE_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage.result }}
-          COVERAGE_DARWIN_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-darwin.result }}
-          COVERAGE_WINDOWS_RESULT: ${{ needs.coverage-windows.result }}
-          POLICY_RESULT: ${{ needs.policy.result }}
-          INTERFACE_INTEGRITY_RESULT: ${{ needs.interface-integrity.result }}
-          CLI_SMOKE_RESULT: ${{ needs.cli-smoke.result }}
-          MOCK_MCP_SMOKE_RESULT: ${{ needs.mock-mcp-smoke.result }}
-          EDITION_TESTS_RESULT: ${{ needs.edition-tests.result }}
-        run: |
-          failed=0
-          for check in \
-            "Lint:$LINT_RESULT" \
-            "Actionlint:$ACTIONLINT_RESULT" \
-            "Test:$TEST_RESULT" \
-            "Test (macOS auth/keychain):$TEST_DARWIN_RESULT" \
-            "Test (Windows):$TEST_WINDOWS_RESULT" \
-            "Coverage:$COVERAGE_RESULT" \
-            "Coverage (macOS):$COVERAGE_DARWIN_RESULT" \
-            "Coverage (Windows):$COVERAGE_WINDOWS_RESULT" \
-            "Policy Check:$POLICY_RESULT" \
-            "Interface Integrity:$INTERFACE_INTEGRITY_RESULT" \
-            "CLI Smoke:$CLI_SMOKE_RESULT" \
-            "Mock MCP Smoke:$MOCK_MCP_SMOKE_RESULT" \
-            "Edition Contract Tests:$EDITION_TESTS_RESULT"
-          do
-            name="${check%%:*}"
-            result="${check#*:}"
-            printf '%s: %s\n' "$name" "$result"
-            if [ "$result" != "success" ]; then
-              failed=1
-            fi
-          done
-          test "$failed" -eq 0
-
-  notify-downstream:
-    name: Notify Wukong Overlay
-    needs: [ci-gate]
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name == 'push'
-    permissions: {}
-    steps:
-      - name: Trigger downstream CI
-        run: |
-          # Trigger internal GitLab CI pipeline via webhook.
-          # WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN is a repository secret.
-          if [ -n "${{ secrets.WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN }}" ]; then
-            curl --fail --silent --show-error \
-              -X POST \
-              -F "token=${{ secrets.WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN }}" \
-              -F "ref=main" \
-              -F "variables[UPSTREAM_SHA]=${{ github.sha }}" \
-              "${{ secrets.WUKONG_TRIGGER_URL }}"
-            echo "Downstream CI triggered."
-          else
-            echo "No WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN configured, skipping downstream notification."
-          fi
+      - name: Record CHANGELOG-only fast path
+        if: needs.lint.outputs.changelog_only == 'true'
+        run: echo "Edition is unaffected by an exact CHANGELOG-only diff." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"

.github/workflows/multi-profile-e2e.yml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-name: Multi Profile E2E
+name: Main Integration — 主干集成
 
 on:
-  pull_request:
   push:
+    branches:
+      - main
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ concurrency:
 
 jobs:
   multi-profile-e2e:
-    name: Multi Profile E2E
+    name: Multi-profile E2E
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     env:
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ jobs:
           mkdir -p .tmp-bin
           bash scripts/dev/test-multi-profile-e2e.sh --keep-workdir | tee "$MULTI_PROFILE_E2E_LOG"
           {
-            echo "### Multi Profile E2E"
+            echo "### Multi-profile E2E"
             echo "- Command: \`bash scripts/dev/test-multi-profile-e2e.sh --keep-workdir\`"
             echo "- Scope: isolated auth/profile storage, profile switch/use, one-shot profile override, CSV multi-profile aggregation, legacy migration"
             echo "- Result: passed"

.github/workflows/notify-wukong.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+name: Main Integration — Wukong Overlay
+
+on:
+  workflow_run:
+    workflows:
+      - CI
+    types:
+      - completed
+
+permissions: {}
+
+jobs:
+  notify-downstream:
+    name: Notify Wukong Overlay
+    if: >-
+      github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' &&
+      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
+      github.event.workflow_run.head_branch == 'main'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Trigger downstream CI
+        env:
+          UPSTREAM_SHA: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
+          WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN }}
+          WUKONG_TRIGGER_URL: ${{ secrets.WUKONG_TRIGGER_URL }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -n "$WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN" ]; then
+            curl --fail --silent --show-error \
+              -X POST \
+              -F "token=$WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN" \
+              -F "ref=main" \
+              -F "variables[UPSTREAM_SHA]=$UPSTREAM_SHA" \
+              "$WUKONG_TRIGGER_URL"
+            echo "Downstream CI triggered."
+          else
+            echo "No WUKONG_TRIGGER_TOKEN configured, skipping downstream notification."
+          fi

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: Release
-run-name: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.governance_preflight_nonce != '' && format('Release governance preflight {0}', inputs.governance_preflight_nonce) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.recover_release_version != '' && format('Release recovery {0} at {1} {2}', inputs.recover_release_version, inputs.recover_release_commit, inputs.recover_release_nonce) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.repair_npm_version != '' && format('Release npm repair {0}', inputs.repair_npm_version) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.repair_gitee_version != '' && format('Release Gitee repair {0}', inputs.repair_gitee_version) || github.workflow }}
+run-name: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.governance_preflight_nonce != '' && format('Release governance preflight {0}', inputs.governance_preflight_nonce) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.recover_release_version != '' && format('Release recovery {0} at {1} {2}', inputs.recover_release_version, inputs.recover_release_commit, inputs.recover_release_nonce) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.repair_npm_version != '' && format('Release npm repair {0}', inputs.repair_npm_version) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.repair_gitee_version != '' && format('Release Gitee repair {0}', inputs.repair_gitee_version) || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.repair_oss_version != '' && format('Release OSS repair {0}', inputs.repair_oss_version) || github.workflow }}
 
 on:
   push:
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ on:
         description: "Mirror an existing public immutable release's assets to Gitee"
         required: false
         type: string
+      repair_oss_version:
+        description: "Mirror an existing public immutable release's assets to OSS"
+        required: false
+        type: string
       governance_preflight_commit:
         description: "Verify release governance for this exact default-branch commit without publishing"
         required: false
@@ -75,6 +79,7 @@ jobs:
         env:
           REPAIR_NPM_VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_npm_version }}
           REPAIR_GITEE_VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          REPAIR_OSS_VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_oss_version }}
           GOVERNANCE_COMMIT: ${{ inputs.governance_preflight_commit }}
           GOVERNANCE_NONCE: ${{ inputs.governance_preflight_nonce }}
           RECOVER_VERSION: ${{ inputs.recover_release_version }}
@@ -88,17 +93,19 @@ jobs:
           set -eu
           npm_repair=0
           gitee_repair=0
+          oss_repair=0
           governance=0
           recovery=0
           test -z "$REPAIR_NPM_VERSION" || npm_repair=1
           test -z "$REPAIR_GITEE_VERSION" || gitee_repair=1
+          test -z "$REPAIR_OSS_VERSION" || oss_repair=1
           if test -n "$GOVERNANCE_COMMIT" || test -n "$GOVERNANCE_NONCE"; then governance=1; fi
           if test -n "$RECOVER_VERSION" || test -n "$RECOVER_TAG_OBJECT" || \
              test -n "$RECOVER_COMMIT" || test -n "$RECOVER_FAILED_RUN_ID" || \
              test -n "$RECOVER_FAILED_RUN_ATTEMPT" || \
              test -n "$RECOVER_NONCE" || \
              test -n "$RECOVER_CONFIRMATION"; then recovery=1; fi
-          test $((npm_repair + gitee_repair + governance + recovery)) -eq 1 || {
+          test $((npm_repair + gitee_repair + oss_repair + governance + recovery)) -eq 1 || {
             echo "workflow_dispatch must select exactly one release mode" >&2
             exit 1
           }
@@ -106,6 +113,8 @@ jobs:
             echo "mode=repair_npm" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           elif test "$gitee_repair" -eq 1; then
             echo "mode=repair_gitee" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          elif test "$oss_repair" -eq 1; then
+            echo "mode=repair_oss" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           elif test "$governance" -eq 1; then
             if test -z "$GOVERNANCE_COMMIT" || test -z "$GOVERNANCE_NONCE"; then
               echo "governance preflight requires both commit and nonce" >&2
@@ -235,26 +244,56 @@ jobs:
             exit 1
           }
 
-      - name: Require successful CI Gate on the preflight commit
+      - name: Require successful Code Admission contexts on the preflight commit
         uses: actions/github-script@v7
         env:
           PREFLIGHT_COMMIT: ${{ inputs.governance_preflight_commit }}
         with:
           script: |
             const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
-            const { data } = await github.rest.checks.listForRef({
+            const sha = process.env.PREFLIGHT_COMMIT;
+            const requiredContexts = [
+              "Lint",
+              "Test",
+              "Coverage",
+              "Policy",
+              "Edition",
+              "Interface Integrity",
+              "AI Behavior",
+              "CLI Smoke",
+              "Mock MCP",
+            ];
+            const runs = await github.paginate(github.rest.checks.listForRef, {
               owner,
               repo,
-              ref: process.env.PREFLIGHT_COMMIT,
-              check_name: "CI Gate",
+              ref: sha,
               filter: "latest",
               per_page: 100,
             });
-            const passed = data.check_runs.some(
-              (run) => run.name === "CI Gate" && run.conclusion === "success",
-            );
-            if (!passed) {
-              core.setFailed(`CI Gate has not succeeded for ${process.env.PREFLIGHT_COMMIT}`);
+            const latestByName = new Map();
+            for (const run of runs) {
+              if (run.head_sha !== sha || !requiredContexts.includes(run.name)) {
+                continue;
+              }
+              const current = latestByName.get(run.name);
+              if (!current || run.id > current.id) {
+                latestByName.set(run.name, run);
+              }
+            }
+            const missing = requiredContexts.filter((name) => !latestByName.has(name));
+            const nonSuccess = requiredContexts.flatMap((name) => {
+              const run = latestByName.get(name);
+              if (!run || run.conclusion === "success") {
+                return [];
+              }
+              return [`${name}=${run.conclusion || run.status || "unknown"}`];
+            });
+            if (missing.length > 0 || nonSuccess.length > 0) {
+              core.setFailed(
+                `Code Admission contexts are not all successful for ${sha}; ` +
+                `missing: ${missing.length > 0 ? missing.join(", ") : "none"}; ` +
+                `non-success: ${nonSuccess.length > 0 ? nonSuccess.join(", ") : "none"}`,
+              );
             }
 
       - name: Check out trusted preflight tooling
@@ -502,26 +541,56 @@ jobs:
           "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/tmp/trusted-release-tooling/scripts/release/verify-github-tag-authority.sh" \
             "$RELEASE_VERSION" "$RELEASE_COMMIT" "$RELEASE_TAG_OBJECT"
 
-      - name: Require successful CI Gate on the sealed commit
+      - name: Require successful Code Admission contexts on the sealed commit
         uses: actions/github-script@v7
         env:
           RELEASE_COMMIT: ${{ steps.target.outputs.release_commit }}
         with:
           script: |
             const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
-            const { data } = await github.rest.checks.listForRef({
+            const sha = process.env.RELEASE_COMMIT;
+            const requiredContexts = [
+              "Lint",
+              "Test",
+              "Coverage",
+              "Policy",
+              "Edition",
+              "Interface Integrity",
+              "AI Behavior",
+              "CLI Smoke",
+              "Mock MCP",
+            ];
+            const runs = await github.paginate(github.rest.checks.listForRef, {
               owner,
               repo,
-              ref: process.env.RELEASE_COMMIT,
-              check_name: "CI Gate",
+              ref: sha,
               filter: "latest",
               per_page: 100,
             });
-            const passed = data.check_runs.some(
-              (run) => run.name === "CI Gate" && run.conclusion === "success",
-            );
-            if (!passed) {
-              core.setFailed(`CI Gate has not succeeded for ${process.env.RELEASE_COMMIT}`);
+            const latestByName = new Map();
+            for (const run of runs) {
+              if (run.head_sha !== sha || !requiredContexts.includes(run.name)) {
+                continue;
+              }
+              const current = latestByName.get(run.name);
+              if (!current || run.id > current.id) {
+                latestByName.set(run.name, run);
+              }
+            }
+            const missing = requiredContexts.filter((name) => !latestByName.has(name));
+            const nonSuccess = requiredContexts.flatMap((name) => {
+              const run = latestByName.get(name);
+              if (!run || run.conclusion === "success") {
+                return [];
+              }
+              return [`${name}=${run.conclusion || run.status || "unknown"}`];
+            });
+            if (missing.length > 0 || nonSuccess.length > 0) {
+              core.setFailed(
+                `Code Admission contexts are not all successful for ${sha}; ` +
+                `missing: ${missing.length > 0 ? missing.join(", ") : "none"}; ` +
+                `non-success: ${nonSuccess.length > 0 ? nonSuccess.join(", ") : "none"}`,
+              );
             }
 
       - name: Require delivered previous stable baseline
@@ -721,7 +790,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install archive tooling
         run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y zip unzip
 
-      - name: Multi Profile E2E
+      - name: Multi-profile E2E
         run: bash scripts/dev/test-multi-profile-e2e.sh
 
       - name: Install rcodesign (sign darwin binaries from Linux)
@@ -1818,7 +1887,7 @@ jobs:
       - publish-channels
       - mirror-gitee-release
       - repair-npm
-      - repair-gitee
+      - repair-channel
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 2
     permissions: {}
@@ -1838,7 +1907,7 @@ jobs:
           PUBLISH_CHANNELS_RESULT: ${{ needs.publish-channels.result }}
           MIRROR_GITEE_RESULT: ${{ needs.mirror-gitee-release.result }}
           REPAIR_NPM_RESULT: ${{ needs.repair-npm.result }}
-          REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT: ${{ needs.repair-gitee.result }}
+          REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT: ${{ needs.repair-channel.result }}
         run: |
           set -eu
           require_result() {
@@ -1868,7 +1937,7 @@ jobs:
               require_result authorize-recovery "$AUTHORIZE_RECOVERY_RESULT" skipped
               require_result governance-preflight "$GOVERNANCE_PREFLIGHT_RESULT" skipped
               require_result repair-npm "$REPAIR_NPM_RESULT" skipped
-              require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" skipped
               require_publication
               ;;
             workflow_dispatch:recover_release)
@@ -1876,7 +1945,7 @@ jobs:
               require_result authorize-recovery "$AUTHORIZE_RECOVERY_RESULT" success
               require_result governance-preflight "$GOVERNANCE_PREFLIGHT_RESULT" skipped
               require_result repair-npm "$REPAIR_NPM_RESULT" skipped
-              require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" skipped
               require_publication
               ;;
             workflow_dispatch:governance_preflight)
@@ -1890,7 +1959,7 @@ jobs:
               require_result publish-channels "$PUBLISH_CHANNELS_RESULT" skipped
               require_result mirror-gitee-release "$MIRROR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
               require_result repair-npm "$REPAIR_NPM_RESULT" skipped
-              require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" skipped
               ;;
             workflow_dispatch:repair_npm)
               require_result dispatch-contract "$DISPATCH_RESULT" success
@@ -1903,11 +1972,24 @@ jobs:
               require_result publish-release "$PUBLISH_RELEASE_RESULT" skipped
               require_result publish-channels "$PUBLISH_CHANNELS_RESULT" skipped
               require_result mirror-gitee-release "$MIRROR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
-              require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" skipped
               ;;
             workflow_dispatch:repair_gitee)
               require_result dispatch-contract "$DISPATCH_RESULT" success
-              require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" success
+              require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" success
+              require_result authorize-recovery "$AUTHORIZE_RECOVERY_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result governance-preflight "$GOVERNANCE_PREFLIGHT_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result release-contract "$RELEASE_CONTRACT_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result release "$RELEASE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result verify-darwin-signatures "$DARWIN_SIGNATURE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result publish-release "$PUBLISH_RELEASE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result publish-channels "$PUBLISH_CHANNELS_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result mirror-gitee-release "$MIRROR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped
+              require_result repair-npm "$REPAIR_NPM_RESULT" skipped
+              ;;
+            workflow_dispatch:repair_oss)
+              require_result dispatch-contract "$DISPATCH_RESULT" success
+              require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" success
               require_result authorize-recovery "$AUTHORIZE_RECOVERY_RESULT" skipped
               require_result governance-preflight "$GOVERNANCE_PREFLIGHT_RESULT" skipped
               require_result release-contract "$RELEASE_CONTRACT_RESULT" skipped
@@ -1923,16 +2005,16 @@ jobs:
               exit 1
               ;;
           esac
-  # Mirror an existing public immutable release's assets to Gitee on demand. The
-  # push-triggered mirror-gitee-release job depends on the same run's finalized
-  # dist artifact, so a tag that was already published (including one delivered
-  # by a recovery dispatch) cannot reuse it. This dispatch path re-derives the
-  # asset set from the immutable GitHub Release itself and mirrors it. The
-  # release tag and asset checksums remain the sealed authority boundary.
-  repair-gitee:
-    name: Mirror an existing immutable release to Gitee
+  # Repair one downstream channel from an existing public immutable release on
+  # demand. The push-triggered channel jobs depend on the original run's
+  # finalized dist artifact, so a tag that was already published cannot reuse
+  # it. This dispatch path re-derives the asset set from the immutable GitHub
+  # Release itself. The release tag, delivery provenance, and asset checksums
+  # remain the sealed authority boundary.
+  repair-channel:
+    name: Repair an existing immutable release channel
     needs: dispatch-contract
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.dispatch-contract.result == 'success' && needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_gitee' && github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', github.event.repository.default_branch) && github.repository == 'DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli' }}
+    if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.dispatch-contract.result == 'success' && (needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_gitee' || needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_oss') && github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', github.event.repository.default_branch) && github.repository == 'DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 120
     permissions:
@@ -1950,7 +2032,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Validate repair version
         working-directory: tooling
         env:
-          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
         run: |
           set -eu
           . ./scripts/release/release-lib.sh
@@ -1963,7 +2045,7 @@ jobs:
         id: authority
         uses: actions/github-script@v7
         env:
-          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
         with:
           script: |
             const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
@@ -2042,12 +2124,20 @@ jobs:
             core.setOutput("commit_sha", commitSha);
             core.setOutput("tag_object", ref.data.object.sha);
 
+      - name: Check out sealed release source
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ steps.authority.outputs.commit_sha }}
+          path: release-source
+          persist-credentials: false
+
       - name: Fetch and verify sealed release tag
         working-directory: tooling
         env:
-          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
           RELEASE_COMMIT: ${{ steps.authority.outputs.commit_sha }}
           RELEASE_TAG_OBJECT: ${{ steps.authority.outputs.tag_object }}
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -eu
           git fetch --force --no-tags \
@@ -2059,17 +2149,23 @@ jobs:
       - name: Require successful Release workflow delivery
         working-directory: tooling
         env:
-          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
           RELEASE_COMMIT: ${{ steps.authority.outputs.commit_sha }}
+          REPAIR_MODE: ${{ needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode }}
           DWS_RELEASE_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
+          case "$REPAIR_MODE" in
+            repair_gitee) target=gitee ;;
+            repair_oss) target=oss ;;
+            *) echo "Unsupported channel repair mode: $REPAIR_MODE" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+          esac
           ./scripts/release/verify-release-workflow-delivery.sh \
-            "$VERSION" "$RELEASE_COMMIT"
+            --channel-repair "$target" "$VERSION" "$RELEASE_COMMIT"
 
       - name: Download and verify immutable GitHub Release assets
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
         run: |
           set -eu
           mkdir -p dist
@@ -2083,14 +2179,31 @@ jobs:
             "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/tooling/scripts/release/verify-release-artifacts.sh" "$VERSION"
 
       - name: Mirror release to Gitee (China)
+        if: ${{ needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_gitee' }}
         timeout-minutes: 100
         working-directory: tooling
         run: |
           "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/tooling/scripts/release/sync-to-gitee.sh"
         env:
-          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
           DIST_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/dist
           GITEE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEE_TOKEN }}
           GITEE_USER: ${{ secrets.GITEE_USER }}
           GITEE_REPO: ${{ secrets.GITEE_REPO }}
           DWS_REQUIRE_GITEE: "1"
+
+      - name: Mirror release to OSS (China)
+        if: ${{ needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_oss' }}
+        timeout-minutes: 30
+        working-directory: release-source
+        run: |
+          "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/tooling/scripts/release/sync-to-oss.sh"
+        env:
+          VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version || inputs.repair_oss_version }}
+          DIST_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/dist
+          OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
+          OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET }}
+          OSS_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.OSS_ENDPOINT }}
+          OSS_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.OSS_BUCKET }}
+          OSS_PREFIX: ${{ secrets.OSS_PREFIX }}
+          DWS_REQUIRE_OSS: "1"

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ The format is inspired by [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/) and th
 
 ### Fixed
 
+- **Consistent access-token caching and errors** — runtime, recovery, Skill, PAT polling, and personal/portal event clients now resolve user access tokens through one expiry- and publication-aware manager, so long-running processes reload rotated credentials while keychain, refresh, parse, permission, and cancellation failures remain observable instead of being collapsed into “not authenticated.”
 - **Tag-push GitHub Release publication** — Draft publication now locks one GitHub Release database ID, verifies its exact tag, channel, notes, recovery marker, asset set, and uploaded bytes, then publishes and rechecks that same ID as immutable. Recovery runs use the trusted default-branch release helpers instead of the sealed tag's historical scripts, fixing the Draft-only `GET /releases/tags/{tag}` 404 without allowing the release identity to drift during recovery.
 - **Release preflight reliability** — source-mode installer tests now use isolated temporary checkouts and HOME directories instead of overwriting and deleting the real repository `dws` binary, release preflight explicitly rebuilds before policy checks, and the full-suite runner gives the growing script package a non-flaky five-minute per-suite budget.
 

Formula/dingtalk-workspace-cli-beta.rb

@@ -1,33 +1,33 @@
 class DingtalkWorkspaceCliBeta < Formula
   desc "Automate DingTalk workspace tasks from the terminal (beta channel)"
   homepage "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli"
-  version "1.0.53-beta.2"
+  version "1.0.53-beta.4"
   license "Apache-2.0"
   keg_only "it is the beta channel and conflicts with dingtalk-workspace-cli"
 
   on_macos do
     if Hardware::CPU.arm?
-      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.2/dws-darwin-arm64.tar.gz"
-      sha256 "47d3f470003a309f4a93a4dfe55ab39240018b7c698f7863d85834e1f0a3affa"
+      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.4/dws-darwin-arm64.tar.gz"
+      sha256 "32a442d5b42dfed8512a695a7cef513722db6912f3c3168954cfaefb68e0b075"
     else
-      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.2/dws-darwin-amd64.tar.gz"
-      sha256 "2dcf90b515d934e71715d95098d3b3cec34299cdbe6c858e1106a81d23d3d51a"
+      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.4/dws-darwin-amd64.tar.gz"
+      sha256 "00c694677b9ce2e1a711535740681defe0a5f83d6b72140f305483501628faf8"
     end
   end
 
   on_linux do
     if Hardware::CPU.arm?
-      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.2/dws-linux-arm64.tar.gz"
-      sha256 "b4692a3c2690460c039e641f75f6793daf3b8549b8c9a35d01153a908f6cc2b1"
+      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.4/dws-linux-arm64.tar.gz"
+      sha256 "98516620e861e516cf846cf418f1a0ad5c5eb9a8681bd066b1fd29f4847aca6a"
     else
-      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.2/dws-linux-amd64.tar.gz"
-      sha256 "000d29d4c81589553e5b23b573002b7014b16c073793b8d7c5617e9b89488175"
+      url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.4/dws-linux-amd64.tar.gz"
+      sha256 "266df80e8a989971789a157dd134685a7c9eda01dd1d082719ec9e09d5a07bf0"
     end
   end
 
   resource "skills" do
-    url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.2/dws-skills.zip"
-    sha256 "b55a4eaaa63073147c3b9efff48b4713be75577c8a1d2dc8c6e11dc30b4f91c8"
+    url "https://github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/releases/download/v1.0.53-beta.4/dws-skills.zip"
+    sha256 "6770511ab9b04b4d97da1858069ff694830ba91d47c1e8564fd85856f95b016e"
   end
 
   def install

Makefile

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ help:
 	@printf "  make policy        - Check the built dws plus open-source and Schema policies\n"
 	@printf "  make interface-integrity - Check historical commands and help contracts still work\n"
 	@printf "  make authoritative-interface-integrity BASE_REF=<ref> - Check the Git-owned PR merge-base\n"
-	@printf "  make coverage-gate BASE_REF=<ref> - Enforce overall non-regression and changed-code coverage\n"
-	@printf "  make coverage-gate-platform BASE_REF=<ref> PROFILE=<file> - Enforce native-platform changed-code coverage\n"
+	@printf "  make coverage-gate BASE_REF=<ref> - Enforce overall non-regression and 100%% changed-code coverage\n"
+	@printf "  make coverage-gate-platform BASE_REF=<ref> PROFILE=<file> - Enforce 100%% native changed-code coverage\n"
 	@printf "  make update-interface-baseline - Add new CLI contracts without removing history\n"
 	@printf "  make reset-interface-baseline - DANGEROUS: replace all CLI compatibility history\n"
 	@printf "  make schema-compatibility BASE_REF=<ref> - Check the complete Schema contract against the PR merge-base\n"

docs/architecture.md

@@ -43,3 +43,38 @@
 - `skills/`: bundled agent skills (mono/ and multi/ layouts)
 - `test/`: CLI, integration, contract, unit, and skill E2E tests
 - `scripts/`: install scripts, policy checks, and CI helpers
+
+## Quality Pipeline
+
+Quality enforcement is layered so a pull request receives fast, deterministic
+admission feedback without pretending that downstream integration has already
+run.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TB
+  PR["Pull request"] --> CA["CI"]
+  subgraph CA_CHECKS["Nine required contexts"]
+    L["Lint"]
+    T["Test"]
+    C["Coverage"]
+    P["Policy"]
+    E["Edition"]
+    I["Interface Integrity"]
+    A["AI Behavior"]
+    S["CLI Smoke"]
+    M["Mock MCP"]
+  end
+  CA --> CA_CHECKS
+  CA_CHECKS --> MAIN["Protected main"]
+  MAIN --> MP["Main Integration — 主干集成<br/>Multi-profile E2E"]
+  MAIN --> PLATFORM["Risk-selected / release native platform validation"]
+  MP --> RELEASE["Release delivery"]
+  PLATFORM --> RELEASE
+```
+
+Complete Multi-profile E2E and the ordinary full native-platform matrix are
+downstream of PR admission. PRs still run primary-environment assurance and
+fast cross-platform compilation; auth, keychain, OS-specific, installer, and
+release changes additionally select native platform tests before merge. See
+[`docs/ci-pr-gates.md`](ci-pr-gates.md) for the exact context and ruleset
+contract.

docs/automation.md

@@ -108,6 +108,22 @@ commit, and failed tag-push run all match; it then reuses the normal release
 jobs. Do not put publication secrets in temporary branches or create ad-hoc
 recovery workflows.
 
+If the immutable GitHub Release and npm package were delivered but a downstream
+China mirror failed, dispatch the normal `Release` workflow from the protected
+default branch with exactly one of `repair_gitee_version` or
+`repair_oss_version`. Channel repair accepts a failed exact-tag run only when
+its latest attempt completed the release contract, build, Apple signature,
+immutable GitHub publication, and npm delivery checks for the exact tagged
+commit. It then downloads and re-verifies the immutable assets before invoking
+only the selected mirror. An OSS repair requires the OSS step itself to be the
+recorded failure. A Gitee repair accepts either a failed Gitee job or a Gitee
+job that was skipped behind that OSS failure; the latter is an explicit Gitee
+backfill and does not claim that OSS has been repaired. Gitee repair requires
+`GITEE_TOKEN`, `GITEE_USER`, and `GITEE_REPO`; OSS repair requires
+`OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET`, `OSS_ENDPOINT`, and `OSS_BUCKET`
+(with optional `OSS_PREFIX`) as Actions secrets. Missing credentials fail the
+selected repair closed.
+
 ## Handoff Checklist
 
 Before handoff, include:

docs/ci-pr-gates.md

@@ -1,133 +1,158 @@
-# Pull request quality gates
+# CI — PR 合入门禁
 
-The repository defines five focused checks in addition to its existing CI:
+The pull-request admission layer has exactly nine required external contexts:
 
-- **Interface Integrity** enforces backwards compatibility. Every historical
-  command path and alias must still resolve, every historical command must
-  still render `-h`, and historical flags must keep their type and shorthand.
-  New commands, aliases, and flags are allowed. The same job compares the full
-  complete `dws schema --all` contract with the PR merge-base, blocking removed
-  products/tools/parameters, incompatible parameter or interface mappings,
-  constraint drift, and safety-semantic drift. It also checks that executable
-  `dws ...` references in `skills/**/*.md` resolve to real commands.
-  Help compatibility covers command/alias/flag spelling, flag type and
-  shorthand; descriptive prose may evolve without breaking the gate.
-- **Coverage** runs unit tests on every pull request and prints both overall and
-  changed-code statement coverage. During the migration to the 80% repository
-  target, overall coverage may not regress from a profile generated from the
-  merge-base with the same test command, while changed production Go
-  statements must meet 80%. Linux, Windows, and macOS each generate a native
-  coverage profile for changed packages and enforce the threshold against
-  changed files buildable on that platform, so build-tagged source cannot be
-  hidden by an Ubuntu-only profile. Overall non-regression allows 0.1 percentage point of measurement
-  variance to avoid failing unchanged code on test-path noise. Set
-  `COVERAGE_ENFORCE_OVERALL=true` once repository coverage reaches 80% to make
-  the overall target fail closed as well.
-  CI generates the candidate, supporting, and merge-base profiles on three
-  independent runners, then downloads all profiles into the aggregate
-  `Coverage` job and applies the same fail-closed gate. The split changes only
-  scheduling: the tested packages, profile contents, merge-base comparison,
-  and final coverage thresholds remain unchanged.
-- **CLI Smoke** builds the release binary, reads the root command list from the
-  structured Interface contract, and renders offline help for every public
-  top-level command. It rejects Cobra's unknown-command root-help fallback and
-  fails when the checked-in development fixture is stale.
-- **Mock MCP Smoke** runs the existing HTTP and stdio MCP lifecycle tests
-  (`Initialize -> ListTools -> CallTool`).
-- **AI Behavior Check** applies to pull requests labeled `ai-generated`. It
-  limits the change to 30 files and blocks release/CI infrastructure changes,
-  including policy implementations and the checked-in Interface fixture.
-  It uses `pull_request_target` without checking out PR code, so the policy
-  cannot be bypassed by changing the workflow in the same pull request. The
-  evaluator writes an `AI Behavior Check` commit status to the PR head SHA so
-  GitHub rulesets can require it.
+| Required context | Contract |
+|---|---|
+| `Lint` | Stable PR revision classification, formatting, `go vet`, and Actionlint |
+| `Test` | Race/unit/release-script tests plus fast cross-platform compilation |
+| `Coverage` | Overall non-regression and 100% changed-code coverage |
+| `Policy` | Repository policy and the fail-closed CHANGELOG contract |
+| `Edition` | Edition contract tests |
+| `Interface Integrity` | CLI, Schema, Skill, and stable-release compatibility |
+| `AI Behavior` | Base-owned policy for PRs labeled `ai-generated` |
+| `CLI Smoke` | Offline help for every public top-level command |
+| `Mock MCP` | HTTP and stdio MCP lifecycle smoke tests |
 
-## Running the compatibility gates
+The workflow display name is `CI`. Parallel helper
+jobs may implement `Test` and `Coverage`, but they are not ruleset contexts.
+Do not require an aggregate alias or a downstream integration check in place of
+the nine contracts above.
 
-Run:
+`AI Behavior` is evaluated by a `pull_request_target` workflow that never
+checks out or executes PR code. It writes the exact `AI Behavior` status to the
+current PR head. Its Files API read is bracketed by base/head revision checks,
+so a synchronize race fails closed. The same workflow supplies a successful
+`AI Behavior` check run on protected `main` pushes for release governance.
+
+## Exact CHANGELOG-only fast path
+
+A pull request qualifies only when GitHub reports exactly one changed file,
+that file is an in-place modification of `CHANGELOG.md`, and the base and head
+both retain it as a regular non-executable `100644` blob. Add, delete, rename,
+symlink, executable-mode, and second-file changes do not qualify.
+
+`Lint` classifies the Files API result only after verifying that the API's base
+and head equal the event revision both before and after pagination. `Policy`
+checks out GitHub's PR merge ref and verifies its parents:
+
+```text
+HEAD^1 = pull_request.base.sha
+HEAD^2 = pull_request.head.sha
+```
+
+It then runs:
+
+```sh
+./scripts/policy/check-changelog-pr.sh \
+  --fast-path "$PR_BASE_SHA" HEAD
+```
+
+Because the verified PR diff contains only `CHANGELOG.md`, the validator and
+its policy dependencies in that merge tree are byte-for-byte the current base
+versions. Validation targets the synthetic merge tree, not the feature-branch
+tree, so a stale branch cannot supply an older validator or combine with newer
+base notes into an invalid final CHANGELOG.
+
+All nine admission contexts are still emitted and must succeed. Expensive
+implementation helpers are skipped; the named contexts record that their code
+surface is unaffected. After merge, the protected `main` push executes the
+full admission suite.
+
+Any PR that touches `CHANGELOG.md` but also changes another file runs the same
+content contract in `Policy` with `--content-only`. That mode permits the
+second file but still rejects invalid dates or versions, missing bullets,
+placeholder `TODO`/`TBD`, unmanaged-section changes, and unsafe tree modes.
+Adding a second file therefore cannot bypass CHANGELOG validation.
+
+## Platform and downstream boundaries
+
+Ordinary PRs run the primary Linux assurance plus fast Darwin/Windows compile
+checks. Full native macOS/Windows tests and platform coverage run on a PR only
+when its diff touches auth, keychain, OS-specific Go files, installers,
+packaging, Formulae, or release automation. Protected `main` pushes run the
+complete native matrix.
+
+Complete `Multi-profile E2E` is not a PR admission context. It belongs to the
+`Main Integration — 主干集成` workflow and runs only after a push to `main` (or
+an explicit manual dispatch). A failing downstream run remains a real
+regression and must be repaired, but it must not be represented by a synthetic
+successful PR check.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TB
+  PR["Pull request"] --> ADMISSION["CI"]
+  ADMISSION --> L["Lint"]
+  ADMISSION --> T["Test"]
+  ADMISSION --> C["Coverage"]
+  ADMISSION --> P["Policy"]
+  ADMISSION --> E["Edition"]
+  ADMISSION --> I["Interface Integrity"]
+  ADMISSION --> A["AI Behavior"]
+  ADMISSION --> S["CLI Smoke"]
+  ADMISSION --> M["Mock MCP"]
+  ADMISSION --> MAIN["Protected main"]
+  MAIN --> NATIVE["Full native platform matrix"]
+  MAIN --> E2E["Multi-profile E2E"]
+  MAIN --> RELEASE["Release delivery"]
+```
+
+## Running focused gates locally
+
+Run the contracts relevant to the change:
 
 ```sh
 make build
+make policy
 make interface-integrity
 make authoritative-interface-integrity BASE_REF=<merge-base>
 make schema-compatibility BASE_REF=<merge-base>
 make skill-command-integrity
 make cli-smoke
-# Run on the corresponding native runner with its generated profile:
-make coverage-gate-platform BASE_REF=<merge-base> PROFILE=<coverage-profile>
+make mock-mcp-smoke
+go test -v -count=1 ./pkg/editiontest/...
 ```
 
-`make coverage-gate` is the enforcement step, not a profile generator. It
-expects the candidate, policy, shortcut, and merge-base profiles
-(`coverage.txt`, `coverage-policy.txt`, `coverage-shortcut.txt`, and
-`coverage-base.txt`) produced by the parallel CI profile jobs. A clean local
-checkout can reproduce the Linux/overall CI gate sequentially with:
+For an exact CHANGELOG-only branch:
 
 ```sh
 base_ref=$(git merge-base HEAD origin/main)
-root=$(pwd)
-base_worktree=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/dws-coverage-base.XXXXXX")
-rmdir "$base_worktree"
-cleanup() { git worktree remove --force "$base_worktree" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
-trap cleanup EXIT HUP INT TERM
-
-go test -count=1 -p 1 -coverprofile=coverage.txt -covermode=atomic \
-  ./ ./cmd/... ./internal/... ./skills/...
-go test -count=1 -coverprofile=coverage-policy.txt -covermode=atomic \
-  ./pkg/... ./scripts/policy/...
-go test -count=1 \
-  -run '^(TestAllShortcuts|TestCrossPlatformCoverage)' \
-  -coverpkg=./internal/app,./internal/helpers,./internal/shortcut/... \
-  -coverprofile=coverage-shortcut.txt \
-  -covermode=atomic \
-  ./internal/app ./internal/helpers ./internal/shortcut/...
-git worktree add --detach "$base_worktree" "$base_ref"
-(
-  cd "$base_worktree"
-  go test -count=1 -p 1 \
-    -coverprofile="$root/coverage-base.txt" -covermode=atomic \
-    ./ ./cmd/... ./internal/... ./skills/...
-)
-COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_PROFILE=coverage-shortcut.txt \
-  make coverage-gate BASE_REF="$base_ref"
+./scripts/policy/check-changelog-pr.sh --fast-path "$base_ref" HEAD
 ```
 
-The native-platform target likewise expects `PROFILE` to have already been
-generated on that operating system. CI owns those generation steps; copying
-only either enforcement command into a clean checkout is intentionally an
-incomplete invocation.
+`make coverage-gate` is an enforcement step, not a profile generator. CI
+generates the candidate, supporting, merge-base, and (when risk-selected)
+native profiles before the aggregate `Coverage` context evaluates them. The
+aggregate and native gates require 100% coverage for changed executable Go
+statements. Overall coverage remains an unrounded, zero-tolerance merge-base
+non-regression check. Candidate and baseline profiles are evaluated by the
+same block-deduplicating checker; supporting policy and shortcut profiles
+contribute to changed-code coverage only. The checked-in badge is presentation
+only and is never read as a gate input.
 
-CI derives the authoritative Interface snapshots from both the PR merge-base
-and the latest reachable stable release tag. The complete Schema snapshot comes
-from the PR merge-base, which contains the registry-first Schema introduced on
-`main`. The candidate branch cannot bless a breaking change by editing a
-fixture. Schema additions are allowed; historical products, tools, parameters,
-parameter mappings, positional execution fields, constraints, and safety
-semantics remain protected. Positional descriptions are documentation and may
-change without breaking compatibility.
-
-`make update-interface-baseline` still extends the local checked-in Interface
-fixture used by `make interface-integrity`. Updates are monotonic: they add new
-commands and flags without removing history.
-
-For an intentional compatibility reset at a major-version boundary, run
-`make reset-interface-baseline`. This replaces all CLI compatibility history
-with the current command tree and must receive explicit human review.
+Compatibility checks derive authoritative Interface snapshots from the PR
+merge-base and the latest reachable stable release. The candidate cannot bless
+a breaking change by editing a fixture. Schema additions are allowed;
+historical products, tools, parameters, mappings, positional execution fields,
+constraints, and safety semantics remain protected.
 
 ## Required GitHub repository settings
 
-Create a ruleset for `main` that requires pull requests and code-owner review,
-then mark these aggregate status checks as required:
+The `main` quality ruleset must enable strict required-status-check policy
+(`strict_required_status_checks_policy=true`) so a PR is revalidated whenever
+`main` advances. It must require these exact contexts and no legacy aliases:
 
-- `CI Gate`
-- `Multi Profile E2E`
-- `AI Behavior Check`
+- `Lint`
+- `Test`
+- `Coverage`
+- `Policy`
+- `Edition`
+- `Interface Integrity`
+- `AI Behavior`
+- `CLI Smoke`
+- `Mock MCP`
 
-`CI Gate` fails closed unless every first-layer CI job succeeds, including
-lint, tests, native Linux/Windows/macOS coverage, policy,
-Interface/Schema/Skill integrity, and smoke tests. Requiring the aggregate
-check keeps repository rules stable when an internal job is renamed or split.
-
-The `ai-generated` label must be applied by the PR-creation automation or by a
-maintainer; GitHub cannot infer reliably whether a human-authored PR contains
-AI-generated code.
+Do not require helper jobs, `Multi-profile E2E`, or an aggregate admission
+alias. Update ruleset contexts only after the new names have appeared on the
+protected branch, so a rename cannot silently remove enforcement or leave an
+unproducible required context.

docs/releasing.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 发布只走一条链路：本地脚本负责封板、验证并推送 annotated tag；GitHub Actions 负责构建和发布最终产物。不要直接运行 `goreleaser release`，也不要手工补打或移动 tag。
 
-发布前必须完成平台治理：目标 GitHub 仓库已启用 immutable releases，`main` 要求 `CI Gate`，操作机已安装并登录 `gh`。本地脚本会在封 tag 前通过 API 检查 immutable releases、当前 SHA 的 `CI Gate` 和在途 Release；`v*` tag ruleset 仍需仓库管理员预先配置并由操作人确认。
+发布前必须完成平台治理：目标 GitHub 仓库已启用 immutable releases，`main` 精确要求 `CI` workflow 的九个 context：`Lint`、`Test`、`Coverage`、`Policy`、`Edition`、`Interface Integrity`、`AI Behavior`、`CLI Smoke`、`Mock MCP`，操作机已安装并登录 `gh`。本地脚本会在封 tag 前通过 API 检查 immutable releases、当前 SHA 的全部九个 context 和在途 Release；`v*` tag ruleset 仍需仓库管理员预先配置并由操作人确认。
 
 ## 日常只用一个入口
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ dws-release v1.2.3-beta.1
 dws-release v1.2.3-beta.1
 ```
 
-预检包含测试、策略检查、旧正式版命令树兼容检查、全平台打包、npm 安装验证，以及 macOS 环境下的 Homebrew 安装验证。它还会从默认分支触发一次无发布权限的 `Release governance preflight`，用正式流水线相同的身份检查 `CI Gate` 和 immutable releases。通过后会在当前 Git worktree 的私有 Git 状态目录写入一个有效期六小时的证明，绑定版本、精确 commit、发布仓库、beta/stable 基线和远端 `main`：
+预检包含测试、策略检查、旧正式版命令树兼容检查、全平台打包、npm 安装验证，以及 macOS 环境下的 Homebrew 安装验证。它还会从默认分支触发一次无发布权限的 `Release governance preflight`，用正式流水线相同的身份检查该精确 commit 的九个 Code Admission context 和 immutable releases。通过后会在当前 Git worktree 的私有 Git 状态目录写入一个有效期六小时的证明，绑定版本、精确 commit、发布仓库、beta/stable 基线和远端 `main`：
 
 ```bash
 dws-release v1.2.3-beta.1 --publish
@@ -97,7 +97,16 @@ dws-release v1.2.3 --from-beta v1.2.3-beta.1 --publish
 
 npm 补发只允许从默认分支触发 Release workflow 的 `repair_npm_version`。它只支持启用 immutable releases 后、由本流水线成功产出的公开 immutable release：目标必须是 `main` 历史中的 annotated tag，并且同 commit 的 `Build immutable GitHub Release` job 已成功。即使后续 npm 分发失败，这个独立的产物封存边界仍可作为补发依据。补发会用目标 commit 的 npm 模板重组包，逐平台核验资产和二进制版本，再发布到隔离的 `backfill` dist-tag，不会回滚 `latest` / `beta`。历史 mutable release 不进入自动补发路径，避免把可被替换的资产带入 npm。
 
-OSS/Gitee 分发失败时直接重跑该 tag 的 `Publish npm and mirrors` failed job；各步会复用 immutable GitHub 资产并保持 channel 单调。独立 Gitee release workflow 和本地直发脚本已停用，避免绕开 publication queue 或用重新构建的不同字节覆盖镜像。
+OSS/Gitee 分发失败且 GitHub immutable Release、npm 已交付时，从受保护的默认分支触发
+Release workflow，并且只填写 `repair_oss_version` 或 `repair_gitee_version` 之一。channel
+repair 会精确绑定失败 tag run 的最新 attempt；contract、构建、Developer ID 签名、
+immutable GitHub 发布和 npm delivery 必须全部成功，且只能有一个 OSS/Gitee 下游失败，
+随后才会下载并重新校验原始资产、修复所选镜像。OSS repair 必须匹配失败的 OSS step；
+Gitee repair 还允许其 job 因该 OSS 失败而 skipped，此时只代表 Gitee backfill 成功，
+不会把仍未修复的 OSS 标成成功。该证据不能用于 beta → stable 或
+stable baseline，后两者仍要求整条 Release 成功或受保护 recovery 成功。不要重跑旧
+attempt 的单个 failed job，以免在 attempts 之间拼接交付证据。独立 Gitee release
+workflow 和本地直发脚本已停用，避免绕开 publication queue 或用重新构建的不同字节覆盖镜像。
 
 ## 既有 tag 的紧急恢复
 
@@ -125,10 +134,10 @@ Homebrew 当前只属于本机预检/手工公式通道：预检会在当前 mac
 
 仓库管理员还需要在 GitHub 平台配置以下不可由脚本替代的规则：
 
-- `main` 必须要求精确的 `CI Gate`；tag workflow 也会通过 Checks API 再确认该封板 SHA 已通过。
+- `main` 必须精确要求 `Lint`、`Test`、`Coverage`、`Policy`、`Edition`、`Interface Integrity`、`AI Behavior`、`CLI Smoke`、`Mock MCP` 九个 Code Admission context；tag workflow 也会通过 Checks API 再确认该封板 SHA 上九项全部成功。
 - 必须启用 immutable releases；它只保护启用后发布的 release，因此应在第一次使用新流水线前配置。为 `v*` 增加 tag ruleset，限制创建权限，并在 release 发布前保护 tag 的短暂窗口。
 - 配置 `RELEASE_GOVERNANCE_TOKEN` Actions secret，只授予目标仓库 `Administration: read`；内置 `GITHUB_TOKEN` 不具备 immutable-releases API 所需的仓库治理权限。每次本地预检和 tag workflow 都使用这一个身份进行 fail-closed 验证。
 - 单独配置 `HOMEBREW_PR_TOKEN`，优先使用仅授权本仓库且具备 `Contents: write`、`Pull requests: write` 的 fine-grained PAT；若组织策略不允许该账号使用 fine-grained PAT，则回退到仅带 `public_repo` scope 的专用 classic PAT。治理预检和 tag contract 会验证 token 身份、classic scope，并用 `[skip ci]` 临时分支和 draft PR 完成真实写权限 canary，随后立即关闭 PR、删除分支；任何清理失败都会 fail closed。门禁也会拒绝与治理 token 复用。
 - 创建 `release-recovery` environment，只允许受保护分支，设置 required reviewer、禁止自审并关闭管理员绕过。workflow 会读取 environment 的 required-reviewer、prevent-self-review 和 protected-branch 规则；规则缺失时紧急恢复会失败，正常 beta/stable tag 发布不受影响。
 
-immutable releases 或 `CI Gate` 缺失时，发布脚本会自动拒绝封 tag。tag ruleset 可能来自组织层，脚本不自动推断其最终作用范围；管理员确认不能省略，脚本约定也不能替代平台强制。
+immutable releases，或任一 Code Admission context 缺失、未成功时，发布脚本会自动拒绝封 tag。tag ruleset 可能来自组织层，脚本不自动推断其最终作用范围；管理员确认不能省略，脚本约定也不能替代平台强制。

internal/app/access_token_manager_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	authpkg "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/edition"
+)
+
+type tokenManagerSnapshotProvider struct {
+	load func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error)
+}
+
+func (p tokenManagerSnapshotProvider) GetAccessToken(context.Context) (string, error) {
+	data, err := p.load()
+	if err != nil || data == nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return data.AccessToken, nil
+}
+
+func (p tokenManagerSnapshotProvider) GetTokenSnapshot(context.Context) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+	return p.load()
+}
+
+type tokenManagerLegacyGetter struct {
+	token string
+	err   error
+}
+
+func (g tokenManagerLegacyGetter) GetToken() (string, string, error) {
+	return g.token, "file", g.err
+}
+
+func installTokenManagerFakes(t *testing.T, load func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error)) {
+	t.Helper()
+	oldProvider, oldLegacy := newAccessTokenProvider, newLegacyTokenManager
+	oldEdition := edition.Get()
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{})
+	newAccessTokenProvider = func(string) accessTokenGetter {
+		return tokenManagerSnapshotProvider{load: load}
+	}
+	newLegacyTokenManager = func(string) legacyTokenGetter {
+		return tokenManagerLegacyGetter{err: authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound}
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		newAccessTokenProvider, newLegacyTokenManager = oldProvider, oldLegacy
+		edition.Override(oldEdition)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenManagerCachesUntilMarkerRevisionChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := authpkg.WriteTokenMarker(configDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	token := "token-a"
+	installTokenManagerFakes(t, func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: token, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}, nil
+	})
+
+	manager := NewTokenManager()
+	first, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, "")
+	if err != nil || first.AccessToken != "token-a" {
+		t.Fatalf("first token = %#v, %v", first, err)
+	}
+	second, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, "")
+	if err != nil || second.AccessToken != "token-a" || calls.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("cached token = %#v, %v, calls=%d", second, err, calls.Load())
+	}
+
+	token = "token-b"
+	if err := authpkg.WriteTokenMarker(configDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	rotated, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, "")
+	if err != nil || rotated.AccessToken != "token-b" || calls.Load() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("rotated token = %#v, %v, calls=%d", rotated, err, calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenManagerDoesNotCacheWithoutExpiryOrRevision(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	installTokenManagerFakes(t, func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "token"}, nil
+	})
+	manager := NewTokenManager()
+	for range 2 {
+		if _, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls.Load() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d, want 2", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenManagerTreatsMalformedMarkerAsUncacheable(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(configDir, "token.json"), []byte("{"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	installTokenManagerFakes(t, func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "token", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}, nil
+	})
+	manager := NewTokenManager()
+	for range 2 {
+		if snapshot, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, ""); err != nil || snapshot.AccessToken != "token" {
+			t.Fatalf("snapshot = %#v, error = %v", snapshot, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls.Load() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d, want 2", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenManagerDoesNotCacheOpaqueEditionStorageWithProviderFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := authpkg.WriteTokenMarker(configDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	installTokenManagerFakes(t, func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "token", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}, nil
+	})
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{
+		LoadToken: func(string) ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil },
+		TokenProvider: func(_ context.Context, fallback func() (string, error)) (string, error) {
+			return fallback()
+		},
+	})
+	manager := NewTokenManager()
+	for range 2 {
+		if _, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls.Load() != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d, want 2", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenManagerCoalescesConcurrentLoads(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := authpkg.WriteTokenMarker(configDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	installTokenManagerFakes(t, func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		<-release
+		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "token", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}, nil
+	})
+	manager := NewTokenManager()
+	const workers = 8
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	wg.Add(workers)
+	errs := make(chan error, workers)
+	for range workers {
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			_, err := manager.Get(context.Background(), configDir, "")
+			errs <- err
+		}()
+	}
+	for calls.Load() == 0 {
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	close(release)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(errs)
+	for err := range errs {
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d, want 1", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenManagerPreservesProviderFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	want := errors.New("keychain permission denied")
+	installTokenManagerFakes(t, func() (*authpkg.TokenData, error) { return nil, want })
+	_, err := NewTokenManager().Get(context.Background(), configDir, "")
+	if !errors.Is(err, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want cause %v", err, want)
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("provider failure was misclassified as missing credentials: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenResolutionErrorOnlyClassifiesTrueMissingCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	missing := tokenResolutionError(authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound)
+	var typed interface{ Unwrap() error }
+	if !errors.As(missing, &typed) || !errors.Is(missing, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("missing error = %v", missing)
+	}
+	want := errors.New("decrypt failed")
+	if got := tokenResolutionError(want); !errors.Is(got, want) || errors.Is(got, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("storage error = %v", got)
+	}
+	if got := tokenResolutionError(context.Canceled); !errors.Is(got, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("cancellation = %v", got)
+	}
+}

internal/app/access_token_resolve.go

@@ -21,19 +21,61 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
 
 	authpkg "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/edition"
 )
 
+const accessTokenRefreshWindow = 5 * time.Minute
+
 type legacyTokenGetter interface {
 	GetToken() (string, string, error)
 }
 
+type accessTokenSnapshotGetter interface {
+	GetTokenSnapshot(context.Context) (*authpkg.TokenData, error)
+}
+
+// AccessTokenSnapshot is the minimal bearer view needed by the process cache.
+// Refresh-token material never leaves the auth package.
+type AccessTokenSnapshot struct {
+	AccessToken string
+	ExpiresAt   time.Time
+	Source      string
+}
+
+type tokenManagerKey struct {
+	configDir string
+	profile   string
+}
+
+type tokenManagerEntry struct {
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	snapshot AccessTokenSnapshot
+	revision string
+}
+
+// TokenManager is the only process cache for user access tokens. Cache entries
+// are isolated by config directory and profile, expiry-aware, and invalidated
+// by the credential publication marker written by auth storage.
+type TokenManager struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	entries map[tokenManagerKey]*tokenManagerEntry
+	now     func() time.Time
+}
+
+func NewTokenManager() *TokenManager {
+	return &TokenManager{entries: make(map[tokenManagerKey]*tokenManagerEntry), now: time.Now}
+}
+
+var runtimeTokenManager = NewTokenManager()
+
 var (
 	newAccessTokenProvider = func(configDir string) accessTokenGetter {
-		disc := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
-		provider := authpkg.NewOAuthProvider(configDir, disc)
+		discard := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
+		provider := authpkg.NewOAuthProvider(configDir, discard)
 		configureOAuthProviderCompatibility(provider, configDir)
 		return provider
 	}
@@ -44,64 +86,218 @@ var (
 	}
 )
 
-// resolveAccessTokenFromDir loads OAuth then legacy token from configDir, applying
-// the same host compatibility hooks as MCP. It mirrors the former body of
-// getCachedRuntimeToken (excluding process-level cache and timing).
-func resolveAccessTokenFromDir(ctx context.Context, configDir string) (string, error) {
-	provider := newAccessTokenProvider(configDir)
-	token, tokenErr := provider.GetAccessToken(ctx)
-	if tokenErr == nil && strings.TrimSpace(token) != "" {
-		return strings.TrimSpace(token), nil
-	}
-	if tokenErr != nil && errors.Is(tokenErr, authpkg.ErrTokenDecryption) {
-		return "", tokenErr
-	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(authpkg.RuntimeProfile()) != "" {
-		if tokenErr != nil {
-			return "", tokenErr
-		}
-		return "", nil
-	}
-	manager := newLegacyTokenManager(configDir)
-	if leg, _, err := manager.GetToken(); err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(leg) != "" {
-		return strings.TrimSpace(leg), nil
-	}
-	if tokenErr != nil {
-		return "", tokenErr
-	}
-	return "", nil
-}
-
-// ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken resolves a bearer token for HTTP clients that should
-// align with MCP tool calls. Non-empty explicitToken wins. When configDir matches
-// the active edition config directory, the same process-cached path as MCP is used.
-// Otherwise tokens are loaded from configDir with host compatibility hooks applied.
-func ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken(ctx context.Context, configDir, explicitToken string) (string, error) {
-	if t := strings.TrimSpace(explicitToken); t != "" {
-		return t, nil
+// Get resolves an access token for the active runtime profile.
+func (m *TokenManager) Get(ctx context.Context, configDir, explicitToken string) (AccessTokenSnapshot, error) {
+	if token := strings.TrimSpace(explicitToken); token != "" {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{AccessToken: token, Source: "explicit"}, nil
 	}
 	if strings.TrimSpace(configDir) == "" {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("config directory is empty")
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, fmt.Errorf("config directory is empty")
 	}
-	if filepath.Clean(configDir) == filepath.Clean(defaultConfigDir()) {
-		if tok := resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx, ""); tok != "" {
-			return tok, nil
+	key := tokenManagerKey{
+		configDir: canonicalTokenConfigDir(configDir),
+		profile:   strings.TrimSpace(authpkg.RuntimeProfile()),
+	}
+	entry := m.entry(key)
+	entry.mu.Lock()
+	defer entry.mu.Unlock()
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	if m != nil && m.now != nil {
+		now = m.now()
+	}
+	revision, present, err := authpkg.ReadTokenMarkerRevision(configDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+	}
+	if tokenSnapshotUsable(entry.snapshot, now) && present && revision != "" && revision == entry.revision {
+		return entry.snapshot, nil
+	}
+
+	// Treat the marker and credential as one optimistic snapshot. A concurrent
+	// login/refresh between the reads causes a retry instead of caching stale A
+	// under the publication marker for B.
+	for attempt := 0; attempt < 4; attempt++ {
+		beforeRevision, beforePresent, err := authpkg.ReadTokenMarkerRevision(configDir)
+		if err != nil {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
 		}
-		return "", noCredentialsError()
+		snapshot, err := resolveTokenSnapshotWithEdition(ctx, configDir, key.profile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+		}
+		afterRevision, afterPresent, err := authpkg.ReadTokenMarkerRevision(configDir)
+		if err != nil {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+		}
+		if beforePresent != afterPresent || beforeRevision != afterRevision {
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(snapshot.AccessToken) == "" {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, noCredentialsError()
+		}
+		if tokenSnapshotUsable(snapshot, now) && afterPresent && afterRevision != "" {
+			entry.snapshot = snapshot
+			entry.revision = afterRevision
+		} else {
+			entry.snapshot = AccessTokenSnapshot{}
+			entry.revision = ""
+		}
+		return snapshot, nil
 	}
-	tok, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(ctx, configDir)
+	return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, fmt.Errorf("token publication changed repeatedly while resolving credentials")
+}
+
+func (m *TokenManager) entry(key tokenManagerKey) *tokenManagerEntry {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if m.entries == nil {
+		m.entries = make(map[tokenManagerKey]*tokenManagerEntry)
+	}
+	entry := m.entries[key]
+	if entry == nil {
+		entry = &tokenManagerEntry{}
+		m.entries[key] = entry
+	}
+	return entry
+}
+
+func (m *TokenManager) Invalidate() {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	m.entries = make(map[tokenManagerKey]*tokenManagerEntry)
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func resolveTokenSnapshotWithEdition(ctx context.Context, configDir, profile string) (AccessTokenSnapshot, error) {
+	hooks := edition.Get()
+	opaqueStorage := hooks.LoadToken != nil || hooks.SaveToken != nil || hooks.DeleteToken != nil
+	provider := hooks.TokenProvider
+	if provider == nil {
+		snapshot, err := resolveAccessTokenSnapshotFromDir(ctx, configDir, profile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+		}
+		// Opaque edition storage hooks have no publication-revision contract.
+		// Resolve them on every logical request instead of caching a token that
+		// may be replaced outside the default auth store.
+		if opaqueStorage {
+			snapshot.ExpiresAt = time.Time{}
+		}
+		return snapshot, nil
+	}
+	var fallbackSnapshot AccessTokenSnapshot
+	var fallbackCalled bool
+	token, err := provider(ctx, func() (string, error) {
+		fallbackCalled = true
+		var fallbackErr error
+		fallbackSnapshot, fallbackErr = resolveAccessTokenSnapshotFromDir(ctx, configDir, profile)
+		if fallbackErr != nil {
+			return "", fallbackErr
+		}
+		return fallbackSnapshot.AccessToken, nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, fmt.Errorf("edition token provider: %w", err)
+	}
+	token = strings.TrimSpace(token)
+	if token == "" {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, noCredentialsError()
+	}
+	if fallbackCalled && token == fallbackSnapshot.AccessToken {
+		if opaqueStorage {
+			fallbackSnapshot.ExpiresAt = time.Time{}
+		}
+		return fallbackSnapshot, nil
+	}
+	// Edition providers expose no lifetime metadata, so resolve them on every
+	// logical request instead of recreating a process-lifetime string cache.
+	return AccessTokenSnapshot{AccessToken: token, Source: "edition"}, nil
+}
+
+func resolveAccessTokenSnapshotFromDir(ctx context.Context, configDir, profile string) (AccessTokenSnapshot, error) {
+	provider := newAccessTokenProvider(configDir)
+	if snapshotProvider, ok := provider.(accessTokenSnapshotGetter); ok {
+		data, err := snapshotProvider.GetTokenSnapshot(ctx)
+		if err == nil && data != nil && strings.TrimSpace(data.AccessToken) != "" {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{
+				AccessToken: strings.TrimSpace(data.AccessToken),
+				ExpiresAt:   data.ExpiresAt,
+				Source:      "oauth",
+			}, nil
+		}
+		if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+		}
+		if strings.TrimSpace(profile) != "" {
+			return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound
+		}
+		return resolveLegacyToken(configDir, err)
+	}
+
+	token, err := provider.GetAccessToken(ctx)
+	if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(token) != "" {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{AccessToken: strings.TrimSpace(token), Source: "oauth_compat"}, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(profile) != "" {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound
+	}
+	return resolveLegacyToken(configDir, err)
+}
+
+func resolveLegacyToken(configDir string, oauthErr error) (AccessTokenSnapshot, error) {
+	token, source, err := newLegacyTokenManager(configDir).GetToken()
+	if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(token) != "" {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{AccessToken: strings.TrimSpace(token), Source: source}, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, err
+	}
+	if oauthErr != nil {
+		return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, oauthErr
+	}
+	return AccessTokenSnapshot{}, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound
+}
+
+func resolveAccessTokenFromDir(ctx context.Context, configDir string) (string, error) {
+	snapshot, err := resolveAccessTokenSnapshotFromDir(ctx, configDir, authpkg.RuntimeProfile())
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
-	if tok != "" {
-		return tok, nil
+	return snapshot.AccessToken, nil
+}
+
+// ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken resolves every non-runner bearer token through
+// the same TokenManager used by MCP tool calls.
+func ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken(ctx context.Context, configDir, explicitToken string) (string, error) {
+	snapshot, err := runtimeTokenManager.Get(ctx, configDir, explicitToken)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
 	}
-	return "", noCredentialsError()
+	return snapshot.AccessToken, nil
+}
+
+func tokenSnapshotUsable(snapshot AccessTokenSnapshot, now time.Time) bool {
+	return strings.TrimSpace(snapshot.AccessToken) != "" &&
+		!snapshot.ExpiresAt.IsZero() &&
+		now.Before(snapshot.ExpiresAt.Add(-accessTokenRefreshWindow))
+}
+
+func canonicalTokenConfigDir(configDir string) string {
+	if absolute, err := filepath.Abs(configDir); err == nil {
+		return filepath.Clean(absolute)
+	}
+	return filepath.Clean(configDir)
 }
 
 func noCredentialsError() error {
 	if edition.Get().IsEmbedded {
-		return fmt.Errorf("认证信息已失效，请重新认证")
+		return fmt.Errorf("认证信息已失效，请重新认证: %w", authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound)
 	}
-	return fmt.Errorf("no credentials found, run: dws auth login")
+	return fmt.Errorf("no credentials found, run: dws auth login: %w", authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound)
 }

internal/app/app_small_coverage_test.go

@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ func (g fakeAccessTokenGetter) GetAccessToken(context.Context) (string, error) {
 	return g.token, g.err
 }
 
+func (g fakeAccessTokenGetter) ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
+	return g.token, g.err
+}
+
 type fakeLegacyTokenGetter struct {
 	token string
 	err   error
@@ -212,14 +216,16 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageConfigAndTokenSeamsCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(context.Background(), "unused"); !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDecryption) {
 		t.Fatalf("decryption error = %v", err)
 	}
-	newAccessTokenProvider = func(string) accessTokenGetter { return fakeAccessTokenGetter{err: errors.New("missing")} }
+	newAccessTokenProvider = func(string) accessTokenGetter {
+		return fakeAccessTokenGetter{err: authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound}
+	}
 	newLegacyTokenManager = func(string) legacyTokenGetter { return fakeLegacyTokenGetter{token: " legacy "} }
 	if got, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(context.Background(), "unused"); err != nil || got != "legacy" {
 		t.Fatalf("legacy token = %q, %v", got, err)
 	}
 	authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile("corp:user")
 	t.Cleanup(func() { authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile("") })
-	if got, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(context.Background(), "unused"); got != "" || err == nil || err.Error() != "missing" {
+	if got, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(context.Background(), "unused"); got != "" || !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
 		t.Fatalf("explicit profile fallback = token %q error %v, want profile error", got, err)
 	}
 	authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile("")
@@ -246,10 +252,10 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageConfigAndTokenSeamsCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshAndStdioFailureCoverage(t *testing.T) {
-	oldMark, oldFactory := markAccessTokenStale, newRefreshProvider
+	oldLoad, oldFactory := loadRefreshTokenData, newRefreshProvider
 	oldStop := stopStdio
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		markAccessTokenStale, newRefreshProvider = oldMark, oldFactory
+		loadRefreshTokenData, newRefreshProvider = oldLoad, oldFactory
 		stopStdio = oldStop
 		stdioMu.Lock()
 		stdioClients = make(map[string]*transport.StdioClient)
@@ -257,11 +263,13 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshAndStdioFailureCoverage(t *testing.T)
 	})
 	fail := errors.New("failure")
 	_ = oldFactory(t.TempDir())
-	markAccessTokenStale = func(string) error { return fail }
+	loadRefreshTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) { return nil, fail }
 	if _, err := ForceRefreshAccessToken(context.Background(), "config"); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
-		t.Fatalf("mark stale error = %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("load rejected token error = %v", err)
+	}
+	loadRefreshTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
+		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "rejected"}, nil
 	}
-	markAccessTokenStale = func(string) error { return nil }
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		getter fakeAccessTokenGetter
 		want   string
@@ -270,7 +278,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshAndStdioFailureCoverage(t *testing.T)
 		{getter: fakeAccessTokenGetter{token: "  "}, want: "empty"},
 		{getter: fakeAccessTokenGetter{token: " refreshed "}},
 	} {
-		newRefreshProvider = func(string) accessTokenGetter { return tc.getter }
+		newRefreshProvider = func(string) rejectedAccessTokenRefresher { return tc.getter }
 		got, err := ForceRefreshAccessToken(context.Background(), "config")
 		if tc.want != "" && (err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want)) {
 			t.Fatalf("refresh error = %v, want %q", err, tc.want)

internal/app/auth_refresh_retry.go

@@ -15,6 +15,15 @@ package app
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+
+	apperrors "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/errors"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/executor"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/logging"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/authretry"
 )
 
 // authRetryingKey marks a context that has already attempted one
@@ -23,8 +32,35 @@ import (
 // to the user instead.
 type authRetryingKeyType struct{}
 
+type authRefreshFailureError struct {
+	rejection error
+	refresh   error
+}
+
+func (e *authRefreshFailureError) Error() string {
+	return "automatic access token refresh failed"
+}
+
+func (e *authRefreshFailureError) Unwrap() []error {
+	if e == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return []error{e.rejection, e.refresh}
+}
+
 var authRetryingKey = authRetryingKeyType{}
 
+var (
+	runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = forceRefreshRejectedAccessToken
+	runnerExecuteAuthRetry                func(*runtimeRunner, context.Context, string, executor.Invocation) (executor.Result, error)
+)
+
+func init() {
+	runnerExecuteAuthRetry = func(r *runtimeRunner, ctx context.Context, endpoint string, invocation executor.Invocation) (executor.Result, error) {
+		return r.executeInvocation(ctx, endpoint, invocation)
+	}
+}
+
 // IsAuthRetrying reports whether the current context is already inside an
 // AuthRefreshRequired retry. Mirrors IsPatRetrying.
 func IsAuthRetrying(ctx context.Context) bool {
@@ -34,3 +70,103 @@ func IsAuthRetrying(ctx context.Context) bool {
 	v, _ := ctx.Value(authRetryingKey).(bool)
 	return v
 }
+
+func withAuthRetrying(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
+	if ctx == nil {
+		ctx = context.Background()
+	}
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, authRetryingKey, true)
+}
+
+func authRefreshLogger() *slog.Logger {
+	if logger := FileLoggerInstance(); logger != nil {
+		return logger
+	}
+	return slog.Default()
+}
+
+func (r *runtimeRunner) managesRuntimeOAuth(hasPluginAuth bool) bool {
+	if r == nil || hasPluginAuth {
+		return false
+	}
+	return r.globalFlags == nil || strings.TrimSpace(r.globalFlags.Token) == ""
+}
+
+// retryAuthRefreshRequired consumes only the explicit edition marker. It does
+// not infer retryability from free text, generic auth categories, HTTP 403, or
+// ordinary business errors.
+func (r *runtimeRunner) retryAuthRefreshRequired(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	endpoint string,
+	invocation executor.Invocation,
+	rejectedAccessToken string,
+	markerErr error,
+	hasPluginAuth bool,
+) (executor.Result, error, bool) {
+	marker, marked := authretry.As(markerErr)
+	if !marked {
+		return executor.Result{}, nil, false
+	}
+	cause := marker.Cause
+	if cause == nil {
+		cause = markerErr
+	}
+
+	// Explicit --token and plugin credentials are not backed by the default
+	// OAuth refresh store. Preserve the overlay cause without mutating an
+	// unrelated persisted login.
+	if !r.managesRuntimeOAuth(hasPluginAuth) {
+		return executor.Result{}, cause, true
+	}
+	if IsAuthRetrying(ctx) {
+		authRefreshLogger().Warn("auth.runtime.refresh.retry_exhausted",
+			"product", invocation.CanonicalProduct,
+			"tool", invocation.Tool,
+		)
+		return executor.Result{}, cause, true
+	}
+
+	if _, err := runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken(ctx, defaultConfigDir(), rejectedAccessToken); err != nil {
+		// Keep every log credential-safe. The returned error chain retains the
+		// complete cause for in-process diagnosis; even DWS_DEBUG_AUTH must not
+		// serialize an OAuth response body or other attacker-controlled text.
+		authRefreshLogger().Warn("auth.runtime.refresh.failed",
+			"product", invocation.CanonicalProduct,
+			"tool", invocation.Tool,
+			"stage", "force_refresh_rejected_token",
+			"error_type", fmt.Sprintf("%T", err),
+		)
+		logging.AuthDebug("auth.runtime.refresh.failed.detail",
+			"product", invocation.CanonicalProduct,
+			"tool", invocation.Tool,
+			"stage", "force_refresh_rejected_token",
+			"error_type", fmt.Sprintf("%T", err),
+		)
+		combined := &authRefreshFailureError{rejection: cause, refresh: err}
+		return executor.Result{}, apperrors.NewAuth(
+			"automatic access token refresh failed",
+			apperrors.WithOperation("auth/token/refresh"),
+			apperrors.WithReason("auth_refresh_failed"),
+			apperrors.WithHint("本地凭证已保留；可稍后重试，若持续失败请查看认证诊断日志。"),
+			apperrors.WithCause(combined),
+		), true
+	}
+
+	logging.AuthDebug("auth.runtime.refresh.succeeded",
+		"product", invocation.CanonicalProduct,
+		"tool", invocation.Tool,
+	)
+	result, err := runnerExecuteAuthRetry(r, withAuthRetrying(ctx), endpoint, invocation)
+	return result, err, true
+}
+
+// isRefreshableTransportAuthError deliberately excludes HTTP/RPC 403 and
+// generic CategoryAuth values. OnAuthError may request a refresh only for an
+// exact transport-level unauthorized signal.
+func isRefreshableTransportAuthError(err error) bool {
+	var typed *apperrors.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &typed) || typed.Category != apperrors.CategoryAuth {
+		return false
+	}
+	return typed.Reason == "http_401" || typed.RPCCode == 401
+}

internal/app/auth_refresh_retry_runner_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package app
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/audit"
+	authpkg "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/auth"
+	apperrors "github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/errors"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/executor"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/transport"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/authretry"
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/edition"
+)
+
+func installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	previousHooks := edition.Get()
+	previousCall := runnerCallTool
+	previousPreflight := runnerPreflightDocDownload
+	previousRefresh := runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken
+	previousRetry := runnerExecuteAuthRetry
+	previousCapture := runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure
+	previousProfile := authpkg.RuntimeProfile()
+
+	pluginAuthMu.Lock()
+	previousPlugins := pluginAuthRegistry
+	pluginAuthRegistry = make(map[string]*PluginAuth)
+	pluginAuthMu.Unlock()
+
+	runnerPreflightDocDownload = func(*runtimeRunner, context.Context, *transport.Client, string, executor.Invocation) error {
+		return nil
+	}
+	runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure = func(executor.Invocation, error, error) {}
+	authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile("")
+	runtimeTokenManager.Invalidate()
+	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", "")
+	t.Setenv("DWS_DEBUG_AUTH", "0")
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		edition.Override(previousHooks)
+		runnerCallTool = previousCall
+		runnerPreflightDocDownload = previousPreflight
+		runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = previousRefresh
+		runnerExecuteAuthRetry = previousRetry
+		runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure = previousCapture
+		authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile(previousProfile)
+		runtimeTokenManager.Invalidate()
+		pluginAuthMu.Lock()
+		pluginAuthRegistry = previousPlugins
+		pluginAuthMu.Unlock()
+	})
+}
+
+func authRefreshTestRunner(flags *GlobalFlags) *runtimeRunner {
+	return &runtimeRunner{
+		transport:   transport.NewClient(nil),
+		globalFlags: flags,
+		auditSink:   audit.NopSink{},
+	}
+}
+
+func authRefreshTestInvocation() executor.Invocation {
+	return executor.Invocation{
+		CanonicalProduct: "auth-retry-test-product",
+		Tool:             "test_tool",
+		Params:           map[string]any{"value": "safe"},
+	}
+}
+
+func authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir string, token *string, classify func(map[string]any) error) *edition.Hooks {
+	return &edition.Hooks{
+		ConfigDir: func() string { return configDir },
+		TokenProvider: func(context.Context, func() (string, error)) (string, error) {
+			return *token, nil
+		},
+		ClassifyToolResult: classify,
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerRetriesEditionAuthMarkerOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	token := "old-access"
+	rejection := apperrors.NewAuth("server rejected access token", apperrors.WithReason("access_token_rejected"))
+	edition.Override(authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir, &token, func(content map[string]any) error {
+		if expired, _ := content["expired"].(bool); expired {
+			return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: rejection}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}))
+
+	var callTokens []string
+	runnerCallTool = func(client *transport.Client, _ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+		callTokens = append(callTokens, client.AuthToken)
+		if len(callTokens) == 1 {
+			return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"expired": true}}, nil
+		}
+		return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"value": "ok"}}, nil
+	}
+	refreshCalls := 0
+	runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(_ context.Context, gotDir, rejected string) (string, error) {
+		refreshCalls++
+		if gotDir != configDir || rejected != "old-access" {
+			t.Fatalf("refresh input = dir %q token %q", gotDir, rejected)
+		}
+		token = "new-access"
+		return token, nil
+	}
+
+	result, err := authRefreshTestRunner(nil).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if refreshCalls != 1 || len(callTokens) != 2 || callTokens[0] != "old-access" || callTokens[1] != "new-access" {
+		t.Fatalf("refreshes=%d call tokens=%v", refreshCalls, callTokens)
+	}
+	content, _ := result.Response["content"].(map[string]any)
+	if content["value"] != "ok" || content["success"] != true {
+		t.Fatalf("result content = %#v", content)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerRefreshFailurePreservesBothCausesAndSafeLog(t *testing.T) {
+	installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+	t.Setenv("DWS_DEBUG_AUTH", "1")
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	token := "old-access"
+	rejection := apperrors.NewAuth("server rejected access token", apperrors.WithReason("access_token_rejected"))
+	edition.Override(authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir, &token, func(map[string]any) error {
+		return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: rejection}
+	}))
+	runnerCallTool = func(*transport.Client, context.Context, string, string, map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+		return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"expired": true}}, nil
+	}
+	refreshErr := errors.New(`oauth refresh response parse failed: body={"access_token":"access-token-secret","refresh_token":"refresh-token-secret","uid":"uid-secret-value"}`)
+	runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		return "", refreshErr
+	}
+
+	var logs bytes.Buffer
+	previousLogger := slog.Default()
+	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&logs, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug})))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(previousLogger) })
+
+	_, err := authRefreshTestRunner(nil).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation())
+	if !errors.Is(err, rejection) || !errors.Is(err, refreshErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want rejection and refresh causes", err)
+	}
+	var typed *apperrors.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &typed) || typed.Category != apperrors.CategoryAuth || typed.Reason != "auth_refresh_failed" || typed.Operation != "auth/token/refresh" {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh envelope = %#v", typed)
+	}
+	var rendered bytes.Buffer
+	if printErr := apperrors.PrintJSON(&rendered, err); printErr != nil {
+		t.Fatal(printErr)
+	}
+	for _, want := range []string{`"category": "auth"`, `"reason": "auth_refresh_failed"`, `"operation": "auth/token/refresh"`} {
+		if !strings.Contains(rendered.String(), want) {
+			t.Fatalf("structured stderr missing %s: %s", want, rendered.String())
+		}
+	}
+	for _, secret := range []string{"access-token-secret", "refresh-token-secret", "uid-secret-value"} {
+		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secret) || strings.Contains(logs.String(), secret) || strings.Contains(rendered.String(), secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("auth output leaked %q: error=%q logs=%s stderr=%s", secret, err, logs.String(), rendered.String())
+		}
+	}
+	for _, want := range []string{"auth.runtime.refresh.failed", "auth.runtime.refresh.failed.detail", "force_refresh_rejected_token", "error_type"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(logs.String(), want) {
+			t.Fatalf("safe refresh log missing %q: %s", want, logs.String())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerSecondEditionMarkerReturnsSecondCause(t *testing.T) {
+	installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	token := "old-access"
+	firstCause := errors.New("first rejection")
+	secondCause := errors.New("second rejection")
+	edition.Override(authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir, &token, func(content map[string]any) error {
+		attempt, _ := content["attempt"].(int)
+		if attempt == 1 {
+			return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: firstCause}
+		}
+		return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: secondCause}
+	}))
+	calls := 0
+	runnerCallTool = func(*transport.Client, context.Context, string, string, map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+		calls++
+		return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"attempt": calls}}, nil
+	}
+	refreshCalls := 0
+	runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		refreshCalls++
+		token = "new-access"
+		return token, nil
+	}
+
+	_, err := authRefreshTestRunner(nil).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation())
+	if !errors.Is(err, secondCause) || errors.Is(err, firstCause) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want only second rejection cause", err)
+	}
+	if calls != 2 || refreshCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("calls=%d refreshes=%d", calls, refreshCalls)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerOnAuthErrorOnlyRetriesExactUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("http 401 marker retries once", func(t *testing.T) {
+		installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+		configDir := t.TempDir()
+		token := "old-access"
+		rejection := errors.New("transport rejected token")
+		hookCalls := 0
+		hooks := authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir, &token, nil)
+		hooks.OnAuthError = func(string, error) error {
+			hookCalls++
+			return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: rejection}
+		}
+		edition.Override(hooks)
+		calls := 0
+		var callTokens []string
+		runnerCallTool = func(client *transport.Client, _ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+			calls++
+			callTokens = append(callTokens, client.AuthToken)
+			if calls == 1 {
+				return transport.ToolCallResult{}, apperrors.NewAuth("unauthorized", apperrors.WithReason("http_401"))
+			}
+			return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"value": "ok"}}, nil
+		}
+		refreshCalls := 0
+		runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+			refreshCalls++
+			token = "new-access"
+			return token, nil
+		}
+
+		if _, err := authRefreshTestRunner(nil).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation()); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if hookCalls != 1 || refreshCalls != 1 || calls != 2 || strings.Join(callTokens, ",") != "old-access,new-access" {
+			t.Fatalf("hook=%d refresh=%d calls=%d tokens=%v", hookCalls, refreshCalls, calls, callTokens)
+		}
+	})
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		err  error
+	}{
+		{name: "http 403", err: apperrors.NewAuth("forbidden", apperrors.WithReason("http_403"))},
+		{name: "ordinary auth", err: apperrors.NewAuth("load failed", apperrors.WithReason("auth_load_failed"))},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name+" does not enter hook", func(t *testing.T) {
+			installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+			configDir := t.TempDir()
+			token := "old-access"
+			hookCalls := 0
+			hooks := authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir, &token, nil)
+			hooks.OnAuthError = func(string, error) error {
+				hookCalls++
+				return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: errors.New("must not run")}
+			}
+			edition.Override(hooks)
+			runnerCallTool = func(*transport.Client, context.Context, string, string, map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+				return transport.ToolCallResult{}, tc.err
+			}
+			refreshCalls := 0
+			runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+				refreshCalls++
+				return "", nil
+			}
+
+			_, err := authRefreshTestRunner(nil).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation())
+			if !errors.Is(err, tc.err) || hookCalls != 0 || refreshCalls != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("error=%v hook=%d refresh=%d", err, hookCalls, refreshCalls)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerDoesNotRefreshExplicitTokenMarker(t *testing.T) {
+	installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+	rejection := errors.New("explicit token rejected")
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{ClassifyToolResult: func(map[string]any) error {
+		return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: rejection}
+	}})
+	calls := 0
+	runnerCallTool = func(*transport.Client, context.Context, string, string, map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+		calls++
+		return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"expired": true}}, nil
+	}
+	refreshCalls := 0
+	runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		refreshCalls++
+		return "", nil
+	}
+
+	_, err := authRefreshTestRunner(&GlobalFlags{Token: "explicit-token"}).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation())
+	if !errors.Is(err, rejection) || calls != 1 || refreshCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("error=%v calls=%d refresh=%d", err, calls, refreshCalls)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerRetriesPreflightEditionMarkerOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	installAuthRefreshRunnerSeams(t)
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	token := "old-access"
+	rejection := errors.New("preflight token rejected")
+	edition.Override(authRefreshTokenHooks(configDir, &token, nil))
+	preflightCalls := 0
+	runnerPreflightDocDownload = func(*runtimeRunner, context.Context, *transport.Client, string, executor.Invocation) error {
+		preflightCalls++
+		if preflightCalls == 1 {
+			return &authretry.AuthRefreshRequired{Cause: rejection}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	toolCalls := 0
+	runnerCallTool = func(*transport.Client, context.Context, string, string, map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
+		toolCalls++
+		return transport.ToolCallResult{Content: map[string]any{"value": "ok"}}, nil
+	}
+	refreshCalls := 0
+	runnerForceRefreshRejectedAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		refreshCalls++
+		token = "new-access"
+		return token, nil
+	}
+
+	if _, err := authRefreshTestRunner(nil).executeInvocation(context.Background(), "https://example.test", authRefreshTestInvocation()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if preflightCalls != 2 || toolCalls != 1 || refreshCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("preflights=%d tools=%d refreshes=%d", preflightCalls, toolCalls, refreshCalls)
+	}
+}

internal/app/coverage_edges_test.go

@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRecoveryRuntimeHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	defer server.Close()
 	SetDynamicServers([]mcptypes.ServerDescriptor{{Endpoint: server.URL, CLI: mcptypes.CLIOverlay{ID: "devdoc", Tools: []mcptypes.CLITool{{Name: "search_open_platform_docs_rag"}}}}})
 	t.Cleanup(func() { SetDynamicServers(nil) })
-	runtime := &recoveryRuntime{transport: transport.NewClient(server.Client())}
+	runtime := &recoveryRuntime{transport: transport.NewClient(server.Client()), flags: &GlobalFlags{Token: "token"}}
 	got, err := runtime.Search(context.Background(), "query", recovery.RecoveryContext{ToolName: "search"})
 	if err != nil || got.DocSearch.Status != "success" || len(got.KBHits) == 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("recovery search = %#v %v", got, err)
@@ -1650,6 +1650,8 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePersonalSubscriptionAndSourceCoverage(t *testing.T
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePersonalEventCommandRuntimeCoverage(t *testing.T) {
+	authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile("")
+	t.Cleanup(func() { authpkg.SetRuntimeProfile("") })
 	configDir := setupPersonalIdentityToken(t, &authpkg.TokenData{
 		AccessToken: "access", RefreshToken: "refresh", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
 		CorpID: "corp", UserID: "user", ClientID: "client",

internal/app/coverage_more_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRawAPIAndTokenCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	newAccessTokenProvider = func(string) accessTokenGetter { return fakeAccessTokenGetter{} }
 	missing := t.TempDir()
-	if got, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(context.Background(), missing); err != nil || got != "" {
+	if got, err := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(context.Background(), missing); got != "" || !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
 		t.Fatalf("missing access token = %q, %v", got, err)
 	}
 	if _, err := ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken(context.Background(), missing, ""); err == nil {

internal/app/event_command.go

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ func eventStreamBusID(streamOpts eventStreamTicketOptions) string {
 	return "portal-ticket-normal:" + sourceID
 }
 
-func newEventSource(ctx context.Context, configDir, clientID, clientSecret string, streamOpts eventStreamTicketOptions) (*source.DingtalkSource, error) {
+func newEventSource(_ context.Context, configDir, clientID, clientSecret string, streamOpts eventStreamTicketOptions) (*source.DingtalkSource, error) {
 	if !streamOpts.enabled() {
 		return eventNewDingtalkSource(source.Config{
 			ClientID:     clientID,
@@ -421,14 +421,6 @@ func newEventSource(ctx context.Context, configDir, clientID, clientSecret strin
 		})
 	}
 
-	token, err := eventResolveAccessToken(ctx, configDir, "")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("event stream ticket: resolve user token: %w", err)
-	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(token) == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("event stream ticket: empty user token")
-	}
-
 	portalClientID := clientID
 	portalClientSecret := clientSecret
 	if streamOpts.usesPortalNormalMode() {
@@ -440,8 +432,10 @@ func newEventSource(ctx context.Context, configDir, clientID, clientSecret strin
 		ClientID:     portalClientID,
 		ClientSecret: portalClientSecret,
 		PortalTicket: &source.PortalTicketConfig{
-			TicketURL:    eventStreamTicketURL(streamOpts.TicketURL),
-			AccessToken:  token,
+			TicketURL: eventStreamTicketURL(streamOpts.TicketURL),
+			AccessTokenProvider: func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+				return eventResolveAccessToken(ctx, configDir, "")
+			},
 			SourceID:     eventStreamSourceID(streamOpts.SourceID),
 			Mode:         streamOpts.Mode,
 			ClientID:     portalClientID,

internal/app/event_command_full_coverage_test.go

@@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageEventSourcesAndForegroundCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, err := newEventSource(context.Background(), "config", "client", "secret", eventStreamTicketOptions{}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	eventResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) { return "", fail }
 	stream := eventStreamTicketOptions{Mode: "custom"}
-	if _, err := newEventSource(context.Background(), "config", "client", "secret", stream); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
-		t.Fatalf("stream token error = %v", err)
+	var captured source.Config
+	eventNewDingtalkSource = func(cfg source.Config, _ ...source.SourceOption) (*source.DingtalkSource, error) {
+		captured = cfg
+		return &source.DingtalkSource{}, nil
 	}
-	eventResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) { return " ", nil }
-	if _, err := newEventSource(context.Background(), "config", "client", "secret", stream); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("empty stream token succeeded")
+	eventResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) { return "", fail }
+	if _, err := newEventSource(context.Background(), "config", "client", "secret", stream); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stream source construction = %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := captured.PortalTicket.AccessTokenProvider(context.Background()); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
+		t.Fatalf("stream token provider error = %v", err)
 	}
 	eventResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) { return "token", nil }
 	for _, mode := range []string{"custom", "normal"} {

internal/app/event_personal_command.go

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ func runPersonalEventConsume(c *cobra.Command, opts personalConsumeOptions) erro
 		return personalConsumeRun(ctx, cfg)
 	}
 
-	client := personal.NewClient(personalEventControlBaseURL(opts.ControlBaseURL, configDir), identity)
+	client := newPersonalEventControlClient(configDir, personalEventControlBaseURL(opts.ControlBaseURL, configDir), identity)
 	sub, eventKey, ruleType, err := personalEnsureSubscription(ctx, client, identity, opts)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("event consume --as user: %w", err)
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ func runPersonalEventStatus(c *cobra.Command, opts personalStatusOptions) error
 	if status == "" || status == "all" {
 		status = ""
 	}
-	subs, err := personalListSubscriptions(personal.NewClient(personalEventControlBaseURL(opts.ControlBaseURL, configDir), identity), ctx, personal.ListOptions{
+	subs, err := personalListSubscriptions(newPersonalEventControlClient(configDir, personalEventControlBaseURL(opts.ControlBaseURL, configDir), identity), ctx, personal.ListOptions{
 		Status:      status,
 		EventKey:    opts.EventKey,
 		SubscribeID: opts.SubscribeID,
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ func runPersonalEventStop(c *cobra.Command, opts personalStopOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("event stop --as user: %w", err)
 	}
-	client := personal.NewClient(personalEventControlBaseURL(opts.ControlBaseURL, configDir), identity)
+	client := newPersonalEventControlClient(configDir, personalEventControlBaseURL(opts.ControlBaseURL, configDir), identity)
 	for _, id := range subscribeIDs {
 		if err := personalDeleteSubscription(client, ctx, id); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("event stop --as user: cancel subscription %s: %w", id, err)
@@ -723,7 +723,10 @@ func resolvePersonalEventIdentity(ctx context.Context, configDir string, sourceI
 	if err != nil {
 		return personal.Identity{}, err
 	}
-	tokenData, _ := personalLoadTokenData(configDir)
+	tokenData, err := personalLoadTokenData(configDir)
+	if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		return personal.Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("load OAuth identity metadata: %w", err)
+	}
 	var corpID, userID, clientID, refreshToken string
 	if tokenData != nil {
 		corpID = tokenData.CorpID
@@ -769,6 +772,15 @@ func resolvePersonalEventIdentity(ctx context.Context, configDir string, sourceI
 	}, nil
 }
 
+func newPersonalEventControlClient(configDir, baseURL string, identity personal.Identity) *personal.Client {
+	identity.AccessToken = ""
+	client := personal.NewClient(baseURL, identity)
+	client.AccessTokenProvider = func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+		return personalResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken(ctx, configDir, "")
+	}
+	return client
+}
+
 func personalTokenSubject(kind, token string) string {
 	token = strings.TrimSpace(token)
 	if token == "" {
@@ -817,7 +829,9 @@ func newPersonalStreamSource(ctx context.Context, opts personalStreamSourceOptio
 	}
 	_ = ctx
 	return source.NewPersonal(source.PersonalConfig{
-		AccessToken:  opts.Identity.AccessToken,
+		AccessTokenProvider: func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+			return personalResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken(ctx, opts.ConfigDir, "")
+		},
 		ClientID:     clientID,
 		ClientSecret: clientSecret,
 		SourceID:     opts.Identity.SourceID,

internal/app/force_refresh.go

@@ -27,9 +27,13 @@ type accessTokenGetter interface {
 	GetAccessToken(context.Context) (string, error)
 }
 
+type rejectedAccessTokenRefresher interface {
+	ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Context, string) (string, error)
+}
+
 var (
-	markAccessTokenStale = authpkg.MarkAccessTokenStale
-	newRefreshProvider   = func(configDir string) accessTokenGetter {
+	loadRefreshTokenData = authpkg.LoadTokenData
+	newRefreshProvider   = func(configDir string) rejectedAccessTokenRefresher {
 		disc := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
 		provider := authpkg.NewOAuthProvider(configDir, disc)
 		configureOAuthProviderCompatibility(provider, configDir)
@@ -42,26 +46,33 @@ var (
 // server-side rejection (HTTP 401 or business code such as
 // TOKEN_VERIFIED_FAILED) on what locally appeared to be a still-valid token.
 //
-// Steps:
-//  1. MarkAccessTokenStale rewrites ExpiresAt to a past instant so
-//     OAuthProvider.GetAccessToken's fast-path will miss.
-//  2. NewOAuthProvider + GetAccessToken triggers lockedRefresh, which uses the
-//     existing dual-layer lock (process + file) to serialize concurrent
-//     refresh attempts across goroutines and processes.
-//  3. ResetRuntimeTokenCache clears the per-process sync.Once cache so the
-//     next resolveAuthToken call re-reads from disk.
-//
-// Existing OAuthProvider.GetAccessToken behaviour is unchanged; this helper
-// is the only entry point that orchestrates "force refresh" semantics.
+// It snapshots the current access token, then delegates to the OAuth
+// provider's dual-locked compare-and-refresh operation. If another caller has
+// already rotated the token, that newer token is reused without another
+// refresh request.
 func ForceRefreshAccessToken(ctx context.Context, configDir string) (string, error) {
 	if strings.TrimSpace(configDir) == "" {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("config directory is empty")
 	}
-	if err := markAccessTokenStale(configDir); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("mark access token stale: %w", err)
+	data, err := loadRefreshTokenData(configDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if data == nil || strings.TrimSpace(data.AccessToken) == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("stored access token is empty")
+	}
+	return forceRefreshRejectedAccessToken(ctx, configDir, data.AccessToken)
+}
+
+func forceRefreshRejectedAccessToken(ctx context.Context, configDir, rejectedAccessToken string) (string, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(configDir) == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("config directory is empty")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(rejectedAccessToken) == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rejected access token is empty")
 	}
 	provider := newRefreshProvider(configDir)
-	tok, err := provider.GetAccessToken(ctx)
+	tok, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(ctx, rejectedAccessToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}

internal/app/pat_auth_retry.go

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ var openBrowserFunc = tryOpenBrowser
 var (
 	patAuthorizationTimeout       = PatAuthRetryTimeout
 	patAuthorizationPollInterval  = PatAuthPollInterval
-	patLoadTokenData              = authpkg.LoadTokenData
+	patResolveAccessToken         = ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken
 	patWaitForAuthorization       = WaitForPatAuthorization
 	patPollDeviceFlowWithInterval = pollPatDeviceFlowWithInterval
 	patSaveAppConfig              = authpkg.SaveAppConfig
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func patAuthorizationURIFromData(data map[string]any) string {
 
 // WaitForPatAuthorization polls until the user completes authorization or timeout.
 // It returns true if authorization was completed, false if timed out or cancelled.
-func WaitForPatAuthorization(ctx context.Context, configDir string, output io.Writer) bool {
+func WaitForPatAuthorization(ctx context.Context, configDir string, output io.Writer) (bool, error) {
 	timeout := patAuthorizationTimeout
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
 	pollTicker := time.NewTicker(patAuthorizationPollInterval)
@@ -290,27 +290,26 @@ func WaitForPatAuthorization(ctx context.Context, configDir string, output io.Wr
 		select {
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 			fmt.Fprintf(output, "%s 操作已取消\n", tui.StateMark("error"))
-			return false
+			return false, ctx.Err()
 
 		case <-time.After(time.Until(deadline)):
 			fmt.Fprintf(output, "%s 等待授权超时 (%s)\n", tui.StateMark("error"), timeout)
 			fmt.Fprintf(output, "  %s 请重新执行命令\n", tui.Dim("ℹ"))
-			return false
+			return false, nil
 
 		case <-pollTicker.C:
 			pollCount++
 			elapsed := time.Since(start).Truncate(time.Second)
 			remaining := time.Until(deadline).Truncate(time.Second)
 
-			// Check if token is now valid
-			tokenData, err := patLoadTokenData(configDir)
-			if err == nil && tokenData != nil {
-				if tokenData.IsAccessTokenValid() || tokenData.IsRefreshTokenValid() {
-					fmt.Fprintf(output, "\r%s %s (%s 已用, %s 剩余)          \n",
-						tui.StateMark("ok"), tui.Bold("授权成功!"), elapsed, remaining)
-					fmt.Fprintln(output)
-					return true
-				}
+			// Check the same resolver used by every outbound bearer request.
+			if _, err := patResolveAccessToken(ctx, configDir, ""); err == nil {
+				fmt.Fprintf(output, "\r%s %s (%s 已用, %s 剩余)          \n",
+					tui.StateMark("ok"), tui.Bold("授权成功!"), elapsed, remaining)
+				fmt.Fprintln(output)
+				return true, nil
+			} else if !stderrors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+				return false, fmt.Errorf("check authorization token: %w", err)
 			}
 
 			// Show polling status
@@ -340,7 +339,10 @@ func retryWithPatAuthRetry(ctx context.Context, runner executor.Runner, invocati
 	PrintPatAuthError(output, scopeErr)
 
 	// Wait for user to complete authorization
-	authorized := patWaitForAuthorization(ctx, configDir, output)
+	authorized, waitErr := patWaitForAuthorization(ctx, configDir, output)
+	if waitErr != nil {
+		return executor.Result{}, waitErr
+	}
 	if !authorized {
 		return executor.Result{}, apperrors.NewAuth(
 			"等待用户授权超时",
@@ -794,12 +796,6 @@ func pollPatDeviceFlowWithInterval(ctx context.Context, flowID string, configDir
 	pollURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s?flowId=%s",
 		authpkg.GetMCPBaseURL(), authpkg.DevicePollPath, url.QueryEscape(flowID))
 
-	// Load user access token for the poll request header.
-	var accessToken string
-	if tokenData, err := authpkg.LoadTokenData(configDir); err == nil && tokenData != nil {
-		accessToken = tokenData.AccessToken
-	}
-
 	// Use a client that does NOT follow redirects, so we can detect SSO 302.
 	noRedirectClient := &http.Client{
 		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
@@ -828,6 +824,10 @@ func pollPatDeviceFlowWithInterval(ctx context.Context, flowID string, configDir
 				slog.Debug("PAT poll: failed to create request", "error", err)
 				continue
 			}
+			accessToken, tokenErr := patResolveAccessToken(ctx, configDir, "")
+			if tokenErr != nil && !stderrors.Is(tokenErr, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+				return "", "", fmt.Errorf("resolve PAT poll access token: %w", tokenErr)
+			}
 			if accessToken != "" {
 				req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", accessToken)
 			}

internal/app/pat_auth_retry_full_coverage_test.go

@@ -52,39 +52,41 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePATRetryRemainingPureAndWaitCoverage(t *testing.T)
 
 	oldTimeout := patAuthorizationTimeout
 	oldInterval := patAuthorizationPollInterval
-	oldLoad := patLoadTokenData
+	oldResolve := patResolveAccessToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		patAuthorizationTimeout = oldTimeout
 		patAuthorizationPollInterval = oldInterval
-		patLoadTokenData = oldLoad
+		patResolveAccessToken = oldResolve
 	})
 	patAuthorizationTimeout = 50 * time.Millisecond
 	patAuthorizationPollInterval = time.Millisecond
-	patLoadTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
-		return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "token", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}, nil
+	patResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		return "token", nil
 	}
 	out.Reset()
-	if !WaitForPatAuthorization(context.Background(), "", &out) {
+	if ok, err := WaitForPatAuthorization(context.Background(), "", &out); err != nil || !ok {
 		t.Fatal("valid token did not authorize")
 	}
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	cancel()
 	out.Reset()
-	if WaitForPatAuthorization(ctx, "", &out) {
-		t.Fatal("cancelled authorization succeeded")
+	if ok, err := WaitForPatAuthorization(ctx, "", &out); ok || !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("cancelled authorization = %v, %v", ok, err)
 	}
 	patAuthorizationTimeout = time.Millisecond
 	patAuthorizationPollInterval = time.Hour
 	out.Reset()
-	if WaitForPatAuthorization(context.Background(), "", &out) {
-		t.Fatal("timed out authorization succeeded")
+	if ok, err := WaitForPatAuthorization(context.Background(), "", &out); err != nil || ok {
+		t.Fatalf("timed out authorization = %v, %v", ok, err)
 	}
 	patAuthorizationTimeout = 5 * time.Millisecond
 	patAuthorizationPollInterval = time.Millisecond
-	patLoadTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) { return nil, nil }
+	patResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		return "", authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound
+	}
 	out.Reset()
-	if WaitForPatAuthorization(context.Background(), "", &out) || !strings.Contains(out.String(), "等待授权中") {
-		t.Fatalf("invalid-token polling output = %q", out.String())
+	if ok, err := WaitForPatAuthorization(context.Background(), "", &out); err != nil || ok || !strings.Contains(out.String(), "等待授权中") {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid-token polling = %v, %v, output %q", ok, err, out.String())
 	}
 }
 
@@ -109,12 +111,12 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePATRetryRemainingOrchestrationCoverage(t *testing.
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
 
 	scope := &PatScopeError{OriginalError: "missing", Identity: "user", ErrorType: "missing_scope", Message: "missing", Hint: "login", MissingScope: "calendar:read"}
-	patWaitForAuthorization = func(context.Context, string, io.Writer) bool { return false }
+	patWaitForAuthorization = func(context.Context, string, io.Writer) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
 	if _, err := retryWithPatAuthRetry(context.Background(), runnerCoverageFallback{}, executor.Invocation{}, scope, t.TempDir(), io.Discard); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("PAT retry timeout succeeded")
 	}
 	wantErr := errors.New("runner failed")
-	patWaitForAuthorization = func(context.Context, string, io.Writer) bool { return true }
+	patWaitForAuthorization = func(context.Context, string, io.Writer) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
 	if _, err := retryWithPatAuthRetry(context.Background(), runnerCoverageFallback{err: wantErr}, executor.Invocation{}, scope, t.TempDir(), io.Discard); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
 		t.Fatalf("authorized retry = %v", err)
 	}
@@ -215,15 +217,15 @@ func patRaw(flowID, clientID, secret string) string {
 func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePATRetryRemainingPollAndBrowserCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 	oldDo := patPollHTTPDo
 	oldRequest := patPollNewRequest
-	oldLoad := patLoadTokenData
+	oldResolve := patResolveAccessToken
 	oldBrowser := patBrowserOpenCommand
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		patPollHTTPDo = oldDo
 		patPollNewRequest = oldRequest
-		patLoadTokenData = oldLoad
+		patResolveAccessToken = oldResolve
 		patBrowserOpenCommand = oldBrowser
 	})
-	patLoadTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) { return &authpkg.TokenData{AccessToken: "token"}, nil }
+	patResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) { return "token", nil }
 	cancelled, cancelNow := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	cancelNow()
 	if status, _, err := pollPatDeviceFlowWithInterval(cancelled, "flow", t.TempDir(), io.Discard, 0); err != nil || status != authpkg.StatusCancelled {

internal/app/recovery_command.go

@@ -333,7 +333,11 @@ func (r *recoveryRuntime) CallToolDirect(ctx context.Context, serverID, toolName
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	tc := r.transport.WithAuth(resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx, recoveryRuntimeToken(r.flags)), resolveIdentityHeaders())
+	authToken, err := resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx, recoveryRuntimeToken(r.flags))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, tokenResolutionError(err)
+	}
+	tc := r.transport.WithAuth(authToken, resolveIdentityHeaders())
 	result, err := tc.CallTool(ctx, endpoint, toolName, args)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

internal/app/runner.go

@@ -235,7 +235,9 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) runSingle(ctx context.Context, invocation executor.Invoc
 	// ~70ms on macOS; starting it here lets the load overlap with endpoint
 	// resolution and catalog loading below.
 	if prefetchToken {
-		go runnerGetCachedRuntimeToken(ctx)
+		go func() {
+			_, _ = runnerGetCachedRuntimeToken(ctx)
+		}()
 	}
 
 	if shouldUseDirectRuntime(invocation) {
@@ -534,8 +536,12 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 	authToken := ""
 	if hasPluginAuth {
 		authToken = pluginAuth.Token
-	} else {
-		authToken = r.resolveAuthToken(ctx)
+	} else if !invocation.DryRun && (r.globalFlags == nil || !r.globalFlags.Mock) {
+		var tokenErr error
+		authToken, tokenErr = r.resolveAuthToken(ctx)
+		if tokenErr != nil {
+			return executor.Result{}, tokenResolutionError(tokenErr)
+		}
 	}
 
 	var timeoutSec int
@@ -617,6 +623,12 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 			}
 			return runnerHandlePatAuthCheck(ctx, r, invocation, patCheck, defaultConfigDir(), os.Stderr)
 		}
+		if result, retryErr, handled := r.retryAuthRefreshRequired(ctx, endpoint, invocation, authToken, err, hasPluginAuth); handled {
+			if retryErr != nil {
+				runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, err, retryErr)
+			}
+			return result, retryErr
+		}
 		runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, err, err)
 		return executor.Result{}, err
 	}
@@ -625,9 +637,15 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 	callResult, err := runnerCallTool(tc, callCtx, endpoint, invocation.Tool, invocation.Params)
 	RecordTiming(ctx, "mcp_call", time.Since(callStart))
 	if err != nil {
-		if isAuthError(err) {
+		if isRefreshableTransportAuthError(err) {
 			if fn := edition.Get().OnAuthError; fn != nil {
 				if overrideErr := fn(defaultConfigDir(), err); overrideErr != nil {
+					if result, retryErr, handled := r.retryAuthRefreshRequired(ctx, endpoint, invocation, authToken, overrideErr, hasPluginAuth); handled {
+						if retryErr != nil {
+							runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, err, retryErr)
+						}
+						return result, retryErr
+					}
 					runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, err, overrideErr)
 					return executor.Result{}, overrideErr
 				}
@@ -652,6 +670,12 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 				}
 				return runnerHandlePatAuthCheck(ctx, r, invocation, patCheck, defaultConfigDir(), os.Stderr)
 			}
+			if result, retryErr, handled := r.retryAuthRefreshRequired(ctx, endpoint, invocation, authToken, editionErr, hasPluginAuth); handled {
+				if retryErr != nil {
+					runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, editionErr, retryErr)
+				}
+				return result, retryErr
+			}
 			return executor.Result{}, editionErr
 		}
 	}
@@ -672,6 +696,12 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeInvocation(ctx context.Context, endpoint string,
 		// patterns (PAT permission, gateway-auth) before generic handling.
 		if classify := edition.Get().ClassifyToolResult; classify != nil {
 			if hookErr := classify(callResult.Content); hookErr != nil {
+				if result, retryErr, handled := r.retryAuthRefreshRequired(ctx, endpoint, invocation, authToken, hookErr, hasPluginAuth); handled {
+					if retryErr != nil {
+						runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, hookErr, retryErr)
+					}
+					return result, retryErr
+				}
 				runnerCaptureRuntimeFailure(invocation, hookErr, hookErr)
 				return executor.Result{}, hookErr
 			}
@@ -796,67 +826,49 @@ func (r *runtimeRunner) executeStdioInvocation(ctx context.Context, invocation e
 	}, nil
 }
 
-func (r *runtimeRunner) resolveAuthToken(ctx context.Context) string {
+func (r *runtimeRunner) resolveAuthToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 	explicitToken := ""
 	if r != nil && r.globalFlags != nil {
 		explicitToken = r.globalFlags.Token
 	}
-	if token := strings.TrimSpace(explicitToken); token != "" {
-		return token
-	}
-	if tp := edition.Get().TokenProvider; tp != nil {
-		token, _ := tp(ctx, func() (string, error) {
-			return resolveAccessTokenFromDir(ctx, defaultConfigDir())
-		})
-		return token
-	}
-	return getCachedRuntimeToken(ctx)
+	return resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx, explicitToken)
 }
 
-func resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx context.Context, explicitToken string) string {
-	if token := strings.TrimSpace(explicitToken); token != "" {
-		return token
+func resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx context.Context, explicitToken string) (string, error) {
+	snapshot, err := runtimeTokenManager.Get(ctx, defaultConfigDir(), explicitToken)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
 	}
-	// Use cached token to avoid repeated Keychain access (~70ms per call)
-	return getCachedRuntimeToken(ctx)
+	return snapshot.AccessToken, nil
 }
 
-// Cached token state for process lifetime
-var (
-	cachedRuntimeTokenMu sync.Mutex
-	cachedRuntimeTokens  = map[string]string{}
-)
-
-// getCachedRuntimeToken returns a cached access token, loading it only once per process.
-// This avoids repeated Keychain access which takes ~70ms each time.
-func getCachedRuntimeToken(ctx context.Context) string {
-	cacheKey := strings.TrimSpace(authpkg.RuntimeProfile())
-	if cacheKey == "" {
-		cacheKey = "__default__"
-	}
-	cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Lock()
-	if token := cachedRuntimeTokens[cacheKey]; token != "" {
-		cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Unlock()
-		return token
-	}
-	cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Unlock()
-
+// getCachedRuntimeToken is kept as the prefetch seam used by runner tests. The
+// cache itself lives exclusively in TokenManager.
+func getCachedRuntimeToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 	loadStart := time.Now()
 	defer func() { RecordTiming(ctx, "auth_keychain", time.Since(loadStart)) }()
+	return resolveRuntimeAuthToken(ctx, "")
+}
 
-	configDir := defaultConfigDir()
-	token, tokenErr := resolveAccessTokenFromDir(ctx, configDir)
-	if tokenErr != nil && errors.Is(tokenErr, authpkg.ErrTokenDecryption) {
-		slog.Error(tokenErr.Error())
-		return ""
+func tokenResolutionError(err error) error {
+	if err == nil {
+		return nil
 	}
-	if token == "" {
-		return ""
+	if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
+		return err
 	}
-	cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Lock()
-	cachedRuntimeTokens[cacheKey] = token
-	cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Unlock()
-	return token
+	if errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		return apperrors.NewAuth(
+			"未登录，请先执行 dws auth login",
+			apperrors.WithReason("not_authenticated"),
+			apperrors.WithHint("运行 'dws auth login' 完成登录后重试"),
+			apperrors.WithActions("dws auth login"),
+			apperrors.WithCause(err),
+		)
+	}
+	// Keychain, parse, permission, lock, and refresh failures are real local or
+	// network errors. Preserve their cause instead of disguising them as logout.
+	return fmt.Errorf("resolve access token: %w", err)
 }
 
 // generateExecutionID returns a random 16-char hex string used to correlate
@@ -871,9 +883,7 @@ func generateExecutionID() string {
 // ResetRuntimeTokenCache clears the cached token, forcing a reload on next access.
 // This should be called after login/logout operations.
 func ResetRuntimeTokenCache() {
-	cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Lock()
-	defer cachedRuntimeTokenMu.Unlock()
-	cachedRuntimeTokens = map[string]string{}
+	runtimeTokenManager.Invalidate()
 }
 
 func newRuntimeContentScanner() safety.Scanner {

internal/app/runner_full_coverage_test.go

@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerRemainingRoutingCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 
 	inv := executor.Invocation{CanonicalProduct: "product", Tool: "tool"}
 	prefetched := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	runnerGetCachedRuntimeToken = func(context.Context) string {
+	runnerGetCachedRuntimeToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) {
 		prefetched <- struct{}{}
-		return ""
+		return "", nil
 	}
 	r := &runtimeRunner{
 		loader:    cli.CatalogLoaderFrom(cli.Catalog{}, wantErr),
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerRemainingExecutionCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	authErr := apperrors.NewAuth("expired")
+	authErr := apperrors.NewAuth("expired", apperrors.WithReason("http_401"))
 	runnerCallTool = func(*transport.Client, context.Context, string, string, map[string]any) (transport.ToolCallResult, error) {
 		return transport.ToolCallResult{}, authErr
 	}
@@ -329,19 +329,19 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunnerRemainingStdioAuthAndHeadersCoverage(t *test
 	}
 
 	r.globalFlags.Token = " explicit "
-	if got := r.resolveAuthToken(context.Background()); got != "explicit" {
-		t.Fatalf("explicit auth token = %q", got)
+	if got, err := r.resolveAuthToken(context.Background()); err != nil || got != "explicit" {
+		t.Fatalf("explicit auth token = %q, %v", got, err)
 	}
 	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{TokenProvider: func(_ context.Context, fallback func() (string, error)) (string, error) {
 		_, _ = fallback()
 		return "provided", nil
 	}})
 	r.globalFlags.Token = ""
-	if got := r.resolveAuthToken(context.Background()); got != "provided" {
-		t.Fatalf("provided auth token = %q", got)
+	if got, err := r.resolveAuthToken(context.Background()); err != nil || got != "provided" {
+		t.Fatalf("provided auth token = %q, %v", got, err)
 	}
-	if got := resolveRuntimeAuthToken(context.Background(), " runtime "); got != "runtime" {
-		t.Fatalf("runtime explicit token = %q", got)
+	if got, err := resolveRuntimeAuthToken(context.Background(), " runtime "); err != nil || got != "runtime" {
+		t.Fatalf("runtime explicit token = %q, %v", got, err)
 	}
 
 	t.Setenv(envDWSChannel, "channel")

internal/app/skill_command.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"archive/zip"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"mime"
@@ -36,25 +37,25 @@ import (
 )
 
 var (
-	skillLoadAccessToken   = loadSkillAccessToken
-	skillDownloadToTmp     = downloadSkillToTmpDir
-	skillHTTPDo            = func(client *http.Client, req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return client.Do(req) }
-	skillNewRequest        = http.NewRequestWithContext
-	skillLoadTokenData     = authpkg.LoadTokenData
-	skillResolveTargetPath = resolveSkillTargetPath
-	skillFetchDownloadInfo = fetchSkillDownloadInfo
-	skillDownloadFile      = downloadSkillFile
-	skillExtractZip        = extractSkillZip
-	skillUserHomeDir       = os.UserHomeDir
-	skillMkdirTemp         = os.MkdirTemp
-	skillCreate            = os.Create
-	skillCreateTemp        = os.CreateTemp
-	skillRemoveAll         = os.RemoveAll
-	skillRemove            = os.Remove
-	skillMkdirAll          = os.MkdirAll
-	skillOpenFile          = os.OpenFile
-	skillCopy              = io.Copy
-	skillOpenZipFile       = func(file *zip.File) (io.ReadCloser, error) { return file.Open() }
+	skillLoadAccessToken    = loadSkillAccessToken
+	skillDownloadToTmp      = downloadSkillToTmpDir
+	skillHTTPDo             = func(client *http.Client, req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return client.Do(req) }
+	skillNewRequest         = http.NewRequestWithContext
+	skillResolveAccessToken = ResolveAuxiliaryAccessToken
+	skillResolveTargetPath  = resolveSkillTargetPath
+	skillFetchDownloadInfo  = fetchSkillDownloadInfo
+	skillDownloadFile       = downloadSkillFile
+	skillExtractZip         = extractSkillZip
+	skillUserHomeDir        = os.UserHomeDir
+	skillMkdirTemp          = os.MkdirTemp
+	skillCreate             = os.Create
+	skillCreateTemp         = os.CreateTemp
+	skillRemoveAll          = os.RemoveAll
+	skillRemove             = os.Remove
+	skillMkdirAll           = os.MkdirAll
+	skillOpenFile           = os.OpenFile
+	skillCopy               = io.Copy
+	skillOpenZipFile        = func(file *zip.File) (io.ReadCloser, error) { return file.Open() }
 )
 
 func init() {
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ func newSkillAddHintCommand() *cobra.Command {
 
 func runSkillGet(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 	skillID, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("skill-id")
-	accessToken, err := skillLoadAccessToken()
+	accessToken, err := skillLoadAccessToken(cmd.Context())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -319,7 +320,7 @@ func runSkillFind(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 	if source == "" {
 		source, _ = cmd.Flags().GetString("scopes")
 	}
-	accessToken, err := skillLoadAccessToken()
+	accessToken, err := skillLoadAccessToken(cmd.Context())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -388,7 +389,7 @@ func runSkillAdd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 		return apperrors.NewValidation(fmt.Sprintf("invalid target '%s': %v. Supported targets: %s", target, err, supportedTargets()))
 	}
 
-	accessToken, err := skillLoadAccessToken()
+	accessToken, err := skillLoadAccessToken(cmd.Context())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -441,13 +442,16 @@ func runSkillAdd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func loadSkillAccessToken() (string, error) {
+func loadSkillAccessToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 	configDir := defaultConfigDir()
-	tokenData, err := skillLoadTokenData(configDir)
-	if err != nil || tokenData == nil || !tokenData.IsAccessTokenValid() {
+	token, err := skillResolveAccessToken(ctx, configDir, "")
+	if errors.Is(err, authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
 		return "", skillAuthError()
 	}
-	return tokenData.AccessToken, nil
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve skill access token: %w", err)
+	}
+	return token, nil
 }
 
 func skillAuthError() error {

internal/app/skill_command_full_coverage_test.go

@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageSkillCommandHighLevelRemainingCoverage(t *testing.
 	})
 	fail := errors.New("failure")
 	cmd := skillCoverageCommand()
-	skillLoadAccessToken = func() (string, error) { return "", fail }
+	skillLoadAccessToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "", fail }
 	if err := runSkillGet(cmd, nil); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
 		t.Fatalf("skill get auth error = %v", err)
 	}
-	skillLoadAccessToken = func() (string, error) { return "token", nil }
+	skillLoadAccessToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "token", nil }
 	skillNewRequest = func(context.Context, string, string, io.Reader) (*http.Request, error) { return nil, fail }
 	if err := runSkillFind(cmd, nil); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("skill find request failure should propagate")
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageSkillCommandHighLevelRemainingCoverage(t *testing.
 		t.Fatalf("skill get download error = %v", err)
 	}
 
-	skillLoadAccessToken = func() (string, error) { return "", fail }
+	skillLoadAccessToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "", fail }
 	if err := runSkillFind(cmd, nil); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
 		t.Fatalf("skill find auth error = %v", err)
 	}
-	skillLoadAccessToken = func() (string, error) { return "token", nil }
+	skillLoadAccessToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "token", nil }
 	skillHTTPDo = func(*http.Client, *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return nil, fail }
 	if err := runSkillFind(cmd, nil); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("skill find network failure should propagate")
@@ -111,11 +111,11 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageSkillCommandHighLevelRemainingCoverage(t *testing.
 		t.Fatal("invalid skill target should fail")
 	}
 	skillResolveTargetPath = func(string) (string, error) { return "dest", nil }
-	skillLoadAccessToken = func() (string, error) { return "", fail }
+	skillLoadAccessToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "", fail }
 	if err := runSkillAdd(cmd, []string{"id", "target"}); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
 		t.Fatalf("skill add auth error = %v", err)
 	}
-	skillLoadAccessToken = func() (string, error) { return "token", nil }
+	skillLoadAccessToken = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "token", nil }
 	skillFetchDownloadInfo = func(context.Context, string, string) (*downloadSkillResponse, error) { return nil, fail }
 	if err := runSkillAdd(cmd, []string{"id", "target"}); !errors.Is(err, fail) {
 		t.Fatalf("skill info error = %v", err)
@@ -152,25 +152,35 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageSkillCommandHighLevelRemainingCoverage(t *testing.
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageSkillCommandLowLevelRemainingCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 	oldHTTP := skillHTTPDo
-	oldNewRequest, oldLoadToken := skillNewRequest, skillLoadTokenData
+	oldNewRequest, oldResolveToken := skillNewRequest, skillResolveAccessToken
 	oldHome := skillUserHomeDir
 	oldMkdirTemp, oldCreate, oldCreateTemp := skillMkdirTemp, skillCreate, skillCreateTemp
 	oldRemoveAll, oldRemove, oldMkdir := skillRemoveAll, skillRemove, skillMkdirAll
 	oldOpen, oldCopy, oldZipOpen := skillOpenFile, skillCopy, skillOpenZipFile
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		skillHTTPDo = oldHTTP
-		skillNewRequest, skillLoadTokenData = oldNewRequest, oldLoadToken
+		skillNewRequest, skillResolveAccessToken = oldNewRequest, oldResolveToken
 		skillUserHomeDir = oldHome
 		skillMkdirTemp, skillCreate, skillCreateTemp = oldMkdirTemp, oldCreate, oldCreateTemp
 		skillRemoveAll, skillRemove, skillMkdirAll = oldRemoveAll, oldRemove, oldMkdir
 		skillOpenFile, skillCopy, skillOpenZipFile = oldOpen, oldCopy, oldZipOpen
 	})
 	fail := errors.New("failure")
-	skillLoadTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) { return nil, nil }
-	if _, err := loadSkillAccessToken(); err == nil {
+	skillResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		return "", authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound
+	}
+	if _, err := loadSkillAccessToken(context.Background()); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("invalid skill access token succeeded")
 	}
-	skillLoadTokenData = oldLoadToken
+	canceled, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	skillResolveAccessToken = func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (string, error) {
+		return "", ctx.Err()
+	}
+	if _, err := loadSkillAccessToken(canceled); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("skill token cancellation = %v", err)
+	}
+	skillResolveAccessToken = oldResolveToken
 	skillNewRequest = func(context.Context, string, string, io.Reader) (*http.Request, error) { return nil, fail }
 	if _, err := fetchSkillDownloadInfo(context.Background(), "token", "id"); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("download-info request failure should propagate")

internal/app/skill_command_test.go

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
@@ -397,9 +396,11 @@ func TestSkillInstallRequiresAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	configDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "config")
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", configDir)
 	t.Cleanup(CloseFileLogger)
-	originalLoadToken := skillLoadTokenData
-	skillLoadTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) { return nil, errors.New("missing") }
-	t.Cleanup(func() { skillLoadTokenData = originalLoadToken })
+	originalResolveToken := skillResolveAccessToken
+	skillResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		return "", authpkg.ErrTokenDataNotFound
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { skillResolveAccessToken = originalResolveToken })
 
 	// Ensure the config directory exists but has no token
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(configDir, 0755); err != nil {
@@ -679,16 +680,11 @@ func TestSkillSearchUsesSourceQueryAndKeepsScopesCompat(t *testing.T) {
 	configDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config")
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", configDir)
 	t.Cleanup(CloseFileLogger)
-	originalLoadToken := skillLoadTokenData
-	skillLoadTokenData = func(string) (*authpkg.TokenData, error) {
-		return &authpkg.TokenData{
-			AccessToken:  "test-token",
-			RefreshToken: "refresh-token",
-			ExpiresAt:    time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
-			RefreshExpAt: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
-		}, nil
+	originalResolveToken := skillResolveAccessToken
+	skillResolveAccessToken = func(context.Context, string, string) (string, error) {
+		return "test-token", nil
 	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { skillLoadTokenData = originalLoadToken })
+	t.Cleanup(func() { skillResolveAccessToken = originalResolveToken })
 
 	var gotSources []string
 	var gotScopes []string

internal/app/testmain_test.go

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 		_ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
 		panic("set " + keychain.StorageDirEnv + ": " + err.Error())
 	}
+	if err := os.Setenv(keychain.TestNamespaceEnv, tmpDir); err != nil {
+		_ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+		panic("set " + keychain.TestNamespaceEnv + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
 	if err := os.Setenv("DWS_CONFIG_DIR", filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config")); err != nil {
 		_ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
 		panic("set DWS_CONFIG_DIR: " + err.Error())
@@ -79,6 +83,12 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	StopAllStdioClients()
 	CloseAuditSink()
 	CloseFileLogger()
+	if err := keychain.RemoveAuthTokenEntries(keychain.Service); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "internal/app keychain cleanup: %v\n", err)
+		if code == 0 {
+			code = 1
+		}
+	}
 	if err := os.RemoveAll(tmpDir); err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "internal/app test cleanup %s: %v\n", tmpDir, err)
 		if code == 0 {

internal/auth/access_token_snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthProviderTokenSnapshotPreservesLoadFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	oldLoad := oauthLoadToken
+	want := errors.New("keychain permission denied")
+	oauthLoadToken = func(string) (*TokenData, error) { return nil, want }
+	t.Cleanup(func() { oauthLoadToken = oldLoad })
+
+	_, err := NewOAuthProvider(t.TempDir(), nil).GetTokenSnapshot(context.Background())
+	if !errors.Is(err, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want cause %v", err, want)
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrTokenDataNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("load failure was misclassified as missing credentials: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthProviderLoginPreservesLoadFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	oldLoad := oauthLoadToken
+	want := errors.New("keychain permission denied")
+	oauthLoadToken = func(string) (*TokenData, error) { return nil, want }
+	t.Cleanup(func() { oauthLoadToken = oldLoad })
+
+	_, err := NewOAuthProvider(t.TempDir(), nil).Login(context.Background(), false)
+	if !errors.Is(err, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want cause %v", err, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthProviderTokenSnapshotReturnsExpiryMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	oldLoad := oauthLoadToken
+	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	oauthLoadToken = func(string) (*TokenData, error) {
+		return &TokenData{AccessToken: "token", ExpiresAt: expiresAt}, nil
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { oauthLoadToken = oldLoad })
+
+	snapshot, err := NewOAuthProvider(t.TempDir(), nil).GetTokenSnapshot(context.Background())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if snapshot.AccessToken != "token" || !snapshot.ExpiresAt.Equal(expiresAt) {
+		t.Fatalf("snapshot = %#v", snapshot)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageTokenMarkerRevisionChangesOnEveryPublication(t *testing.T) {
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := WriteTokenMarker(configDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	first, present, err := ReadTokenMarkerRevision(configDir)
+	if err != nil || !present || first == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("first marker = %q, %v, %v", first, present, err)
+	}
+	if err := WriteTokenMarker(configDir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	second, present, err := ReadTokenMarkerRevision(configDir)
+	if err != nil || !present || second == "" || second == first {
+		t.Fatalf("second marker = %q, %v, %v; first=%q", second, present, err, first)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/force_refresh.go

@@ -13,7 +13,50 @@
 
 package auth
 
-import "time"
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/edition"
+)
+
+const rejectedTokenRefreshFailureCooldown = 3 * time.Second
+
+type rejectedTokenRefreshKey struct {
+	configDir   string
+	profile     string
+	tokenDigest [sha256.Size]byte
+}
+
+type rejectedTokenRefreshCall struct {
+	done         chan struct{}
+	participants int
+	token        string
+	err          error
+}
+
+type rejectedTokenRefreshFailure struct {
+	at  time.Time
+	err error
+}
+
+var rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator = struct {
+	sync.Mutex
+	inFlight map[rejectedTokenRefreshKey]*rejectedTokenRefreshCall
+	failures map[rejectedTokenRefreshKey]rejectedTokenRefreshFailure
+	now      func() time.Time
+}{
+	inFlight: make(map[rejectedTokenRefreshKey]*rejectedTokenRefreshCall),
+	failures: make(map[rejectedTokenRefreshKey]rejectedTokenRefreshFailure),
+	now:      time.Now,
+}
 
 // MarkAccessTokenStale loads the persisted TokenData, sets ExpiresAt to a past
 // instant (preserving access_token and refresh_token), and writes it back. The
@@ -39,3 +82,192 @@ func MarkAccessTokenStale(configDir string) error {
 	data.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute)
 	return SaveTokenData(configDir, data)
 }
+
+// ForceRefreshRejectedToken refreshes rejectedAccessToken only while it is
+// still the credential stored for the active profile. The compare and refresh
+// run under the same process + file lock used by ordinary expiry refresh, so a
+// late rejection cannot invalidate or refresh over a token another caller has
+// already rotated.
+//
+// When the stored token no longer matches, the newer token is returned without
+// calling the refresh endpoint. Refresh failures leave the stored credential in
+// place; login/logout remain the only owners of credential deletion.
+func (p *OAuthProvider) ForceRefreshRejectedToken(ctx context.Context, rejectedAccessToken string) (string, error) {
+	if p == nil || strings.TrimSpace(p.configDir) == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("config directory is empty")
+	}
+	rejectedAccessToken = strings.TrimSpace(rejectedAccessToken)
+	if rejectedAccessToken == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("rejected access token is empty")
+	}
+	if ctx == nil {
+		ctx = context.Background()
+	}
+
+	profile := strings.TrimSpace(RuntimeProfile())
+	key := newRejectedTokenRefreshKey(p.configDir, profile, rejectedAccessToken)
+	call, leader := beginRejectedTokenRefresh(key)
+	if !leader {
+		select {
+		case <-call.done:
+			return call.token, call.err
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return "", ctx.Err()
+		}
+	}
+
+	token, err, recordFailure := p.forceRefreshRejectedTokenOnce(ctx, profile, rejectedAccessToken, key)
+	finishRejectedTokenRefresh(key, call, token, err, recordFailure)
+	return token, err
+}
+
+func (p *OAuthProvider) forceRefreshRejectedTokenOnce(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	profile string,
+	rejectedAccessToken string,
+	key rejectedTokenRefreshKey,
+) (string, error, bool) {
+	lock, err := oauthAcquireLock(ctx, p.configDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("acquiring dual lock: %w", err), false
+	}
+	defer lock.Release()
+
+	data, err := loadOAuthTokenUnderHeldLock(p.configDir, profile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("reload rejected token: %w", err), false
+	}
+	current := strings.TrimSpace(data.AccessToken)
+	if current == "" {
+		clearRejectedTokenRefreshFailure(key)
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("stored access token is empty"), false
+	}
+	if current != rejectedAccessToken {
+		clearRejectedTokenRefreshFailure(key)
+		return current, nil, false
+	}
+	if cachedErr := recentRejectedTokenRefreshFailure(key); cachedErr != nil {
+		return "", cachedErr, false
+	}
+	if !data.IsRefreshTokenValid() {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("refresh_token 已过期"), true
+	}
+	if err := preflightTokenRefreshPersistence(p.configDir, data); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("本地登录态无法安全更新: %w", err), true
+	}
+
+	refreshed, err := oauthRefreshToken(p, ctx, data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err, true
+	}
+	if refreshed == nil || strings.TrimSpace(refreshed.AccessToken) == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("force refresh returned empty access token"), true
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(refreshed.AccessToken), nil, false
+}
+
+func newRejectedTokenRefreshKey(configDir, profile, rejectedAccessToken string) rejectedTokenRefreshKey {
+	canonicalDir := filepath.Clean(configDir)
+	if absolute, err := filepath.Abs(configDir); err == nil {
+		canonicalDir = filepath.Clean(absolute)
+	}
+	return rejectedTokenRefreshKey{
+		configDir:   canonicalDir,
+		profile:     strings.TrimSpace(profile),
+		tokenDigest: sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(rejectedAccessToken))),
+	}
+}
+
+func beginRejectedTokenRefresh(key rejectedTokenRefreshKey) (*rejectedTokenRefreshCall, bool) {
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	defer rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+
+	if call := rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.inFlight[key]; call != nil {
+		call.participants++
+		return call, false
+	}
+	call := &rejectedTokenRefreshCall{done: make(chan struct{}), participants: 1}
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.inFlight[key] = call
+	return call, true
+}
+
+func finishRejectedTokenRefresh(
+	key rejectedTokenRefreshKey,
+	call *rejectedTokenRefreshCall,
+	token string,
+	err error,
+	recordFailure bool,
+) {
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	defer rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+
+	call.token = token
+	call.err = err
+	delete(rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.inFlight, key)
+	if err == nil {
+		delete(rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures, key)
+	} else if recordFailure && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) && !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
+		now := time.Now()
+		if rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now != nil {
+			now = rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now()
+		}
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures[key] = rejectedTokenRefreshFailure{at: now, err: err}
+	}
+	close(call.done)
+}
+
+func recentRejectedTokenRefreshFailure(key rejectedTokenRefreshKey) error {
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	defer rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	if rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now != nil {
+		now = rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now()
+	}
+	for failureKey, failure := range rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures {
+		age := now.Sub(failure.at)
+		if age < 0 || age >= rejectedTokenRefreshFailureCooldown {
+			delete(rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures, failureKey)
+		}
+	}
+	if failure, ok := rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures[key]; ok {
+		return failure.err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func clearRejectedTokenRefreshFailure(key rejectedTokenRefreshKey) {
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	delete(rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures, key)
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+}
+
+// loadOAuthTokenUnderHeldLock mirrors LoadTokenDataForProfile without taking a
+// second, non-reentrant auth lock. Opaque edition storage hooks (for example
+// Wukong's encrypted .data file) are read inside the caller's dual lock so the
+// compare-and-refresh decision covers both Core and embedded storage.
+func loadOAuthTokenUnderHeldLock(configDir, profile string) (*TokenData, error) {
+	hooks := edition.Get()
+	if hooks.LoadToken == nil {
+		data, err := oauthLoadTokenLocked(configDir, profile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if data == nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("stored token data is empty")
+		}
+		return data, nil
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(profile) != "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("profile selection is not supported by the current auth backend")
+	}
+	blob, err := hooks.LoadToken(configDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var data TokenData
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(blob, &data); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing token data from hook: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &data, nil
+}

internal/auth/manager.go

@@ -47,8 +47,10 @@ func (m *Manager) GetToken() (string, string, error) {
 		}
 		return token, "file", nil
 	}
-
-	return "", "", fmt.Errorf("%s", i18n.T("未找到认证信息，请运行 dws auth login"))
+	if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("load legacy token: %w", err)
+	}
+	return "", "", fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", i18n.T("未找到认证信息，请运行 dws auth login"), ErrTokenDataNotFound)
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) GetMCPURL() (string, error) {

internal/auth/oauth_provider.go

@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ func (p *OAuthProvider) Login(ctx context.Context, force bool) (*TokenData, erro
 	// Smart degradation: try silent refresh before opening browser.
 	if !force {
 		data, err := oauthLoadToken(p.configDir)
+		if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, ErrTokenDataNotFound) && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			if preflightErr := preflightTokenPersistence(p.configDir); preflightErr != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", i18n.T("本地登录态无法安全更新"), preflightErr)
+			}
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("load existing access token: %w", err)
+		}
 		if err == nil {
 			// Case 1: access_token still valid — no action needed.
 			if data.IsAccessTokenValid() {
@@ -636,36 +642,50 @@ continueLogin:
 	return tokenData, nil
 }
 
-// GetAccessToken returns a valid access token, auto-refreshing if needed.
-// Uses a file lock with double-check pattern to prevent concurrent refresh
-// from multiple CLI processes.
-func (p *OAuthProvider) GetAccessToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+// GetTokenSnapshot returns a valid token together with its expiry metadata.
+// Storage and refresh failures retain their original cause; only a confirmed
+// missing credential is reported as ErrTokenDataNotFound.
+func (p *OAuthProvider) GetTokenSnapshot(ctx context.Context) (*TokenData, error) {
 	data, err := oauthLoadToken(p.configDir)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", errors.New(i18n.T("未登录，请运行 dws auth login"))
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrTokenDataNotFound) || os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", i18n.T("未登录，请运行 dws auth login"), ErrTokenDataNotFound)
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load access token: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Fast path: access_token still valid — no lock needed.
 	if data.IsAccessTokenValid() {
-		return data.AccessToken, nil
+		return data, nil
 	}
 
 	// Slow path: token expired — try locked refresh.
 	if data.IsRefreshTokenValid() {
 		refreshed, rErr := p.lockedRefresh(ctx)
 		if rErr == nil {
-			return refreshed.AccessToken, nil
+			return refreshed, nil
 		}
 		_ = oauthMarkProfile(p.configDir, TokenProfileSelector(data), ProfileStatusExpired)
 		if p.logger != nil {
 			p.logger.Warn(i18n.T("refresh_token 刷新失败"), "error", rErr)
 		}
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", i18n.T("refresh_token 刷新失败"), rErr)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", i18n.T("refresh_token 刷新失败"), rErr)
 	} else {
 		_ = oauthMarkProfile(p.configDir, TokenProfileSelector(data), ProfileStatusExpired)
 	}
 
-	return "", errors.New(i18n.T("所有凭证已失效，请运行 dws auth login 重新登录"))
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", i18n.T("所有凭证已失效，请运行 dws auth login 重新登录"), ErrTokenDataNotFound)
+}
+
+// GetAccessToken returns a valid access token, auto-refreshing if needed.
+// Uses a file lock with double-check pattern to prevent concurrent refresh
+// from multiple CLI processes.
+func (p *OAuthProvider) GetAccessToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+	data, err := p.GetTokenSnapshot(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(data.AccessToken), nil
 }
 
 // lockedRefresh attempts to refresh the token while holding dual-layer locks.
@@ -697,7 +717,7 @@ func (p *OAuthProvider) lockedRefresh(ctx context.Context) (*TokenData, error) {
 
 	// Double-check: re-load from disk — another goroutine/process may have refreshed
 	// while we were waiting for the lock.
-	data, err := oauthLoadTokenLocked(p.configDir, RuntimeProfile())
+	data, err := loadOAuthTokenUnderHeldLock(p.configDir, RuntimeProfile())
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

internal/auth/oauth_provider_coverage_test.go

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ import (
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/internal/keychain"
 )
 
 type oauthLoginFixture struct {
@@ -33,8 +35,79 @@ type oauthLoginFixture struct {
 	exchangeError   atomic.Bool
 }
 
+type oauthLoginResult struct {
+	token *TokenData
+	err   error
+}
+
+type oauthHTTPResult struct {
+	status int
+	body   string
+	err    error
+}
+
+const oauthTestWaitTimeout = 5 * time.Second
+
+func isolateOAuthPersistence(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv(keychain.DisableKeychainEnv, "1")
+	cleanupKeychain(t)
+}
+
+func startOAuthLogin(t *testing.T, parent context.Context, f *oauthLoginFixture) <-chan oauthLoginResult {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(parent)
+	done := make(chan oauthLoginResult, 1)
+	finished := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(finished)
+		token, err := f.provider.Login(ctx, true)
+		done <- oauthLoginResult{token: token, err: err}
+	}()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		cancel()
+		select {
+		case <-finished:
+		case <-time.After(oauthTestWaitTimeout):
+			t.Errorf("OAuth Login goroutine did not stop after cancellation")
+		}
+	})
+	return done
+}
+
+func awaitOAuthLogin(t *testing.T, done <-chan oauthLoginResult) oauthLoginResult {
+	t.Helper()
+	select {
+	case result := <-done:
+		return result
+	case <-time.After(oauthTestWaitTimeout):
+		t.Fatal("timed out waiting for OAuth Login")
+		return oauthLoginResult{}
+	}
+}
+
+func waitOAuthSignal(t *testing.T, signal <-chan struct{}, done <-chan oauthLoginResult, name string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	select {
+	case <-signal:
+	case result := <-done:
+		t.Fatalf("OAuth Login returned before %s: token=%#v err=%v", name, result.token, result.err)
+	case <-time.After(oauthTestWaitTimeout):
+		t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for OAuth %s", name)
+	}
+}
+
+func closeOAuthRelease(ch chan struct{}) {
+	select {
+	case <-ch:
+	default:
+		close(ch)
+	}
+}
+
 func newOAuthLoginFixture(t *testing.T, status func(int32) CLIAuthStatus) *oauthLoginFixture {
 	t.Helper()
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	SetClientID("")
 	SetClientSecret("")
 	resetClientIDFromMCP()
@@ -91,6 +164,10 @@ func newOAuthLoginFixture(t *testing.T, status func(int32) CLIAuthStatus) *oauth
 		}
 	}))
 	t.Cleanup(f.server.Close)
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+	})
 	f.configDir = setupMCPConfigDir(t, f.server.URL)
 
 	oldClient := oauthHTTPClient
@@ -118,17 +195,25 @@ func newOAuthLoginFixture(t *testing.T, status func(int32) CLIAuthStatus) *oauth
 
 func httpGetBody(t *testing.T, rawURL string) (int, string) {
 	t.Helper()
+	result := getHTTPBody(rawURL)
+	if result.err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GET %s: %v", rawURL, result.err)
+	}
+	return result.status, result.body
+}
+
+func getHTTPBody(rawURL string) oauthHTTPResult {
 	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Second}
 	resp, err := client.Get(rawURL)
 	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GET %s: %v", rawURL, err)
+		return oauthHTTPResult{err: err}
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 	data, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
 	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
+		return oauthHTTPResult{err: err}
 	}
-	return resp.StatusCode, string(data)
+	return oauthHTTPResult{status: resp.StatusCode, body: string(data)}
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginCallbackAndAPIs(t *testing.T) {
@@ -136,17 +221,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginCallbackAndAPIs(t *testing.T) {
 		return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{CLIAuthEnabled: true}}
 	})
 
-	loginDone := make(chan struct {
-		token *TokenData
-		err   error
-	}, 1)
-	go func() {
-		token, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-		loginDone <- struct {
-			token *TokenData
-			err   error
-		}{token, err}
-	}()
+	loginDone := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 
 	for _, path := range []string{"/api/superAdmin", "/api/sendApply?adminStaffId=admin-1", "/api/cliAuthEnabled"} {
 		_, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+path)
@@ -166,18 +241,17 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginCallbackAndAPIs(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("success page = %q", body)
 	}
 
-	callbackDone := make(chan string, 1)
+	callbackDone := make(chan oauthHTTPResult, 1)
 	go func() {
-		_, callbackBody := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=good")
-		callbackDone <- callbackBody
+		callbackDone <- getHTTPBody(f.callbackBase + CallbackPath + "?code=good")
 	}()
-	<-f.exchangeEntered
+	waitOAuthSignal(t, f.exchangeEntered, loginDone, "token exchange")
 	_, body = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?authCode=good")
 	if !strings.Contains(body, "正在处理授权") {
 		t.Fatalf("concurrent callback = %q", body)
 	}
-	close(f.exchangeRelease)
-	<-f.statusEntered
+	closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+	waitOAuthSignal(t, f.statusEntered, loginDone, "CLI auth status check")
 
 	_, body = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=good")
 	if !strings.Contains(body, "<html") {
@@ -204,11 +278,16 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginCallbackAndAPIs(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("auth enabled API = %q", body)
 	}
 
-	close(f.statusRelease)
-	if callbackBody := <-callbackDone; !strings.Contains(callbackBody, "<html") {
-		t.Fatalf("callback body = %q", callbackBody)
+	closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+	select {
+	case callback := <-callbackDone:
+		if callback.err != nil || !strings.Contains(callback.body, "<html") {
+			t.Fatalf("callback body = %q, %v", callback.body, callback.err)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(oauthTestWaitTimeout):
+		t.Fatal("timed out waiting for OAuth callback")
 	}
-	result := <-loginDone
+	result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, loginDone)
 	if result.err != nil || result.token == nil || result.token.AccessToken != "access" {
 		t.Fatalf("Login = %#v, %v", result.token, result.err)
 	}
@@ -228,23 +307,20 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginMissingCallbackCode(t *testing.T) {
 	f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus {
 		return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{CLIAuthEnabled: true}}
 	})
-	close(f.exchangeRelease)
-	close(f.statusRelease)
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		_, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-		done <- err
-	}()
+	closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+	closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+	done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 	status, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath)
 	if status != http.StatusBadRequest || strings.TrimSpace(body) == "" {
 		t.Fatalf("missing callback = %d %q", status, body)
 	}
-	if err := <-done; err == nil {
+	if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("missing callback code did not fail login")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginEarlyAndListenerEdges(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	p := &OAuthProvider{configDir: t.TempDir(), Output: &buf}
 	if p.output() != &buf || (*OAuthProvider)(nil).output() != io.Discard {
@@ -311,6 +387,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginTimeoutAndServerError(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthProviderOtherMethods(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	_ = DeleteTokenDataKeychain()
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = DeleteTokenDataKeychain() })
@@ -363,6 +440,7 @@ func (f roundTripFunc) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthPersistConfigEdges(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	p := &OAuthProvider{configDir: t.TempDir(), logger: slog.Default()}
 	SetClientID("")
 	SetClientSecret("")
@@ -425,16 +503,12 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginDenialAndPolling(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tt := range terminal {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus { return tt.status })
-			close(f.exchangeRelease)
-			close(f.statusRelease)
+			closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+			closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
 			f.provider.NoBrowser = false
-			done := make(chan error, 1)
-			go func() {
-				_, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-				done <- err
-			}()
+			done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 			_, _ = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=denied")
-			if err := <-done; err == nil {
+			if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil {
 				t.Fatal("denied login succeeded")
 			}
 		})
@@ -445,15 +519,11 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginDenialAndPolling(t *testing.T) {
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus {
 			return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{ChannelScope: "specified", AllowedChannels: []string{"allowed"}}}
 		})
-		close(f.exchangeRelease)
-		close(f.statusRelease)
-		done := make(chan error, 1)
-		go func() {
-			_, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-			done <- err
-		}()
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 		_, _ = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=denied")
-		if err := <-done; err == nil {
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("channel-denied login succeeded")
 		}
 	})
@@ -463,15 +533,11 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginDenialAndPolling(t *testing.T) {
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus {
 			return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{}}
 		})
-		close(f.exchangeRelease)
-		close(f.statusRelease)
-		done := make(chan error, 1)
-		go func() {
-			_, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-			done <- err
-		}()
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 		_, _ = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=pending")
-		if err := <-done; err == nil {
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("approval timeout login succeeded")
 		}
 		oauthApprovalTimeout = oldApproval
@@ -481,16 +547,12 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginDenialAndPolling(t *testing.T) {
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(call int32) CLIAuthStatus {
 			return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{CLIAuthEnabled: call > 1}}
 		})
-		close(f.exchangeRelease)
-		close(f.statusRelease)
-		done := make(chan error, 1)
-		go func() {
-			_, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-			done <- err
-		}()
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 		_, _ = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=pending")
-		if err := <-done; err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("poll-enabled login failed: %v", err)
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("poll-enabled login failed: %v", result.err)
 		}
 	})
 
@@ -498,17 +560,13 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginDenialAndPolling(t *testing.T) {
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus {
 			return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{}}
 		})
-		close(f.exchangeRelease)
-		close(f.statusRelease)
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-		done := make(chan error, 1)
-		go func() {
-			_, err := f.provider.Login(ctx, true)
-			done <- err
-		}()
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, ctx, f)
 		_, _ = httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=pending")
 		cancel()
-		if err := <-done; err == nil {
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("canceled pending login succeeded")
 		}
 	})
@@ -519,23 +577,20 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLoginExchangeFailure(t *testing.T) {
 		return CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{CLIAuthEnabled: true}}
 	})
 	f.exchangeError.Store(true)
-	close(f.exchangeRelease)
-	close(f.statusRelease)
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		_, err := f.provider.Login(context.Background(), true)
-		done <- err
-	}()
+	closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+	closeOAuthRelease(f.statusRelease)
+	done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
 	_, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=bad")
 	if !strings.Contains(body, "failed") {
 		t.Fatalf("exchange failure page = %q", body)
 	}
-	if err := <-done; err == nil {
+	if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("exchange failure login succeeded")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthRefreshAndParsingEdges(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CLIENT_ID", "")
 	t.Setenv("DWS_CLIENT_SECRET", "")
 	dir := t.TempDir()
@@ -640,6 +695,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthRefreshAndParsingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthProviderHighLevelEdges(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	oldLoad := oauthLoadToken
 	oldLoadLocked := oauthLoadTokenLocked
 	oldAcquire := oauthAcquireLock
@@ -800,29 +856,24 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 	oauthSuccessPause = 0
 	oauthSleep = func(time.Duration) {}
 
-	type loginResult struct {
-		token *TokenData
-		err   error
-	}
-	startLogin := func(ctx context.Context, f *oauthLoginFixture) <-chan loginResult {
+	finishExchange := func(t *testing.T, f *oauthLoginFixture, done <-chan oauthLoginResult, code string) string {
 		t.Helper()
-		done := make(chan loginResult, 1)
+		bodyCh := make(chan oauthHTTPResult, 1)
 		go func() {
-			token, err := f.provider.Login(ctx, true)
-			done <- loginResult{token: token, err: err}
+			bodyCh <- getHTTPBody(f.callbackBase + CallbackPath + "?code=" + url.QueryEscape(code))
 		}()
-		return done
-	}
-	finishExchange := func(t *testing.T, f *oauthLoginFixture, code string) string {
-		t.Helper()
-		bodyCh := make(chan string, 1)
-		go func() {
-			_, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code="+url.QueryEscape(code))
-			bodyCh <- body
-		}()
-		<-f.exchangeEntered
-		close(f.exchangeRelease)
-		return <-bodyCh
+		waitOAuthSignal(t, f.exchangeEntered, done, "token exchange")
+		closeOAuthRelease(f.exchangeRelease)
+		select {
+		case result := <-bodyCh:
+			if result.err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("OAuth callback failed: %v", result.err)
+			}
+			return result.body
+		case <-time.After(oauthTestWaitTimeout):
+			t.Fatal("timed out waiting for OAuth callback")
+			return ""
+		}
 	}
 
 	t.Run("switch organization and cached disabled pages", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -835,8 +886,8 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 			return &CLIAuthStatus{Success: true, Result: &CLIAuthResult{CLIAuthEnabled: true}}, nil
 		}
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus { return CLIAuthStatus{} })
-		done := startLogin(context.Background(), f)
-		if body := finishExchange(t, f, "first"); !strings.Contains(body, "<html") {
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
+		if body := finishExchange(t, f, done, "first"); !strings.Contains(body, "<html") {
 			t.Fatalf("disabled callback body = %q", body)
 		}
 		if _, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=first"); !strings.Contains(body, "<html") {
@@ -848,7 +899,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 		if _, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+CallbackPath+"?code=second"); !strings.Contains(body, "<html") {
 			t.Fatalf("switched callback = %q", body)
 		}
-		result := <-done
+		result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done)
 		if result.err != nil || result.token == nil || result.token.AccessToken != "access" {
 			t.Fatalf("switched login = %#v %v", result.token, result.err)
 		}
@@ -862,15 +913,15 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 		oauthSendApply = func(context.Context, string, string) (*SendApplyResponse, error) { return nil, fail }
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus { return CLIAuthStatus{} })
-		done := startLogin(ctx, f)
-		finishExchange(t, f, "errors")
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, ctx, f)
+		finishExchange(t, f, done, "errors")
 		for _, path := range []string{"/api/superAdmin", "/api/sendApply?adminStaffId=admin", "/api/cliAuthEnabled"} {
 			if _, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+path); !strings.Contains(body, "hook failure") {
 				t.Fatalf("API error %s = %q", path, body)
 			}
 		}
 		cancel()
-		if result := <-done; !errors.Is(result.err, context.Canceled) {
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); !errors.Is(result.err, context.Canceled) {
 			t.Fatalf("canceled error login = %v", result.err)
 		}
 	})
@@ -887,14 +938,14 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus { return CLIAuthStatus{} })
 		var output bytes.Buffer
 		f.provider.Output = &output
-		done := startLogin(ctx, f)
-		finishExchange(t, f, "apply")
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, ctx, f)
+		finishExchange(t, f, done, "apply")
 		if _, body := httpGetBody(t, f.callbackBase+"/api/sendApply?adminStaffId=admin"); !strings.Contains(body, "true") {
 			t.Fatalf("apply response = %q", body)
 		}
 		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
 		cancel()
-		if result := <-done; !errors.Is(result.err, context.Canceled) {
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); !errors.Is(result.err, context.Canceled) {
 			t.Fatalf("canceled apply login = %v", result.err)
 		}
 		if !strings.Contains(output.String(), "Waiting for admin approval") && !strings.Contains(output.String(), "等待管理员审批中") {
@@ -908,9 +959,9 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 			return &CLIAuthStatus{Success: false, ErrorCode: "ENTERPRISE_NOT_AUTHORIZED"}, nil
 		}
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus { return CLIAuthStatus{} })
-		done := startLogin(context.Background(), f)
-		finishExchange(t, f, "enterprise")
-		if result := <-done; result.err == nil || !strings.Contains(result.err.Error(), "企业安全认证") {
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
+		finishExchange(t, f, done, "enterprise")
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); result.err == nil || !strings.Contains(result.err.Error(), "企业安全认证") {
 			t.Fatalf("enterprise denial = %v", result.err)
 		}
 	})
@@ -933,15 +984,16 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthCallbackRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
 		fail := errors.New("save failure")
 		oauthSaveToken = func(string, *TokenData) error { return fail }
 		f := newOAuthLoginFixture(t, func(int32) CLIAuthStatus { return CLIAuthStatus{} })
-		done := startLogin(context.Background(), f)
-		finishExchange(t, f, "save")
-		if result := <-done; !errors.Is(result.err, fail) {
+		done := startOAuthLogin(t, context.Background(), f)
+		finishExchange(t, f, done, "save")
+		if result := awaitOAuthLogin(t, done); !errors.Is(result.err, fail) {
 			t.Fatalf("save failure login = %v", result.err)
 		}
 	})
 }
 
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthHelperRemainingEdges(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateOAuthPersistence(t)
 	oldClient := oauthHTTPClient
 	oldRequest := oauthNewRequest
 	oldRetry := oauthRetryAfter

internal/auth/rejected_token_refresh_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Alibaba Group
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli/pkg/edition"
+)
+
+type rejectedTokenHookStore struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	data    TokenData
+	deletes int
+}
+
+func (s *rejectedTokenHookStore) load(string) ([]byte, error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	return json.Marshal(s.data)
+}
+
+func (s *rejectedTokenHookStore) save(_ string, blob []byte) error {
+	var data TokenData
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(blob, &data); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.data = data
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *rejectedTokenHookStore) delete(string) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.data = TokenData{}
+	s.deletes++
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *rejectedTokenHookStore) snapshot() (TokenData, int) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	return s.data, s.deletes
+}
+
+func installRejectedTokenHookStore(t *testing.T, data TokenData) *rejectedTokenHookStore {
+	t.Helper()
+	store := &rejectedTokenHookStore{data: data}
+	previousHooks := edition.Get()
+	edition.Override(&edition.Hooks{
+		LoadToken:   store.load,
+		SaveToken:   store.save,
+		DeleteToken: store.delete,
+	})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { edition.Override(previousHooks) })
+	return store
+}
+
+func installOAuthRefreshStub(t *testing.T, fn func(*OAuthProvider, context.Context, *TokenData) (*TokenData, error)) {
+	t.Helper()
+	resetRejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator(t)
+	previous := oauthRefreshToken
+	oauthRefreshToken = fn
+	t.Cleanup(func() { oauthRefreshToken = previous })
+}
+
+func resetRejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	reset := func() {
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.inFlight = make(map[rejectedTokenRefreshKey]*rejectedTokenRefreshCall)
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures = make(map[rejectedTokenRefreshKey]rejectedTokenRefreshFailure)
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now = time.Now
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+	}
+	reset()
+	t.Cleanup(reset)
+}
+
+func waitForRejectedTokenRefreshParticipants(t *testing.T, key rejectedTokenRefreshKey, want int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
+	for {
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+		call := rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.inFlight[key]
+		got := 0
+		if call != nil {
+			got = call.participants
+		}
+		rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+		if got >= want {
+			return
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatalf("refresh participants = %d, want %d", got, want)
+		}
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+	}
+}
+
+func installProfilesAcquireProbe(t *testing.T) <-chan struct{} {
+	t.Helper()
+	previous := profilesAcquireDualLock
+	attempted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+	profilesAcquireDualLock = func(ctx context.Context, configDir string) (*DualLock, error) {
+		attempted <- struct{}{}
+		return previous(ctx, configDir)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { profilesAcquireDualLock = previous })
+	return attempted
+}
+
+func waitForProfilesAcquire(t *testing.T, attempted <-chan struct{}) {
+	t.Helper()
+	select {
+	case <-attempted:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("public opaque token mutation did not enter the Core dual lock")
+	}
+}
+
+func validRejectedTokenData(accessToken string) TokenData {
+	return TokenData{
+		AccessToken:  accessToken,
+		RefreshToken: "refresh-token",
+		ExpiresAt:    time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
+		RefreshExpAt: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
+		Source:       "mcp",
+		ClientID:     "client-id",
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshRejectedTokenConcurrentCallersExchangeOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, validRejectedTokenData("old-access"))
+	var refreshCalls atomic.Int32
+	started := make(chan struct{})
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(p *OAuthProvider, _ context.Context, data *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+		if refreshCalls.Add(1) == 1 {
+			close(started)
+		}
+		<-release
+		updated := *data
+		updated.AccessToken = "new-access"
+		updated.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+		if err := saveTokenDataLocked(p.configDir, &updated); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &updated, nil
+	})
+
+	provider := NewOAuthProvider(t.TempDir(), nil)
+	const workers = 8
+	results := make(chan string, workers)
+	errs := make(chan error, workers)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	wg.Add(workers)
+	for range workers {
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			token, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+			results <- token
+			errs <- err
+		}()
+	}
+	<-started
+	close(release)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(results)
+	close(errs)
+
+	for err := range errs {
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	for token := range results {
+		if token != "new-access" {
+			t.Fatalf("token = %q, want new-access", token)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := refreshCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh calls = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+	stored, deletes := store.snapshot()
+	if stored.AccessToken != "new-access" || deletes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("stored token = %q, deletes = %d", stored.AccessToken, deletes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshRejectedTokenFailurePreservesCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, validRejectedTokenData("old-access"))
+	refreshErr := errors.New("temporary refresh failure")
+	installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(*OAuthProvider, context.Context, *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+		return nil, refreshErr
+	})
+
+	_, err := NewOAuthProvider(t.TempDir(), nil).ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+	if !errors.Is(err, refreshErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want refresh cause", err)
+	}
+	stored, deletes := store.snapshot()
+	if stored.AccessToken != "old-access" || stored.RefreshToken != "refresh-token" || deletes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("credential changed after transient failure: %#v, deletes=%d", stored, deletes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshRejectedTokenFailureIsSingleflightAndCooledDown(t *testing.T) {
+	store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, validRejectedTokenData("old-access"))
+	previousProfile := RuntimeProfile()
+	SetRuntimeProfile("")
+	t.Cleanup(func() { SetRuntimeProfile(previousProfile) })
+
+	refreshErr := errors.New("temporary refresh failure")
+	var refreshCalls atomic.Int32
+	started := make(chan struct{})
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	baseNow := time.Now()
+	var nowNanos atomic.Int64
+	nowNanos.Store(baseNow.UnixNano())
+	installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(p *OAuthProvider, _ context.Context, data *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+		call := refreshCalls.Add(1)
+		if call == 1 {
+			close(started)
+			<-release
+			return nil, refreshErr
+		}
+		updated := *data
+		updated.AccessToken = "recovered-access"
+		updated.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+		if err := saveTokenDataLocked(p.configDir, &updated); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &updated, nil
+	})
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now = func() time.Time {
+		return time.Unix(0, nowNanos.Load())
+	}
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	provider := NewOAuthProvider(configDir, nil)
+	const workers = 8
+	start := make(chan struct{})
+	ready := make(chan struct{}, workers)
+	errs := make(chan error, workers)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	wg.Add(workers)
+	for range workers {
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			ready <- struct{}{}
+			<-start
+			_, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+			errs <- err
+		}()
+	}
+	for range workers {
+		<-ready
+	}
+	close(start)
+	<-started
+	key := newRejectedTokenRefreshKey(configDir, "", "old-access")
+	waitForRejectedTokenRefreshParticipants(t, key, workers)
+	close(release)
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(errs)
+
+	for err := range errs {
+		if !errors.Is(err, refreshErr) {
+			t.Fatalf("shared refresh error = %v, want %v", err, refreshErr)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := refreshCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh calls after concurrent failure = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+	stored, deletes := store.snapshot()
+	if stored.AccessToken != "old-access" || stored.RefreshToken != "refresh-token" || deletes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("credential changed after shared failure: %#v, deletes=%d", stored, deletes)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access"); !errors.Is(err, refreshErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("cooldown error = %v, want %v", err, refreshErr)
+	}
+	if got := refreshCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh calls inside cooldown = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+
+	nowNanos.Store(baseNow.Add(rejectedTokenRefreshFailureCooldown + time.Nanosecond).UnixNano())
+	token, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+	if err != nil || token != "recovered-access" {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh after cooldown = %q, %v", token, err)
+	}
+	if got := refreshCalls.Load(); got != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh calls after cooldown = %d, want 2", got)
+	}
+	stored, deletes = store.snapshot()
+	if stored.AccessToken != "recovered-access" || deletes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("stored token after cooldown recovery = %q, deletes=%d", stored.AccessToken, deletes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageForceRefreshRejectedTokenChangedDuringCooldownUsesNewToken(t *testing.T) {
+	store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, validRejectedTokenData("old-access"))
+	previousProfile := RuntimeProfile()
+	SetRuntimeProfile("")
+	t.Cleanup(func() { SetRuntimeProfile(previousProfile) })
+
+	refreshErr := errors.New("temporary refresh failure")
+	var refreshCalls atomic.Int32
+	baseNow := time.Now()
+	installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(*OAuthProvider, context.Context, *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+		refreshCalls.Add(1)
+		return nil, refreshErr
+	})
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.now = func() time.Time { return baseNow }
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	provider := NewOAuthProvider(configDir, nil)
+	if _, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access"); !errors.Is(err, refreshErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("initial refresh error = %v, want %v", err, refreshErr)
+	}
+	if got := refreshCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("initial refresh calls = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+
+	store.mu.Lock()
+	store.data = validRejectedTokenData("externally-refreshed")
+	store.mu.Unlock()
+	token, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+	if err != nil || token != "externally-refreshed" {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh after external publication = %q, %v", token, err)
+	}
+	if got := refreshCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("external publication triggered another exchange: calls=%d", got)
+	}
+	key := newRejectedTokenRefreshKey(configDir, "", "old-access")
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Lock()
+	_, failurePresent := rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.failures[key]
+	rejectedTokenRefreshCoordinator.Unlock()
+	if failurePresent {
+		t.Fatal("old-token failure cache was not cleared after external publication")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOpaquePublisherWaitsForRejectedTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
+	store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, validRejectedTokenData("old-access"))
+	started := make(chan struct{})
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	var releaseOnce sync.Once
+	t.Cleanup(func() { releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(release) }) })
+	installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(p *OAuthProvider, _ context.Context, data *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+		close(started)
+		<-release
+		updated := *data
+		updated.AccessToken = "refreshed-from-old"
+		updated.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+		if err := saveTokenDataLocked(p.configDir, &updated); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &updated, nil
+	})
+
+	configDir := t.TempDir()
+	provider := NewOAuthProvider(configDir, nil)
+	refreshResult := make(chan struct {
+		token string
+		err   error
+	}, 1)
+	go func() {
+		token, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+		refreshResult <- struct {
+			token string
+			err   error
+		}{token: token, err: err}
+	}()
+	<-started
+
+	acquireAttempted := installProfilesAcquireProbe(t)
+	publishResult := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		publishResult <- SaveTokenData(configDir, ptrTokenData(validRejectedTokenData("login-published")))
+	}()
+	waitForProfilesAcquire(t, acquireAttempted)
+	releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(release) })
+
+	refresh := <-refreshResult
+	if refresh.err != nil || refresh.token != "refreshed-from-old" {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh result = %q, %v", refresh.token, refresh.err)
+	}
+	if err := <-publishResult; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("publish token: %v", err)
+	}
+	stored, deletes := store.snapshot()
+	if stored.AccessToken != "login-published" || deletes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("older refresh overwrote login publication: token=%q deletes=%d", stored.AccessToken, deletes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOpaqueLogoutWaitsForRejectedTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		logout func(string) error
+	}{
+		{name: "current profile", logout: func(configDir string) error {
+			return DeleteTokenDataForProfile(configDir, "")
+		}},
+		{name: "all profiles", logout: DeleteAllTokenData},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, validRejectedTokenData("old-access"))
+			started := make(chan struct{})
+			release := make(chan struct{})
+			var releaseOnce sync.Once
+			t.Cleanup(func() { releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(release) }) })
+			installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(p *OAuthProvider, _ context.Context, data *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+				close(started)
+				<-release
+				updated := *data
+				updated.AccessToken = "refreshed-before-logout"
+				updated.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+				if err := saveTokenDataLocked(p.configDir, &updated); err != nil {
+					return nil, err
+				}
+				return &updated, nil
+			})
+
+			configDir := t.TempDir()
+			provider := NewOAuthProvider(configDir, nil)
+			refreshResult := make(chan error, 1)
+			go func() {
+				_, err := provider.ForceRefreshRejectedToken(context.Background(), "old-access")
+				refreshResult <- err
+			}()
+			<-started
+
+			acquireAttempted := installProfilesAcquireProbe(t)
+			logoutResult := make(chan error, 1)
+			go func() { logoutResult <- tc.logout(configDir) }()
+			waitForProfilesAcquire(t, acquireAttempted)
+			releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(release) })
+
+			if err := <-refreshResult; err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("refresh: %v", err)
+			}
+			if err := <-logoutResult; err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("logout: %v", err)
+			}
+			stored, deletes := store.snapshot()
+			if stored.AccessToken != "" || stored.RefreshToken != "" || deletes != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("refresh resurrected logged-out credential: %#v deletes=%d", stored, deletes)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func ptrTokenData(data TokenData) *TokenData {
+	return &data
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageOAuthLockedRefreshReadsOpaqueEditionStore(t *testing.T) {
+	data := validRejectedTokenData("expired-access")
+	data.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
+	store := installRejectedTokenHookStore(t, data)
+	var refreshCalls atomic.Int32
+	installOAuthRefreshStub(t, func(p *OAuthProvider, _ context.Context, current *TokenData) (*TokenData, error) {
+		refreshCalls.Add(1)
+		updated := *current
+		updated.AccessToken = "proactively-refreshed"
+		updated.ExpiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+		if err := saveTokenDataLocked(p.configDir, &updated); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &updated, nil
+	})
+
+	token, err := NewOAuthProvider(t.TempDir(), nil).GetAccessToken(context.Background())
+	if err != nil || token != "proactively-refreshed" {
+		t.Fatalf("GetAccessToken() = %q, %v", token, err)
+	}
+	if refreshCalls.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("refresh calls = %d, want 1", refreshCalls.Load())
+	}
+	stored, deletes := store.snapshot()
+	if stored.AccessToken != "proactively-refreshed" || deletes != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("stored token = %q, deletes = %d", stored.AccessToken, deletes)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/testmain_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 package auth
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -34,7 +35,17 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 		_ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
 		panic("set " + keychain.StorageDirEnv + ": " + err.Error())
 	}
+	if err := os.Setenv(keychain.TestNamespaceEnv, tmpDir); err != nil {
+		_ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+		panic("set " + keychain.TestNamespaceEnv + ": " + err.Error())
+	}
 	code := m.Run()
+	if err := keychain.RemoveAuthTokenEntries(keychain.Service); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "internal/auth keychain cleanup: %v\n", err)
+		if code == 0 {
+			code = 1
+		}
+	}
 	_ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
 	os.Exit(code)
 }

internal/auth/token.go

@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ const tokenJSONFile = "token.json"
 type TokenMarker struct {
 	UpdatedAt   string `json:"updated_at"`
 	ManualToken bool   `json:"manual_token,omitempty"`
+	// Revision changes on every credential publication. Runtime token caches
+	// use it as a cheap cross-process invalidation signal without reading the
+	// platform keychain on every request.
+	Revision string `json:"revision,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // WriteTokenMarker writes a token.json marker containing only an updated_at
@@ -147,6 +151,7 @@ func writeTokenMarker(configDir string, manual bool) error {
 	marker := TokenMarker{
 		UpdatedAt:   time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
 		ManualToken: manual,
+		Revision:    uuid.NewString(),
 	}
 	data, _ := tokenJSONMarshalIndent(marker, "", "  ")
 	if err := tokenMkdirAll(configDir, 0o700); err != nil {
@@ -159,6 +164,27 @@ func writeTokenMarker(configDir string, manual bool) error {
 	return tokenRename(tmp, filepath.Join(configDir, tokenJSONFile))
 }
 
+// ReadTokenMarkerRevision returns the current credential publication revision.
+// Existing markers without a revision remain readable, but callers must avoid
+// caching them because they cannot prove that the credential is unchanged.
+func ReadTokenMarkerRevision(configDir string) (revision string, present bool, err error) {
+	data, err := tokenReadFile(filepath.Join(configDir, tokenJSONFile))
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return "", false, nil
+		}
+		return "", false, fmt.Errorf("read token marker: %w", err)
+	}
+	var marker TokenMarker
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &marker); err != nil {
+		// The marker is only a cache-coherency hint. A malformed historical or
+		// externally modified marker must disable caching, not make an otherwise
+		// valid credential unusable.
+		return "", true, nil
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(marker.Revision), true, nil
+}
+
 func manualTokenMarkerActive(configDir string) (bool, error) {
 	data, err := tokenReadFile(filepath.Join(configDir, tokenJSONFile))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -184,13 +210,10 @@ func DeleteTokenMarker(configDir string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// SaveTokenData persists TokenData. When an edition hook (SaveToken) is
-// registered, it delegates entirely to the hook; otherwise it falls back
-// to the default keychain-based storage.
+// SaveTokenData persists TokenData under the auth dual lock. When an edition
+// hook (SaveToken) is registered, the locked write delegates to that hook;
+// otherwise it falls back to the default keychain-based storage.
 func SaveTokenData(configDir string, data *TokenData) error {
-	if h := edition.Get(); h.SaveToken != nil {
-		return saveTokenViaHook(h, configDir, data)
-	}
 	return withProfilesLock(configDir, func() error {
 		return saveTokenDataLocked(configDir, data)
 	})
@@ -464,9 +487,8 @@ func tokenLoadProfileIdentity(profile Profile) (*TokenData, error) {
 	return orgData, nil
 }
 
-// DeleteTokenData removes token data. When an edition hook (DeleteToken) is
-// registered, it delegates entirely to the hook; otherwise it falls back
-// to keychain + legacy cleanup.
+// DeleteTokenData removes token data. Edition hooks and the default keychain
+// path are both serialized with refresh through the auth dual lock.
 func DeleteTokenData(configDir string) error {
 	return DeleteTokenDataForProfile(configDir, RuntimeProfile())
 }
@@ -478,7 +500,9 @@ func DeleteTokenDataForProfile(configDir, profile string) error {
 		if strings.TrimSpace(profile) != "" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("profile selection is not supported by the current auth backend")
 		}
-		return h.DeleteToken(configDir)
+		return withProfilesLock(configDir, func() error {
+			return h.DeleteToken(configDir)
+		})
 	}
 	return withProfilesLock(configDir, func() error {
 		return deleteTokenDataForProfileLocked(configDir, profile)
@@ -913,7 +937,9 @@ func restoreTokenMarker(configDir string, marker tokenMarkerSnapshot) error {
 // DeleteAllTokenData removes all profile-scoped and legacy token data.
 func DeleteAllTokenData(configDir string) error {
 	if h := edition.Get(); h.DeleteToken != nil {
-		return h.DeleteToken(configDir)
+		return withProfilesLock(configDir, func() error {
+			return h.DeleteToken(configDir)
+		})
 	}
 	return withProfilesLock(configDir, func() error {
 		var firstErr error

internal/event/personal/client.go

@@ -63,9 +63,10 @@ func (i Identity) Key() string {
 }
 
 type Client struct {
-	BaseURL    string
-	HTTPClient *http.Client
-	Identity   Identity
+	BaseURL             string
+	HTTPClient          *http.Client
+	Identity            Identity
+	AccessTokenProvider func(context.Context) (string, error)
 }
 
 type CreateSubscriptionRequest struct {
@@ -337,8 +338,9 @@ func (c *Client) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, q url.Values, body
 	if c == nil {
 		return errors.New("personal event: nil client")
 	}
-	if c.Identity.AccessToken == "" {
-		return errors.New("personal event: access token is required")
+	accessToken, err := c.resolveAccessToken(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
 	u := strings.TrimRight(c.BaseURL, "/") + path
 	if len(q) > 0 {
@@ -358,7 +360,7 @@ func (c *Client) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, q url.Values, body
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("personal event: create request: %w", err)
 	}
-	c.decorate(req)
+	c.decorate(req, accessToken)
 	if body != nil {
 		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	}
@@ -424,9 +426,26 @@ func (c *Client) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, q url.Values, body
 	return json.Unmarshal(data, out)
 }
 
-func (c *Client) decorate(req *http.Request) {
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.Identity.AccessToken)
-	req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", c.Identity.AccessToken)
+func (c *Client) resolveAccessToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+	if c.AccessTokenProvider != nil {
+		token, err := c.AccessTokenProvider(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("personal event: resolve access token: %w", err)
+		}
+		if token = strings.TrimSpace(token); token != "" {
+			return token, nil
+		}
+		return "", errors.New("personal event: access token provider returned empty token")
+	}
+	if token := strings.TrimSpace(c.Identity.AccessToken); token != "" {
+		return token, nil
+	}
+	return "", errors.New("personal event: access token is required")
+}
+
+func (c *Client) decorate(req *http.Request, accessToken string) {
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+accessToken)
+	req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", accessToken)
 	req.Header.Set("X-DWS-Client-Id", c.Identity.ClientID)
 	req.Header.Set("X-DWS-Source-Id", c.Identity.SourceID)
 	if c.Identity.CorpID != "" {

internal/event/personal/token_provider_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package personal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type accessTokenRoundTripper func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
+
+func (f accessTokenRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	return f(req)
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageClientResolvesAccessTokenPerRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	tokens := []string{"token-a", "token-b"}
+	calls := 0
+	client := NewClient("https://control.test", Identity{AccessToken: "stale", ClientID: "client", SourceID: "source"})
+	client.AccessTokenProvider = func(context.Context) (string, error) {
+		token := tokens[calls]
+		calls++
+		return token, nil
+	}
+	client.HTTPClient = &http.Client{Transport: accessTokenRoundTripper(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		want := tokens[calls-1]
+		if got := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer "+want {
+			t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q, want Bearer %s", got, want)
+		}
+		return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"success":true,"result":{"items":[]}}`)), Header: make(http.Header)}, nil
+	})}
+	for range 2 {
+		if _, err := client.ListSubscriptions(context.Background(), ListOptions{}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d, want 2", calls)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageClientDoesNotFallBackAfterProviderFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	want := errors.New("keychain failed")
+	client := NewClient("https://control.test", Identity{AccessToken: "stale", ClientID: "client", SourceID: "source"})
+	client.AccessTokenProvider = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "", want }
+	client.HTTPClient = &http.Client{Transport: accessTokenRoundTripper(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		t.Fatal("HTTP must not run after token provider failure")
+		return nil, nil
+	})}
+	_, err := client.ListSubscriptions(context.Background(), ListOptions{})
+	if !errors.Is(err, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want %v", err, want)
+	}
+}

internal/event/source/personal.go

@@ -41,19 +41,22 @@ const (
 )
 
 type PersonalConfig struct {
-	AccessToken     string
-	ClientID        string
-	ClientSecret    string
-	SourceID        string
-	TicketURL       string
-	TicketMode      string
-	HTTPClient      *http.Client
-	WebSocketDialer *websocket.Dialer
-	Now             func() time.Time
-	ReconnectMin    time.Duration
-	ReconnectMax    time.Duration
+	AccessToken         string
+	AccessTokenProvider AccessTokenProvider
+	ClientID            string
+	ClientSecret        string
+	SourceID            string
+	TicketURL           string
+	TicketMode          string
+	HTTPClient          *http.Client
+	WebSocketDialer     *websocket.Dialer
+	Now                 func() time.Time
+	ReconnectMin        time.Duration
+	ReconnectMax        time.Duration
 }
 
+type AccessTokenProvider func(context.Context) (string, error)
+
 type PersonalSource struct {
 	cfg     PersonalConfig
 	machine *Machine
@@ -73,8 +76,8 @@ type ticketResponse struct {
 }
 
 func NewPersonal(cfg PersonalConfig) (*PersonalSource, error) {
-	if strings.TrimSpace(cfg.AccessToken) == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("personal source: AccessToken is required")
+	if cfg.AccessTokenProvider == nil && strings.TrimSpace(cfg.AccessToken) == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("personal source: AccessToken or AccessTokenProvider is required")
 	}
 	if strings.TrimSpace(cfg.ClientID) == "" {
 		return nil, errors.New("personal source: ClientID is required")
@@ -192,6 +195,10 @@ func (s *PersonalSource) runAttempt(ctx context.Context, emit dwsevent.EmitFn) (
 }
 
 func (s *PersonalSource) fetchTicket(ctx context.Context) (*ticketResponse, error) {
+	accessToken, err := resolveSourceAccessToken(ctx, s.cfg.AccessTokenProvider, s.cfg.AccessToken, "personal source")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	body := map[string]any{
 		"sourceId": s.cfg.SourceID,
 		"mode":     s.cfg.TicketMode,
@@ -207,8 +214,8 @@ func (s *PersonalSource) fetchTicket(ctx context.Context) (*ticketResponse, erro
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
-	req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", s.cfg.AccessToken)
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.cfg.AccessToken)
+	req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", accessToken)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+accessToken)
 	req.Header.Set("X-DWS-Client-Id", s.cfg.ClientID)
 	req.Header.Set("X-DWS-Source-Id", s.cfg.SourceID)
 
@@ -238,6 +245,23 @@ func (s *PersonalSource) fetchTicket(ctx context.Context) (*ticketResponse, erro
 	return ticket, nil
 }
 
+func resolveSourceAccessToken(ctx context.Context, provider AccessTokenProvider, fallback, component string) (string, error) {
+	if provider != nil {
+		token, err := provider(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("%s: resolve access token: %w", component, err)
+		}
+		if token = strings.TrimSpace(token); token != "" {
+			return token, nil
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%s: access token provider returned empty token", component)
+	}
+	if token := strings.TrimSpace(fallback); token != "" {
+		return token, nil
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("%s: access token is required", component)
+}
+
 func (s *PersonalSource) handleFrame(conn *websocket.Conn, data []byte, emit dwsevent.EmitFn) error {
 	df, err := payload.DecodeDataFrame(data)
 	if err != nil {

internal/event/source/portal_ticket.go

@@ -39,14 +39,15 @@ const (
 // normal mode uses portal-side managed credentials; custom mode asks portal to
 // open the user connection with the caller-provided clientId/clientSecret.
 type PortalTicketConfig struct {
-	TicketURL    string
-	AccessToken  string
-	SourceID     string
-	Mode         string
-	ClientID     string
-	ClientSecret string
-	UserAgent    string
-	HTTPClient   *http.Client
+	TicketURL           string
+	AccessToken         string
+	AccessTokenProvider AccessTokenProvider
+	SourceID            string
+	Mode                string
+	ClientID            string
+	ClientSecret        string
+	UserAgent           string
+	HTTPClient          *http.Client
 }
 
 var portalWriteMessage = func(conn *websocket.Conn, messageType int, data []byte) error {
@@ -60,8 +61,8 @@ func (c *PortalTicketConfig) Valid() error {
 	if strings.TrimSpace(c.TicketURL) == "" {
 		return errors.New("source: portal ticket URL is required")
 	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(c.AccessToken) == "" {
-		return errors.New("source: portal access token is required")
+	if c.AccessTokenProvider == nil && strings.TrimSpace(c.AccessToken) == "" {
+		return errors.New("source: portal access token or provider is required")
 	}
 	if strings.TrimSpace(c.SourceID) == "" {
 		return errors.New("source: portal sourceId is required")
@@ -161,6 +162,10 @@ type portalStreamTicket struct {
 }
 
 func requestPortalTicket(ctx context.Context, cfg *PortalTicketConfig) (portalStreamTicket, error) {
+	accessToken, err := resolveSourceAccessToken(ctx, cfg.AccessTokenProvider, cfg.AccessToken, "source: portal ticket")
+	if err != nil {
+		return portalStreamTicket{}, err
+	}
 	httpClient := cfg.HTTPClient
 	if httpClient == nil {
 		httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 20 * time.Second}
@@ -184,7 +189,7 @@ func requestPortalTicket(ctx context.Context, cfg *PortalTicketConfig) (portalSt
 	if ua := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.UserAgent); ua != "" {
 		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", ua)
 	}
-	req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", cfg.AccessToken)
+	req.Header.Set("x-user-access-token", accessToken)
 
 	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {

internal/event/source/token_provider_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package source
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type tokenProviderRoundTripper func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
+
+func (f tokenProviderRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	return f(req)
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePersonalSourceResolvesTokenForEveryTicketRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	tokens := []string{"token-a", "token-b"}
+	calls := 0
+	source, err := NewPersonal(PersonalConfig{
+		AccessTokenProvider: func(context.Context) (string, error) {
+			token := tokens[calls]
+			calls++
+			return token, nil
+		},
+		ClientID:  "client",
+		SourceID:  "source",
+		TicketURL: "https://ticket.test",
+		HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: tokenProviderRoundTripper(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+			want := tokens[calls-1]
+			if got := req.Header.Get("x-user-access-token"); got != want {
+				t.Fatalf("token header = %q, want %q", got, want)
+			}
+			return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"endpoint":"wss://stream.test","ticket":"ticket"}`)), Header: make(http.Header)}, nil
+		})},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for range 2 {
+		if _, err := source.fetchTicket(context.Background()); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provider calls = %d, want 2", calls)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCrossPlatformCoveragePortalTicketProviderFailureStopsBeforeHTTP(t *testing.T) {
+	want := errors.New("token store failed")
+	httpCalled := false
+	_, err := requestPortalTicket(context.Background(), &PortalTicketConfig{
+		TicketURL:           "https://ticket.test",
+		AccessTokenProvider: func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "", want },
+		SourceID:            "source",
+		HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: tokenProviderRoundTripper(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+			httpCalled = true
+			return nil, errors.New("unexpected HTTP")
+		})},
+	})
+	if !errors.Is(err, want) || httpCalled {
+		t.Fatalf("request error = %v, httpCalled=%v", err, httpCalled)
+	}
+}

internal/keychain/keychain.go

@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ const (
 	// parallel. When empty, the platform default applies.
 	StorageDirEnv = "DWS_KEYCHAIN_DIR"
 
+	// TestNamespaceEnv isolates the Windows HKCU registry backend for tests.
+	// Production code must not set it. Other platforms already isolate secure
+	// storage through StorageDirEnv and ignore this value.
+	TestNamespaceEnv = "DWS_KEYCHAIN_TEST_NAMESPACE"
+
 	// DisableKeychainEnv opts the macOS implementation out of system
 	// Keychain access for the DEK, falling back to a file-based DEK
 	// (same scheme as Linux). Intended for sandboxed runtimes where

internal/keychain/keychain_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 package keychain
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
@@ -25,8 +26,15 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 		panic(err)
 	}
 	_ = os.Setenv(StorageDirEnv, dir)
+	_ = os.Setenv(TestNamespaceEnv, dir)
 	_ = os.Setenv(DisableKeychainEnv, "1")
 	code := m.Run()
+	if err := RemoveAuthTokenEntries(Service); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "internal/keychain test cleanup: %v\n", err)
+		if code == 0 {
+			code = 1
+		}
+	}
 	_ = os.RemoveAll(dir)
 	os.Exit(code)
 }

internal/keychain/keychain_windows.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 package keychain
 
 import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -47,9 +48,8 @@ const regRootPath = `Software\DwsCli\keychain`
 // The Windows keychain backend keeps secrets in DPAPI-protected HKCU registry
 // values rather than on disk, so this path is used only by the portable
 // auth-bundle export/import (internal/auth) to colocate config. When the
-// DWS_KEYCHAIN_DIR environment variable is set (used by tests for isolation),
-// the storage root is taken from that env var instead; otherwise it defaults
-// to %LocalAppData%\<service>.
+// DWS_KEYCHAIN_DIR environment variable is set, the storage root is taken from
+// that env var; otherwise it defaults to %LocalAppData%\<service>.
 func StorageDir(service string) string {
 	if override := os.Getenv(StorageDirEnv); override != "" {
 		return filepath.Join(override, service)
@@ -66,7 +66,22 @@ func StorageDir(service string) string {
 }
 
 func registryPathForService(service string) string {
-	return regRootPath + `\` + safeRegistryComponent(service)
+	path := regRootPath + `\` + safeRegistryComponent(service)
+	namespace := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(TestNamespaceEnv))
+	if namespace == "" {
+		return path
+	}
+
+	// Windows stores credentials in HKCU instead of DWS_KEYCHAIN_DIR. Tests set
+	// an explicit process namespace so concurrent package binaries cannot
+	// delete each other's credentials. Hash it to avoid leaking temp paths or
+	// introducing registry separators.
+	namespace = filepath.Clean(namespace)
+	if absolute, err := filepath.Abs(namespace); err == nil {
+		namespace = absolute
+	}
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.ToLower(namespace)))
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`%s\test-%x`, path, sum[:16])
 }
 
 var safeRegRe = regexp.MustCompile(`[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]`)

internal/keychain/keychain_windows_test.go

@@ -17,12 +17,37 @@ package keychain
 
 import (
 	"errors"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
 	"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
 )
 
+func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRegistryPathForServiceHonorsTestNamespace(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv(TestNamespaceEnv, "")
+	defaultPath := registryPathForService("service")
+	if defaultPath != regRootPath+`\service` {
+		t.Fatalf("default registry path = %q, want historical path %q", defaultPath, regRootPath+`\service`)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv(TestNamespaceEnv, t.TempDir())
+	firstPath := registryPathForService("service")
+
+	t.Setenv(TestNamespaceEnv, t.TempDir())
+	secondPath := registryPathForService("service")
+
+	if firstPath == defaultPath || secondPath == defaultPath {
+		t.Fatalf("isolated registry paths = %q, %q; want paths distinct from %q", firstPath, secondPath, defaultPath)
+	}
+	if firstPath == secondPath {
+		t.Fatalf("isolated registry paths collide: %q", firstPath)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(firstPath, defaultPath+`\test-`) {
+		t.Fatalf("isolated registry path = %q, want prefix %q", firstPath, defaultPath+`\test-`)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestDeleteRegistryValuePropagatesFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	originalDelete := registryDeleteValue
 	failure := errors.New("delete failed")

scripts/policy/check-changelog-pr.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+
+# Validate CHANGELOG.md changes against the release contract.
+#
+# --fast-path additionally requires the complete PR diff to be exactly one
+# in-place CHANGELOG.md modification. --content-only validates CHANGELOG.md
+# while allowing other files to change in the same PR.
+
+ROOT="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
+
+usage() {
+	printf '%s\n' "usage: $0 (--fast-path|--content-only) BASE HEAD" >&2
+}
+
+if [ "$#" -ne 3 ]; then
+	usage
+	exit 2
+fi
+
+case "$1" in
+--fast-path)
+	VALIDATION_MODE="fast-path"
+	;;
+--content-only)
+	VALIDATION_MODE="content-only"
+	;;
+*)
+	usage
+	exit 2
+	;;
+esac
+BASE_REF="$2"
+HEAD_REF="$3"
+
+cd "$ROOT"
+
+BASE_COMMIT="$(git rev-parse --verify --quiet "${BASE_REF}^{commit}")" || {
+	printf 'error: CHANGELOG base ref is not an available commit: %s\n' "$BASE_REF" >&2
+	exit 2
+}
+HEAD_COMMIT="$(git rev-parse --verify --quiet "${HEAD_REF}^{commit}")" || {
+	printf 'error: CHANGELOG head ref is not an available commit: %s\n' "$HEAD_REF" >&2
+	exit 2
+}
+
+TMP_ROOT="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/dws-changelog-pr.XXXXXX")"
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_ROOT"' EXIT HUP INT TERM
+
+if ! git merge-base --all "$BASE_COMMIT" "$HEAD_COMMIT" >"$TMP_ROOT/merge-bases"; then
+	printf 'error: CHANGELOG base and head commits have no merge base\n' >&2
+	exit 2
+fi
+merge_base_count="$(wc -l <"$TMP_ROOT/merge-bases" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+if [ "$merge_base_count" -ne 1 ]; then
+	printf 'error: expected exactly one merge base, found %s\n' "$merge_base_count" >&2
+	exit 2
+fi
+IFS= read -r MERGE_BASE <"$TMP_ROOT/merge-bases"
+
+require_regular_changelog() {
+	_rrc_label="$1"
+	_rrc_commit="$2"
+	if ! git ls-tree "$_rrc_commit" -- CHANGELOG.md |
+		awk '
+			NR == 1 &&
+				$1 == "100644" &&
+				$2 == "blob" &&
+				$4 == "CHANGELOG.md" {
+				valid = 1
+			}
+			END {
+				exit !(NR == 1 && valid)
+			}
+		'; then
+		printf 'error: CHANGELOG.md must be a regular 100644 blob at %s\n' \
+			"$_rrc_label" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+# The merge base is the effective base of the PR diff. Also validate the
+# caller-provided base commit so a stale or malformed target ref fails closed.
+require_regular_changelog "base" "$BASE_COMMIT"
+if [ "$MERGE_BASE" != "$BASE_COMMIT" ]; then
+	require_regular_changelog "merge base" "$MERGE_BASE"
+fi
+require_regular_changelog "head" "$HEAD_COMMIT"
+
+git diff --no-ext-diff --find-renames --name-status \
+	"$MERGE_BASE" "$HEAD_COMMIT" >"$TMP_ROOT/name-status"
+case "$VALIDATION_MODE" in
+fast-path)
+	printf 'M\tCHANGELOG.md\n' >"$TMP_ROOT/expected-name-status"
+	if ! cmp -s "$TMP_ROOT/expected-name-status" "$TMP_ROOT/name-status"; then
+		printf '%s\n' 'error: fast path requires exactly one in-place modification: CHANGELOG.md' >&2
+		if [ -s "$TMP_ROOT/name-status" ]; then
+			sed 's/^/  /' "$TMP_ROOT/name-status" >&2
+		else
+			printf '%s\n' '  (no changed files)' >&2
+		fi
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+content-only)
+	if ! awk -F '	' '
+		$1 == "M" && $2 == "CHANGELOG.md" && NF == 2 {
+			count++
+		}
+		END {
+			exit count != 1
+		}
+	' "$TMP_ROOT/name-status"; then
+		printf '%s\n' 'error: content-only validation requires an in-place modification: CHANGELOG.md' >&2
+		if [ -s "$TMP_ROOT/name-status" ]; then
+			sed 's/^/  /' "$TMP_ROOT/name-status" >&2
+		else
+			printf '%s\n' '  (no changed files)' >&2
+		fi
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
+
+if ! git diff --no-ext-diff --check "$MERGE_BASE" "$HEAD_COMMIT" -- CHANGELOG.md; then
+	printf '%s\n' 'error: CHANGELOG diff contains whitespace errors' >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+"$ROOT/scripts/policy/open-source-audit.sh"
+
+if ! git show "${MERGE_BASE}:CHANGELOG.md" >"$TMP_ROOT/base-changelog" ||
+	! git show "${HEAD_COMMIT}:CHANGELOG.md" >"$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog"; then
+	printf '%s\n' 'error: could not read CHANGELOG.md from both commits' >&2
+	exit 2
+fi
+
+git diff --no-ext-diff --unified=0 \
+	"$MERGE_BASE" "$HEAD_COMMIT" -- CHANGELOG.md >"$TMP_ROOT/changelog.patch"
+if grep -q '^Binary files ' "$TMP_ROOT/changelog.patch"; then
+	printf '%s\n' 'error: CHANGELOG.md must remain a text file' >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+if ! awk '
+	/^\+\+\+ / { next }
+	/^\+/ {
+		line = substr($0, 2)
+		if (line ~ /(^|[^[:alnum:]_])(TODO|TBD)([^[:alnum:]_]|$)/) {
+			bad = 1
+		}
+	}
+	END { exit bad }
+' "$TMP_ROOT/changelog.patch"; then
+	printf '%s\n' 'error: changed CHANGELOG additions must not contain TODO/TBD placeholders' >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+. "$ROOT/scripts/release/release-lib.sh"
+
+extract_labeled_section() {
+	_els_file="$1"
+	_els_wanted="$2"
+	awk -v wanted="$_els_wanted" '
+		/^## / {
+			active = 0
+			if (substr($0, 1, 4) == "## [") {
+				rest = substr($0, 5)
+				close_pos = index(rest, "]")
+				if (close_pos > 1 && substr(rest, 1, close_pos - 1) == wanted) {
+					active = 1
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		active { print }
+	' "$_els_file"
+}
+
+extract_unmanaged_content() {
+	_euc_file="$1"
+	awk '
+		BEGIN { active = 1 }
+		/^## / {
+			active = 1
+			if (substr($0, 1, 4) == "## [") {
+				rest = substr($0, 5)
+				close_pos = index(rest, "]")
+				if (close_pos > 1) {
+					active = 0
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		active { print }
+	' "$_euc_file"
+}
+
+label_heading_count() {
+	_lhc_file="$1"
+	_lhc_wanted="$2"
+	awk -v wanted="$_lhc_wanted" '
+		/^## / && substr($0, 1, 4) == "## [" {
+			rest = substr($0, 5)
+			close_pos = index(rest, "]")
+			if (close_pos > 1 && substr(rest, 1, close_pos - 1) == wanted) count++
+		}
+		END { print count + 0 }
+	' "$_lhc_file"
+}
+
+calendar_date_is_valid() {
+	_cdiv_date="$1"
+	awk -v date="$_cdiv_date" 'BEGIN {
+		if (date !~ /^[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]$/) exit 1
+		split(date, part, "-")
+		year = part[1] + 0
+		month = part[2] + 0
+		day = part[3] + 0
+		if (year < 1 || month < 1 || month > 12 || day < 1) exit 1
+		days = 31
+		if (month == 4 || month == 6 || month == 9 || month == 11) days = 30
+		if (month == 2) {
+			days = 28
+			if ((year % 4 == 0 && year % 100 != 0) || year % 400 == 0) days = 29
+		}
+		exit day > days
+	}'
+}
+
+release_heading_date() {
+	_rhd_file="$1"
+	_rhd_version="$2"
+	awk -v wanted="$_rhd_version" '
+		BEGIN { prefix = "## [" wanted "] - " }
+		index($0, prefix) == 1 {
+			print substr($0, length(prefix) + 1)
+		}
+	' "$_rhd_file"
+}
+
+validate_release_notes() {
+	_vrn_file="$1"
+	set +e
+	awk '
+		NR == 1 { next }
+		{
+			if ($0 ~ /[^[:space:]]/) meaningful = 1
+			if ($0 ~ /^- /) bullet = 1
+			if ($0 ~ /(^|[^[:alnum:]_])(TODO|TBD)([^[:alnum:]_]|$)/) placeholder = 1
+		}
+		END {
+			if (!meaningful || !bullet) exit 43
+			if (placeholder) exit 44
+		}
+	' "$_vrn_file"
+	_vrn_status=$?
+	set -e
+	case "$_vrn_status" in
+	0) return 0 ;;
+	43) printf '%s\n' 'error: changed release section must contain notes and at least one bullet' >&2 ;;
+	44) printf '%s\n' 'error: changed release section still contains TODO/TBD placeholders' >&2 ;;
+	*) printf '%s\n' 'error: failed to validate changed release notes' >&2 ;;
+	esac
+	return "$_vrn_status"
+}
+
+extract_unmanaged_content "$TMP_ROOT/base-changelog" >"$TMP_ROOT/base-unmanaged"
+extract_unmanaged_content "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" >"$TMP_ROOT/head-unmanaged"
+if ! cmp -s "$TMP_ROOT/base-unmanaged" "$TMP_ROOT/head-unmanaged"; then
+	printf '%s\n' 'error: CHANGELOG validation only permits notes inside Unreleased or versioned release sections' >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+unreleased_count="$(label_heading_count "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" Unreleased)"
+unreleased_exact_count="$(awk '$0 == "## [Unreleased]" { count++ } END { print count + 0 }' \
+	"$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog")"
+if [ "$unreleased_count" -ne 1 ] || [ "$unreleased_exact_count" -ne 1 ]; then
+	printf 'error: CHANGELOG must contain exactly one heading: ## [Unreleased]\n' >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+extract_labeled_section "$TMP_ROOT/base-changelog" Unreleased >"$TMP_ROOT/base-unreleased"
+extract_labeled_section "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" Unreleased >"$TMP_ROOT/head-unreleased"
+unreleased_changed=0
+if ! cmp -s "$TMP_ROOT/base-unreleased" "$TMP_ROOT/head-unreleased"; then
+	unreleased_changed=1
+fi
+
+awk '
+	/^## / && substr($0, 1, 4) == "## [" {
+		rest = substr($0, 5)
+		close_pos = index(rest, "]")
+		if (close_pos > 1) {
+			label = substr(rest, 1, close_pos - 1)
+			if (label != "Unreleased") print label
+		}
+	}
+' "$TMP_ROOT/base-changelog" "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" |
+	LC_ALL=C sort -u >"$TMP_ROOT/release-labels"
+
+changed_release_count=0
+section_index=0
+while IFS= read -r version; do
+	[ -n "$version" ] || continue
+	section_index=$((section_index + 1))
+	base_section="$TMP_ROOT/base-release-$section_index"
+	head_section="$TMP_ROOT/head-release-$section_index"
+	extract_labeled_section "$TMP_ROOT/base-changelog" "$version" >"$base_section"
+	extract_labeled_section "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" "$version" >"$head_section"
+	if cmp -s "$base_section" "$head_section"; then
+		continue
+	fi
+
+	changed_release_count=$((changed_release_count + 1))
+	if ! release_channel_for_version "v$version" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		printf 'error: changed CHANGELOG release heading has an invalid version: %s\n' "$version" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	if [ "$(label_heading_count "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" "$version")" -ne 1 ]; then
+		printf 'error: CHANGELOG must contain exactly one well-formed section for %s\n' \
+			"$version" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	if ! validate_release_notes "$head_section"; then
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	release_date="$(release_heading_date "$TMP_ROOT/head-changelog" "$version")"
+	if ! calendar_date_is_valid "$release_date"; then
+		printf 'error: CHANGELOG section for %s has an invalid calendar date: %s\n' \
+			"$version" "$release_date" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+done <"$TMP_ROOT/release-labels"
+
+if [ "$changed_release_count" -eq 0 ] && [ "$unreleased_changed" -eq 0 ]; then
+	printf '%s\n' 'error: CHANGELOG modification did not change an eligible notes section' >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+printf 'CHANGELOG PR check: ok (mode=%s release_sections=%s unreleased_changed=%s)\n' \
+	"$VALIDATION_MODE" "$changed_release_count" "$unreleased_changed"

scripts/policy/check-coverage-gate.sh

@@ -4,17 +4,17 @@ set -eu
 ROOT="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
 BASE_REF=""
 OVERALL_PROFILE="coverage.txt"
-ADDITIONAL_PROFILE="${COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_PROFILE:-}"
+ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE="${COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE:-${COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_PROFILE:-}}"
 BASELINE_PROFILE="coverage-base.txt"
 DIFF_PROFILE="coverage-policy.txt"
-TARGET="${COVERAGE_TARGET:-80}"
-OVERALL_TOLERANCE="${COVERAGE_OVERALL_TOLERANCE:-0.1}"
+TARGET="${COVERAGE_TARGET:-100}"
+OVERALL_TOLERANCE="${COVERAGE_OVERALL_TOLERANCE:-0}"
 ENFORCE_OVERALL="${COVERAGE_ENFORCE_OVERALL:-false}"
 CHANGED_ONLY="false"
 SCOPE_BUILDABLE="false"
 
 usage() {
-  printf '%s\n' "usage: $0 --base-ref <ref> [--changed-only] [--scope-buildable] [--overall-profile <file>] [--additional-profile <file>] [--baseline-profile <file>] [--diff-profile <file>]" >&2
+  printf '%s\n' "usage: $0 --base-ref <ref> [--changed-only] [--scope-buildable] [--overall-profile <file>] [--additional-diff-profile <file>] [--baseline-profile <file>] [--diff-profile <file>]" >&2
 }
 
 while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
       OVERALL_PROFILE="$2"
       shift 2
       ;;
-    --additional-profile)
+    --additional-diff-profile|--additional-profile)
       [ "$#" -ge 2 ] || { usage; exit 2; }
-      ADDITIONAL_PROFILE="$2"
+      ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE="$2"
       shift 2
       ;;
     --baseline-profile)
@@ -87,19 +87,12 @@ set -- "$CHECKER" \
 if [ "$CHANGED_ONLY" = "true" ]; then
   set -- "$@" --changed-only
 else
-  baseline="$(go tool cover -func="$BASELINE_PROFILE" | awk '/^total:/ { gsub(/%/, "", $3); print $3 }')"
-  [ -n "$baseline" ] || {
-    printf 'error: cannot parse authoritative coverage from %s\n' "$BASELINE_PROFILE" >&2
-    exit 2
-  }
   set -- "$@" \
     --overall-profile "$OVERALL_PROFILE" \
     --diff-profile "$OVERALL_PROFILE" \
-    --baseline-overall "$baseline"
-  if [ -n "$ADDITIONAL_PROFILE" ]; then
-    set -- "$@" \
-      --overall-profile "$ADDITIONAL_PROFILE" \
-      --diff-profile "$ADDITIONAL_PROFILE"
+    --baseline-profile "$BASELINE_PROFILE"
+  if [ -n "$ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE" ]; then
+    set -- "$@" --diff-profile "$ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE"
   fi
 fi
 if [ "$SCOPE_BUILDABLE" = "true" ]; then

scripts/policy/coverage-gate/main.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"math"
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -37,11 +36,13 @@ func (values *stringList) Set(value string) error {
 }
 
 type coverageBlock struct {
-	File       string
-	StartLine  int
-	EndLine    int
-	Statements int
-	Count      int
+	File        string
+	StartLine   int
+	StartColumn int
+	EndLine     int
+	EndColumn   int
+	Statements  int
+	Count       int
 }
 
 type lineRange struct {
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ func run(
 	buildableLoader func() (map[string]bool, error),
 ) int {
 	var overallPaths stringList
+	var baselinePaths stringList
 	var diffPaths stringList
 	var baseRef string
 	var modulePath string
@@ -90,12 +92,13 @@ func run(
 	flags := flag.NewFlagSet("coverage-gate", flag.ContinueOnError)
 	flags.SetOutput(stderr)
 	flags.Var(&overallPaths, "overall-profile", "coverage profile used for overall coverage (repeatable)")
+	flags.Var(&baselinePaths, "baseline-profile", "merge-base coverage profile evaluated with the same model as the candidate (repeatable)")
 	flags.Var(&diffPaths, "diff-profile", "coverage profile used for changed-code coverage (repeatable)")
 	flags.StringVar(&baseRef, "base-ref", "", "Git merge-base or previous main SHA")
 	flags.StringVar(&modulePath, "module", "", "Go module path used to normalize profile filenames")
 	flags.Float64Var(&baselineOverall, "baseline-overall", -1, "authoritative overall coverage percentage")
-	flags.Float64Var(&overallTolerance, "overall-tolerance", 0.1, "allowed overall coverage measurement variance in percentage points")
-	flags.Float64Var(&target, "target", 80, "required changed-code and eventual overall coverage percentage")
+	flags.Float64Var(&overallTolerance, "overall-tolerance", 0, "allowed overall coverage measurement variance in percentage points")
+	flags.Float64Var(&target, "target", 100, "required changed-code coverage percentage and optional overall floor")
 	flags.BoolVar(&enforceOverall, "enforce-overall-target", false, "require overall coverage to reach target")
 	flags.BoolVar(&changedOnly, "changed-only", false, "enforce changed-code coverage without an overall baseline")
 	flags.BoolVar(&scopeBuildable, "scope-buildable", false, "only evaluate changed files buildable on the current platform")
@@ -103,8 +106,13 @@ func run(
 		return 2
 	}
 
-	if len(diffPaths) == 0 || baseRef == "" || modulePath == "" || (!changedOnly && (len(overallPaths) == 0 || baselineOverall < 0)) {
-		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "coverage-gate requires --diff-profile, --base-ref, and --module; overall mode also requires --overall-profile and --baseline-overall")
+	if len(diffPaths) == 0 || baseRef == "" || modulePath == "" ||
+		(!changedOnly && (len(overallPaths) == 0 || (len(baselinePaths) == 0 && baselineOverall < 0))) {
+		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "coverage-gate requires --diff-profile, --base-ref, and --module; overall mode also requires --overall-profile and either --baseline-profile or --baseline-overall")
+		return 2
+	}
+	if len(baselinePaths) > 0 && baselineOverall >= 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "coverage-gate accepts either --baseline-profile or --baseline-overall, not both")
 		return 2
 	}
 	var overall []coverageBlock
@@ -115,6 +123,14 @@ func run(
 			fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err)
 			return 2
 		}
+		if len(baselinePaths) > 0 {
+			baseline, baselineErr := readProfiles(baselinePaths, modulePath)
+			if baselineErr != nil {
+				fmt.Fprintln(stderr, baselineErr)
+				return 2
+			}
+			baselineOverall = coveragePercent(baseline)
+		}
 	}
 	diff, err := readProfiles(diffPaths, modulePath)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -150,12 +166,12 @@ func run(
 		if enforceOverall {
 			mode = "required"
 		}
-		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "overall coverage: %.1f%% (merge-base %.1f%%; tolerance %.1fpp; target %.1f%%; %s)\n", result.Overall, baselineOverall, overallTolerance, target, mode)
+		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "overall coverage: %.4f%% (merge-base %.4f%%; tolerance %.4fpp; target %.4f%%; %s)\n", result.Overall, baselineOverall, overallTolerance, target, mode)
 	}
 	if result.ChangedStatements == 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "changed code coverage: n/a (no changed executable statements; target %.1f%%)\n", target)
+		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "changed code coverage: n/a (no changed executable statements; target %.4f%%)\n", target)
 	} else {
-		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "changed code coverage: %.1f%% (%d executable statements; target %.1f%%)\n", result.ChangedCoverage, result.ChangedStatements, target)
+		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "changed code coverage: %.4f%% (%d executable statements; target %.4f%%)\n", result.ChangedCoverage, result.ChangedStatements, target)
 	}
 	if len(result.Failures) > 0 {
 		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "coverage gate failed:")
@@ -171,13 +187,11 @@ func evaluate(input gateInput) gateResult {
 	result := gateResult{Failures: []string{}}
 	if !input.ChangedOnly {
 		result.Overall = coveragePercent(input.Overall)
-		baselineRounded := roundOne(input.BaselineOverall)
-		overallRounded := roundOne(result.Overall)
-		if overallRounded+input.OverallTolerance+1e-9 < baselineRounded {
-			result.Failures = append(result.Failures, fmt.Sprintf("overall coverage regressed from %.1f%% to %.1f%%", baselineRounded, overallRounded))
+		if result.Overall+input.OverallTolerance < input.BaselineOverall {
+			result.Failures = append(result.Failures, fmt.Sprintf("overall coverage regressed from %.4f%% to %.4f%%", input.BaselineOverall, result.Overall))
 		}
-		if input.EnforceOverall && overallRounded < input.Target {
-			result.Failures = append(result.Failures, fmt.Sprintf("overall coverage %.1f%% is below target %.1f%%", overallRounded, input.Target))
+		if input.EnforceOverall && result.Overall < input.Target {
+			result.Failures = append(result.Failures, fmt.Sprintf("overall coverage %.4f%% is below target %.4f%%", result.Overall, input.Target))
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -206,8 +220,8 @@ func evaluate(input gateInput) gateResult {
 	result.ChangedStatements = total
 	if total > 0 {
 		result.ChangedCoverage = float64(covered) * 100 / float64(total)
-		if result.ChangedCoverage+1e-9 < input.Target {
-			result.Failures = append(result.Failures, fmt.Sprintf("changed code coverage %.1f%% is below target %.1f%%", result.ChangedCoverage, input.Target))
+		if result.ChangedCoverage < input.Target {
+			result.Failures = append(result.Failures, fmt.Sprintf("changed code coverage %.4f%% is below target %.4f%%", result.ChangedCoverage, input.Target))
 		}
 	}
 	return result
@@ -253,11 +267,13 @@ func readProfiles(paths []string, modulePath string) ([]coverageBlock, error) {
 				values = append(values, value)
 			}
 			blocks = append(blocks, coverageBlock{
-				File:       normalizeProfilePath(match[1], modulePath),
-				StartLine:  values[0],
-				EndLine:    values[2],
-				Statements: values[4],
-				Count:      values[5],
+				File:        normalizeProfilePath(match[1], modulePath),
+				StartLine:   values[0],
+				StartColumn: values[1],
+				EndLine:     values[2],
+				EndColumn:   values[3],
+				Statements:  values[4],
+				Count:       values[5],
 			})
 		}
 		err = scanner.Err()
@@ -402,7 +418,15 @@ func coveragePercent(blocks []coverageBlock) float64 {
 func mergeCoverageBlocks(blocks []coverageBlock) []coverageBlock {
 	merged := make(map[string]coverageBlock, len(blocks))
 	for _, block := range blocks {
-		key := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d:%d:%d", block.File, block.StartLine, block.EndLine, block.Statements)
+		key := fmt.Sprintf(
+			"%s:%d:%d:%d:%d:%d",
+			block.File,
+			block.StartLine,
+			block.StartColumn,
+			block.EndLine,
+			block.EndColumn,
+			block.Statements,
+		)
 		current, ok := merged[key]
 		if !ok || block.Count > current.Count {
 			merged[key] = block
@@ -419,5 +443,3 @@ func mergeCoverageBlocks(blocks []coverageBlock) []coverageBlock {
 	}
 	return result
 }
-
-func roundOne(value float64) float64 { return math.Round(value*10) / 10 }

scripts/policy/coverage-gate/main_test.go

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestRun(t *testing.T) {
 	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, nil); code != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("run code=%d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage: 100.0%") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "changed code coverage: 100.0%") {
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage: 100.0000%") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "changed code coverage: 100.0000%") {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected output %q", stdout.String())
 	}
 
@@ -54,6 +54,115 @@ func TestRun(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestRunDefaultsToFullChangedCodeCoverage(t *testing.T) {
+	profile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "coverage.out")
+	partialBody := "mode: atomic\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:10.1,12.2 9 1\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:13.1,13.2 1 0\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(profile, []byte(partialBody), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	args := []string{
+		"--changed-only",
+		"--diff-profile", profile,
+		"--base-ref", "base",
+		"--module", "example.com/project",
+	}
+	loader := func(string) (map[string][]lineRange, error) {
+		return map[string][]lineRange{"internal/a.go": {{Start: 10, End: 13}}}, nil
+	}
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, nil); code != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("run code=%d, want 1; stdout=%s stderr=%s", code, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "changed code coverage 90.0000% is below target 100.0000%") {
+		t.Fatalf("default target was not enforced: %q", stderr.String())
+	}
+
+	fullBody := "mode: atomic\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:10.1,12.2 9 1\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:13.1,13.2 1 1\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(profile, []byte(fullBody), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	stdout.Reset()
+	stderr.Reset()
+	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, nil); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("100%% changed coverage code=%d; stdout=%s stderr=%s", code, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunEvaluatesBaselineProfileWithCandidateCoverageModel(t *testing.T) {
+	profile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "coverage.out")
+	body := "mode: atomic\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:10.1,12.2 5 0\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:10.1,12.2 5 1\n" +
+		"example.com/project/internal/a.go:20.1,22.2 5 0\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(profile, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	args := []string{
+		"--overall-profile", profile,
+		"--baseline-profile", profile,
+		"--diff-profile", profile,
+		"--base-ref", "base",
+		"--module", "example.com/project",
+	}
+	loader := func(string) (map[string][]lineRange, error) {
+		return map[string][]lineRange{}, nil
+	}
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, nil); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("run code=%d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage: 50.0000% (merge-base 50.0000%") {
+		t.Fatalf("baseline and candidate did not share one coverage model: %q", stdout.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunFailsClosedWhenBaselineProfileIsMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	profile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "coverage.out")
+	body := "mode: atomic\nexample.com/project/internal/a.go:10.1,12.2 5 1\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(profile, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	args := []string{
+		"--overall-profile", profile,
+		"--baseline-profile", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing.out"),
+		"--diff-profile", profile,
+		"--base-ref", "base",
+		"--module", "example.com/project",
+	}
+	loader := func(string) (map[string][]lineRange, error) {
+		return map[string][]lineRange{}, nil
+	}
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, nil); code != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("missing baseline profile code=%d, want 2; stdout=%s stderr=%s", code, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "open coverage profile") {
+		t.Fatalf("missing baseline profile did not fail closed: %q", stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunRejectsConflictingBaselineSources(t *testing.T) {
+	args := []string{
+		"--overall-profile", "candidate.out",
+		"--baseline-profile", "baseline.out",
+		"--baseline-overall", "100",
+		"--diff-profile", "candidate.out",
+		"--base-ref", "base",
+		"--module", "example.com/project",
+	}
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, nil, nil); code != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("conflicting baseline sources code=%d, want 2; stdout=%s stderr=%s", code, stdout.String(), stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "either --baseline-profile or --baseline-overall, not both") {
+		t.Fatalf("conflicting baseline sources were not rejected clearly: %q", stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunUnionsRepeatedOverallProfiles(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	uncovered := filepath.Join(dir, "uncovered.out")
@@ -81,7 +190,7 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageRunUnionsRepeatedOverallProfiles(t *testing.T) {
 	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, nil); code != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("run code=%d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage: 100.0%") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "changed code coverage: 100.0%") {
+	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage: 100.0000%") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "changed code coverage: 100.0000%") {
 		t.Fatalf("repeated profiles were not unioned: %q", stdout.String())
 	}
 }
@@ -113,7 +222,7 @@ func TestRunChangedOnlyWithBuildableScope(t *testing.T) {
 	if code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr, loader, buildableLoader); code != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("run code=%d stderr=%s", code, stderr.String())
 	}
-	if strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "changed code coverage: 100.0%") {
+	if strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "overall coverage") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "changed code coverage: 100.0000%") {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected changed-only output %q", stdout.String())
 	}
 
@@ -143,7 +252,11 @@ func TestReadProfiles(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	if len(blocks) != 1 || blocks[0].File != "internal/a.go" || blocks[0].Statements != 3 {
+	if len(blocks) != 1 ||
+		blocks[0].File != "internal/a.go" ||
+		blocks[0].StartColumn != 1 ||
+		blocks[0].EndColumn != 2 ||
+		blocks[0].Statements != 3 {
 		t.Fatalf("blocks=%v", blocks)
 	}
 	if _, err := readProfiles([]string{filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing")}, "example.com/project"); err == nil {
@@ -275,6 +388,41 @@ func TestCrossPlatformCoverageUnionsDuplicateCrossPackageCoverageBlocks(t *testi
 	}
 }
 
+func TestCoverageKeepsDistinctBlocksOnTheSameLine(t *testing.T) {
+	result := evaluate(gateInput{
+		Diff: []coverageBlock{
+			{
+				File:        "internal/a.go",
+				StartLine:   10,
+				StartColumn: 1,
+				EndLine:     10,
+				EndColumn:   5,
+				Statements:  1,
+				Count:       1,
+			},
+			{
+				File:        "internal/a.go",
+				StartLine:   10,
+				StartColumn: 6,
+				EndLine:     10,
+				EndColumn:   10,
+				Statements:  1,
+				Count:       0,
+			},
+		},
+		Changed:     map[string][]lineRange{"internal/a.go": {{Start: 10, End: 10}}},
+		Target:      100,
+		ChangedOnly: true,
+	})
+	if result.ChangedCoverage != 50 || result.ChangedStatements != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("same-line blocks were collapsed: %#v", result)
+	}
+	if len(result.Failures) != 1 ||
+		!strings.Contains(result.Failures[0], "changed code coverage 50.0000% is below target 100.0000%") {
+		t.Fatalf("same-line uncovered block did not fail the gate: %v", result.Failures)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestEvaluateAllowsMeasurementTolerance(t *testing.T) {
 	result := evaluate(gateInput{
 		Overall:          []coverageBlock{{Statements: 403, Count: 1}, {Statements: 597, Count: 0}},
@@ -288,6 +436,52 @@ func TestEvaluateAllowsMeasurementTolerance(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestEvaluateDefaultsToZeroOverallTolerance(t *testing.T) {
+	result := evaluate(gateInput{
+		Overall:          []coverageBlock{{Statements: 403, Count: 1}, {Statements: 597, Count: 0}},
+		Changed:          map[string][]lineRange{},
+		BaselineOverall:  40.4,
+		OverallTolerance: 0,
+		Target:           100,
+	})
+	if len(result.Failures) != 1 ||
+		!strings.Contains(result.Failures[0], "overall coverage regressed from 40.4000% to 40.3000%") {
+		t.Fatalf("zero-tolerance regression failures = %v", result.Failures)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEvaluateRejectsRegressionHiddenByOneDecimalRounding(t *testing.T) {
+	result := evaluate(gateInput{
+		Overall: []coverageBlock{
+			{Statements: 1999, Count: 1},
+			{Statements: 1, Count: 0},
+		},
+		Changed:         map[string][]lineRange{},
+		BaselineOverall: 100,
+		Target:          100,
+	})
+	if len(result.Failures) != 1 ||
+		!strings.Contains(result.Failures[0], "overall coverage regressed from 100.0000% to 99.9500%") {
+		t.Fatalf("sub-tenth regression failures = %v", result.Failures)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEvaluateRejectsChangedCoverageBelow100WithoutRounding(t *testing.T) {
+	result := evaluate(gateInput{
+		Diff: []coverageBlock{
+			{File: "internal/a.go", StartLine: 1, EndLine: 1999, Statements: 1999, Count: 1},
+			{File: "internal/a.go", StartLine: 2000, EndLine: 2000, Statements: 1, Count: 0},
+		},
+		Changed:     map[string][]lineRange{"internal/a.go": {{Start: 1, End: 2000}}},
+		Target:      100,
+		ChangedOnly: true,
+	})
+	if len(result.Failures) != 1 ||
+		!strings.Contains(result.Failures[0], "changed code coverage 99.9500% is below target 100.0000%") {
+		t.Fatalf("sub-100 changed-code failures = %v", result.Failures)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestEvaluateFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
 	result := evaluate(gateInput{
 		Overall: []coverageBlock{

scripts/release/release-lib.sh

@@ -130,8 +130,7 @@ release_extract_changelog() {
       print
       if ($0 ~ /[^[:space:]]/) meaningful = 1
       if ($0 ~ /^- /) bullet = 1
-      lowered = tolower($0)
-      if (lowered ~ /todo|tbd/) placeholder = 1
+      if ($0 ~ /(^|[^[:alnum:]_])(TODO|TBD)([^[:alnum:]_]|$)/) placeholder = 1
     }
     END {
       if (found != 1) exit 41

scripts/release/release.sh

@@ -134,16 +134,44 @@ require_github_publication_authority() {
   }
 
   sealed_commit="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
-  passed_gate="$(
+  admission_check_runs="$(
     gh api -H 'Accept: application/vnd.github+json' \
-      "repos/$github_repository/commits/$sealed_commit/check-runs?check_name=CI%20Gate&filter=latest&per_page=100" \
-      --jq '[.check_runs[] | select(.name == "CI Gate" and .conclusion == "success")] | length'
+      "repos/$github_repository/commits/$sealed_commit/check-runs?filter=latest&per_page=100" \
+      --jq '.check_runs | group_by(.name) | map(max_by(.id)) | .[] | [.name, (.conclusion // .status // "unknown")] | @tsv'
   )" || {
-    printf 'could not query CI Gate for %s\n' "$sealed_commit" >&2
+    printf 'could not query Code Admission contexts for %s\n' "$sealed_commit" >&2
     return 1
   }
-  [ "$passed_gate" -gt 0 ] || {
-    printf 'CI Gate has not succeeded for sealed commit %s in %s\n' "$sealed_commit" "$github_repository" >&2
+
+  missing_contexts=""
+  non_success_contexts=""
+  while IFS= read -r required_context; do
+    context_state="$(
+      printf '%s\n' "$admission_check_runs" |
+        awk -F '\t' -v required="$required_context" '$1 == required { state = $2 } END { print state }'
+    )"
+    if [ -z "$context_state" ]; then
+      missing_contexts="${missing_contexts}${missing_contexts:+, }$required_context"
+    elif [ "$context_state" != "success" ]; then
+      non_success_contexts="${non_success_contexts}${non_success_contexts:+, }$required_context=$context_state"
+    fi
+  done <<'ADMISSION_CONTEXTS'
+Lint
+Test
+Coverage
+Policy
+Edition
+Interface Integrity
+AI Behavior
+CLI Smoke
+Mock MCP
+ADMISSION_CONTEXTS
+  [ -z "$missing_contexts" ] && [ -z "$non_success_contexts" ] || {
+    printf 'Code Admission contexts are not all successful for sealed commit %s in %s; missing: %s; non-success: %s\n' \
+      "$sealed_commit" \
+      "$github_repository" \
+      "${missing_contexts:-none}" \
+      "${non_success_contexts:-none}" >&2
     return 1
   }
 

scripts/release/sync-to-oss.sh

@@ -47,6 +47,19 @@ if [ -n "$missing" ]; then
   exit 0
 fi
 
+# ossutil v2 signs with V4 and requires an explicit region. Derive it from the
+# endpoint host (oss-<region>[-internal].aliyuncs.com) unless OSS_REGION is set.
+if [ -z "${OSS_REGION:-}" ]; then
+  OSS_REGION="$(printf '%s' "$OSS_ENDPOINT" \
+    | sed -n 's#^\(https\{0,1\}://\)\{0,1\}oss-\([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9]\)\.aliyuncs\.com.*#\2#p' \
+    | sed 's#-internal$##')"
+fi
+if [ -z "$OSS_REGION" ]; then
+  echo "❌ Could not derive OSS_REGION from OSS_ENDPOINT=${OSS_ENDPOINT}; set OSS_REGION explicitly." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+export OSS_REGION
+
 # ── Resolve version ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always 2>/dev/null || echo dev)}"
 CHANNEL="${DWS_RELEASE_CHANNEL:-$(release_channel_for_version "$VERSION")}"

scripts/release/verify-release-workflow-delivery.sh

@@ -4,12 +4,28 @@ set -eu
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
 . "$SCRIPT_DIR/release-lib.sh"
 
+MODE="strict"
+CHANNEL_REPAIR_TARGET=""
+if [ "${1:-}" = "--channel-repair" ]; then
+  MODE="channel-repair"
+  shift
+  CHANNEL_REPAIR_TARGET="${1:-}"
+  shift
+  case "$CHANNEL_REPAIR_TARGET" in
+    oss|gitee) ;;
+    *)
+      printf 'channel repair target must be oss or gitee\n' >&2
+      exit 2
+      ;;
+  esac
+fi
+
 TAG="${1:-}"
 EXPECTED_COMMIT="${2:-}"
 REPOSITORY="${DWS_RELEASE_OFFICIAL_REPOSITORY:-DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli}"
 
 [ -n "$TAG" ] && [ -n "$EXPECTED_COMMIT" ] || {
-  printf 'usage: verify-release-workflow-delivery.sh <tag> <commit>\n' >&2
+  printf 'usage: verify-release-workflow-delivery.sh [--channel-repair <oss|gitee>] <tag> <commit>\n' >&2
   exit 2
 }
 if ! release_is_stable_version "$TAG" && ! release_is_prerelease_version "$TAG"; then
@@ -65,6 +81,200 @@ for run in runs:
   done
 }
 
+find_failed_push_delivery() {
+  matches=""
+  page=1
+  while :; do
+    page_result="$(
+      github_get "repos/$REPOSITORY/actions/workflows/release.yml/runs?branch=$TAG&event=push&status=completed&per_page=100&page=$page" \
+        | python3 -c 'import json,sys
+tag,commit,repository=sys.argv[1:]
+runs=json.load(sys.stdin).get("workflow_runs", [])
+print(len(runs))
+for run in runs:
+    if (run.get("head_sha") == commit and run.get("head_branch") == tag
+            and run.get("event") == "push" and run.get("status") == "completed"
+            and run.get("conclusion") == "failure"
+            and run.get("path") == ".github/workflows/release.yml"
+            and run.get("repository", {}).get("full_name") == repository):
+        run_id=run.get("id", "")
+        attempt=run.get("run_attempt", "")
+        if isinstance(run_id, int) and run_id > 0 and isinstance(attempt, int) and attempt > 0:
+            print(f"{run_id}\t{attempt}")' "$TAG" "$EXPECTED_COMMIT" "$REPOSITORY"
+    )" || return 1
+    page_count="$(printf '%s\n' "$page_result" | sed -n '1p')"
+    page_matches="$(printf '%s\n' "$page_result" | sed '1d')"
+    matches="$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$matches" "$page_matches" | sed '/^$/d')"
+    [ "$page_count" -eq 100 ] || break
+    page=$((page + 1))
+  done
+  match_count="$(printf '%s\n' "$matches" | sed '/^$/d' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
+  [ "$match_count" -eq 1 ] || {
+    printf 'expected exactly one failed exact-tag push run for channel repair, found %s\n' \
+      "$match_count" >&2
+    return 1
+  }
+  printf '%s\n' "$matches"
+}
+
+verify_channel_repair_delivery() {
+  run_id="$1"
+  run_attempt="$2"
+  jobs_dir="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/dws-release-channel-jobs.XXXXXX")"
+  page=1
+  while :; do
+    jobs_page="$jobs_dir/jobs-$page.json"
+    if ! github_get "repos/$REPOSITORY/actions/runs/$run_id/attempts/$run_attempt/jobs?per_page=100&page=$page" \
+      >"$jobs_page"; then
+      rm -rf "$jobs_dir"
+      return 1
+    fi
+    if ! page_count="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(len(json.load(open(sys.argv[1])).get("jobs", [])))' "$jobs_page")"; then
+      rm -rf "$jobs_dir"
+      return 1
+    fi
+    [ "$page_count" -eq 100 ] || break
+    page=$((page + 1))
+  done
+
+  result=0
+  python3 - "$EXPECTED_COMMIT" "$run_id" "$run_attempt" "$TAG" "$CHANNEL_REPAIR_TARGET" "$jobs_dir"/jobs-*.json <<'PY' || result=$?
+import json
+import sys
+
+commit, run_id, run_attempt, tag, target, *pages = sys.argv[1:]
+jobs = []
+for page in pages:
+    with open(page, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        jobs.extend(json.load(handle).get("jobs", []))
+
+def fail(message):
+    print(
+        f"failed Release run {run_id} attempt {run_attempt} is not safe "
+        f"channel-repair authority for {tag}: {message}",
+        file=sys.stderr,
+    )
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+def one_job(name):
+    matches = [job for job in jobs if job.get("name") == name]
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        fail(f"expected exactly one latest-attempt job {name!r}, found {len(matches)}")
+    job = matches[0]
+    if job.get("head_sha") != commit:
+        fail(f"job {name!r} is not bound to {commit}")
+    if job.get("status") != "completed":
+        fail(f"job {name!r} is not completed")
+    return job
+
+for name in (
+    "release-contract",
+    "Build signed release artifacts",
+    "Verify Apple Developer ID signatures",
+    "Publish immutable GitHub Release",
+):
+    if one_job(name).get("conclusion") != "success":
+        fail(f"required job {name!r} did not succeed")
+
+publish_release = one_job("Publish immutable GitHub Release")
+immutable_steps = [
+    step for step in publish_release.get("steps", [])
+    if step.get("name") == "Require immutable published GitHub Release"
+]
+if len(immutable_steps) != 1:
+    fail("expected exactly one immutable GitHub Release verification step")
+if (
+    immutable_steps[0].get("status") != "completed"
+    or immutable_steps[0].get("conclusion") != "success"
+):
+    fail("immutable GitHub Release verification did not succeed")
+
+channels = one_job("Publish npm and mirrors")
+if channels.get("conclusion") not in {"success", "failure"}:
+    fail("channel publication job was not completed with a conclusive result")
+
+steps = channels.get("steps", [])
+for name in (
+    "Download and verify immutable GitHub Release",
+    "Verify immutable npm package without publication credentials",
+    "Inspect npm channel state",
+    "Verify npm channel delivery",
+):
+    matches = [step for step in steps if step.get("name") == name]
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        fail(f"expected exactly one channel step {name!r}, found {len(matches)}")
+    step = matches[0]
+    if step.get("status") != "completed" or step.get("conclusion") != "success":
+        fail(f"required channel step {name!r} did not succeed")
+
+failed_channel_steps = [
+    step.get("name", "")
+    for step in steps
+    if step.get("conclusion") == "failure"
+]
+if channels.get("conclusion") == "failure":
+    if failed_channel_steps != ["Sync release artifacts to China OSS mirror"]:
+        fail(
+            "failed channel publication must have exactly one failed OSS mirror step, "
+            f"got {failed_channel_steps!r}"
+        )
+elif failed_channel_steps:
+    fail(f"successful channel publication contains failed steps {failed_channel_steps!r}")
+
+gitee = one_job("Mirror immutable release to Gitee")
+if gitee.get("conclusion") not in {"success", "skipped", "failure"}:
+    fail("Gitee mirror job did not complete with an allowed channel result")
+
+delivery_gate = one_job("Release delivery gate")
+if delivery_gate.get("conclusion") != "failure":
+    fail("failed channel-repair run must end in a failed delivery gate")
+
+allowed_failures = {
+    "Publish npm and mirrors",
+    "Mirror immutable release to Gitee",
+    "Release delivery gate",
+}
+for job in jobs:
+    if job.get("status") != "completed":
+        fail(f"job {job.get('name', '')!r} is not completed")
+    conclusion = job.get("conclusion")
+    if conclusion not in {"success", "skipped", "failure"}:
+        fail(f"job {job.get('name', '')!r} has disallowed conclusion {conclusion!r}")
+    if conclusion == "failure" and job.get("name") not in allowed_failures:
+        fail(f"unrelated job {job.get('name', '')!r} failed")
+
+business_failures = [
+    job.get("name")
+    for job in (channels, gitee)
+    if job.get("conclusion") == "failure"
+]
+if len(business_failures) != 1:
+    fail(f"expected exactly one failed downstream channel job, got {business_failures!r}")
+if target == "oss":
+    if business_failures != ["Publish npm and mirrors"] or gitee.get("conclusion") != "skipped":
+        fail(
+            "OSS repair requires the OSS mirror step to be the only failed "
+            "downstream channel and Gitee to be skipped"
+        )
+elif target == "gitee":
+    if gitee.get("conclusion") == "failure":
+        if business_failures != ["Mirror immutable release to Gitee"]:
+            fail("Gitee repair evidence contains a different failed downstream channel")
+    elif gitee.get("conclusion") == "skipped":
+        if business_failures != ["Publish npm and mirrors"]:
+            fail(
+                "skipped Gitee backfill requires the upstream OSS mirror to be "
+                "the only failed downstream channel"
+            )
+    else:
+        fail("Gitee repair requires its mirror job to be failed or skipped")
+else:
+    fail(f"unsupported channel repair target {target!r}")
+PY
+  rm -rf "$jobs_dir"
+  return "$result"
+}
+
 push_delivery="$(find_push_delivery || true)"
 if [ -n "$push_delivery" ]; then
   printf 'Release workflow delivery verified through exact-tag push run %s: %s -> %s\n' \
@@ -72,6 +282,18 @@ if [ -n "$push_delivery" ]; then
   exit 0
 fi
 
+if [ "$MODE" = "channel-repair" ]; then
+  failed_push_identity="$(find_failed_push_delivery || true)"
+  failed_push_delivery="$(printf '%s\n' "$failed_push_identity" | cut -f1)"
+  failed_push_attempt="$(printf '%s\n' "$failed_push_identity" | cut -f2)"
+  if [ -n "$failed_push_delivery" ] &&
+    verify_channel_repair_delivery "$failed_push_delivery" "$failed_push_attempt"; then
+    printf 'Release %s channel-repair authority verified through failed exact-tag push run %s attempt %s: %s -> %s\n' \
+      "$CHANNEL_REPAIR_TARGET" "$failed_push_delivery" "$failed_push_attempt" "$TAG" "$EXPECTED_COMMIT"
+    exit 0
+  fi
+fi
+
 find_recovery_identity() {
   page=1
   while :; do

test/scripts/changelog_pr_gate_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,638 @@
+package scripts_test
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type changelogGateRepo struct {
+	root string
+	gate string
+	base string
+}
+
+const changelogGateBase = `# Changelog
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial release.
+`
+
+const changelogGateValidRelease = `# Changelog
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17
+
+### Changed
+
+- Valid release note.
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial release.
+`
+
+func newChangelogGateRepo(t *testing.T) *changelogGateRepo {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sourceRoot, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join("..", ".."))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Abs(repo root) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	root := t.TempDir()
+
+	for _, path := range []string{
+		"LICENSE",
+		"NOTICE",
+		"README.md",
+		"CONTRIBUTING.md",
+		"SECURITY.md",
+		"CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md",
+		".env.example",
+		".github/workflows/ci.yml",
+		".github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md",
+		"docs/architecture.md",
+		"scripts/README.md",
+		"build/README.md",
+	} {
+		changelogGateWrite(t, root, path, "fixture\n", 0o644)
+	}
+	for _, path := range []string{
+		"scripts/policy/check-changelog-pr.sh",
+		"scripts/policy/open-source-audit.sh",
+		"scripts/release/release-lib.sh",
+	} {
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(sourceRoot, path))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("ReadFile(%s) error = %v", path, err)
+		}
+		mode := os.FileMode(0o644)
+		if strings.HasSuffix(path, ".sh") {
+			mode = 0o755
+		}
+		changelogGateWrite(t, root, path, string(data), mode)
+	}
+	changelogGateWrite(t, root, "CHANGELOG.md", changelogGateBase, 0o644)
+
+	changelogGateGit(t, root, "init", "-b", "main")
+	changelogGateGit(t, root, "config", "user.name", "Changelog Gate Test")
+	changelogGateGit(t, root, "config", "user.email", "changelog-gate@example.com")
+	changelogGateGit(t, root, "add", ".")
+	changelogGateGit(t, root, "commit", "-m", "seed repository")
+
+	return &changelogGateRepo{
+		root: root,
+		gate: filepath.Join(root, "scripts", "policy", "check-changelog-pr.sh"),
+		base: strings.TrimSpace(changelogGateGit(t, root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")),
+	}
+}
+
+func changelogGateWrite(t *testing.T, root, path, content string, mode os.FileMode) {
+	t.Helper()
+	full := filepath.Join(root, path)
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(full), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("MkdirAll(%s) error = %v", filepath.Dir(full), err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(full, []byte(content), mode); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WriteFile(%s) error = %v", full, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func changelogGateGit(t *testing.T, root string, args ...string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
+	cmd.Dir = root
+	output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("git %s error = %v\noutput:\n%s", strings.Join(args, " "), err, output)
+	}
+	return string(output)
+}
+
+func (r *changelogGateRepo) commit(t *testing.T, message string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	changelogGateGit(t, r.root, "add", "-A")
+	changelogGateGit(t, r.root, "commit", "-m", message)
+}
+
+func (r *changelogGateRepo) run(t *testing.T) (string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	return r.runMode(t, "--fast-path")
+}
+
+func (r *changelogGateRepo) runMode(t *testing.T, mode string) (string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	return r.runRefs(t, mode, r.base, "HEAD")
+}
+
+func (r *changelogGateRepo) runRefs(t *testing.T, mode, base, head string) (string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	cmd := exec.Command("sh", r.gate, mode, base, head)
+	cmd.Dir = r.root
+	output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	return string(output), err
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRGateAcceptsTargetedChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name      string
+		changelog string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "new release section with lowercase todo product",
+			changelog: `# Changelog
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17
+
+### Changed
+
+- Improve the lowercase todo command family without leaving a placeholder.
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial release.
+`,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "unreleased note",
+			changelog: `# Changelog
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+### Changed
+
+- Document the next release candidate.
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial release.
+`,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			repo := newChangelogGateRepo(t)
+			changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", test.changelog, 0o644)
+			repo.commit(t, test.name)
+
+			output, err := repo.run(t)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("gate error = %v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(output, "CHANGELOG PR check: ok") {
+				t.Fatalf("gate output missing success marker:\n%s", output)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRContentOnlyAllowsOtherFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newChangelogGateRepo(t)
+	changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", changelogGateValidRelease, 0o644)
+	changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "internal/change.go", "package internal\n", 0o644)
+	repo.commit(t, "change code with release notes")
+
+	output, err := repo.runMode(t, "--content-only")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("content-only gate error = %v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "CHANGELOG PR check: ok (mode=content-only") {
+		t.Fatalf("content-only gate output missing success marker:\n%s", output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRContentOnlyStillValidatesContentWithOtherFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		changelog  string
+		wantOutput string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "invalid calendar date",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				changelogGateValidRelease,
+				"2026-07-17",
+				"2026-02-30",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "invalid calendar date",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "placeholder",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				changelogGateValidRelease,
+				"- Valid release note.",
+				"- TODO: write release notes.",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "must not contain TODO/TBD",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			repo := newChangelogGateRepo(t)
+			changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", test.changelog, 0o644)
+			changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "internal/change.go", "package internal\n", 0o644)
+			repo.commit(t, test.name)
+
+			output, err := repo.runMode(t, "--content-only")
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unsafe content-only change unexpectedly passed:\n%s", output)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(output, test.wantOutput) {
+				t.Fatalf("content-only gate output missing %q:\n%s", test.wantOutput, output)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRGateValidatesSyntheticMergeTree(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newChangelogGateRepo(t)
+	commonChangelog := `# Changelog
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial release.
+
+## [0.9.0] - 2026-06-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Earlier release.
+`
+	changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", commonChangelog, 0o644)
+	repo.commit(t, "expand changelog history")
+	common := strings.TrimSpace(changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"))
+	repo.base = common
+
+	changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "switch", "-c", "feature")
+	featureChangelog := strings.Replace(
+		commonChangelog,
+		"## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01",
+		`## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17
+
+### Changed
+
+- Feature branch release note.
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01`,
+		1,
+	)
+	changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", featureChangelog, 0o644)
+	repo.commit(t, "add feature release note")
+	featureHead := strings.TrimSpace(changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"))
+	if output, err := repo.runRefs(t, "--fast-path", common, featureHead); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("feature head should be valid before merging: %v\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+
+	changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "switch", "main")
+	mainChangelog := strings.Replace(
+		commonChangelog,
+		"## [0.9.0] - 2026-06-01",
+		`## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17
+
+### Changed
+
+- Main branch release note.
+
+## [0.9.0] - 2026-06-01`,
+		1,
+	)
+	changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", mainChangelog, 0o644)
+	repo.commit(t, "add main release note")
+	mergeBase := strings.TrimSpace(changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"))
+	changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "merge", "--no-ff", "feature", "-m", "merge feature")
+	mergeHead := strings.TrimSpace(changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"))
+
+	output, err := repo.runRefs(t, "--fast-path", mergeBase, mergeHead)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("synthetic merge with duplicate release heading unexpectedly passed:\n%s", output)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(output, "exactly one well-formed section") {
+		t.Fatalf("synthetic merge rejection missing duplicate-section evidence:\n%s", output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRGateRejectsExecutableModeInBothModes(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mode := range []string{"--fast-path", "--content-only"} {
+		t.Run(strings.TrimPrefix(mode, "--"), func(t *testing.T) {
+			repo := newChangelogGateRepo(t)
+			changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", changelogGateValidRelease, 0o644)
+			changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "add", "CHANGELOG.md")
+			changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "update-index", "--chmod=+x", "CHANGELOG.md")
+			changelogGateGit(t, repo.root, "commit", "-m", "make changelog executable")
+
+			output, err := repo.runMode(t, mode)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("executable CHANGELOG unexpectedly passed:\n%s", output)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(output, "regular 100644 blob at head") {
+				t.Fatalf("gate output missing regular-file rejection:\n%s", output)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReleaseChangelogExtractionAllowsLowercaseTodoProductName(t *testing.T) {
+	sourceRoot, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join("..", ".."))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Abs(repo root) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	changelog := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "CHANGELOG.md")
+	changelogGateWrite(t, filepath.Dir(changelog), filepath.Base(changelog), `# Changelog
+
+## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17
+
+### Changed
+
+- Improve the lowercase todo command family.
+`, 0o644)
+
+	cmd := exec.Command(
+		"sh",
+		"-c",
+		`. "$1"; release_extract_changelog "$2" 1.0.1-beta.1 -`,
+		"sh",
+		filepath.Join(sourceRoot, "scripts", "release", "release-lib.sh"),
+		changelog,
+	)
+	output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("release_extract_changelog error = %v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRFastPathWorkflowContract(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join("..", ".."))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Abs(repo root) error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	readWorkflow := func(path string) string {
+		t.Helper()
+		data, readErr := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, path))
+		if readErr != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("ReadFile(%s) error = %v", path, readErr)
+		}
+		return string(data)
+	}
+
+	admission := readWorkflow(".github/workflows/ci.yml")
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"name: CI",
+		"files.length === 1",
+		"files[0].filename === 'CHANGELOG.md'",
+		"files[0].status === 'modified'",
+		"!files[0].previous_filename",
+		"pre-classification",
+		"post-classification",
+		"before.changed_files !== files.length",
+		"after.changed_files !== files.length",
+		`test "$(git rev-parse HEAD^1)" = "$PR_BASE_SHA"`,
+		`test "$(git rev-parse HEAD^2)" = "$PR_HEAD_SHA"`,
+		"Files API and synthetic merge tree disagree on CHANGELOG scope",
+		"mode=--content-only",
+		"mode=--fast-path",
+		`"$mode" "$PR_BASE_SHA" HEAD`,
+		"needs.lint.outputs.platform_sensitive == 'true'",
+		`COVERAGE_TARGET: "100"`,
+		`COVERAGE_ENFORCE_OVERALL: "false"`,
+		`COVERAGE_OVERALL_TOLERANCE: "0"`,
+		`COVERAGE_ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE=coverage-shortcut.txt`,
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(admission, want) {
+			t.Errorf("Code Admission workflow missing contract %q", want)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, context := range []string{
+		"Lint",
+		"Test",
+		"Coverage",
+		"Policy",
+		"Edition",
+		"Interface Integrity",
+		"CLI Smoke",
+		"Mock MCP",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(admission, "\n    name: "+context+"\n") {
+			t.Errorf("Code Admission workflow missing exact context %q", context)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, forbidden := range []string{
+		"name: CI Gate",
+		"name: Changelog Check",
+		"name: Policy Check",
+		"name: Edition Contract Tests",
+		"name: Mock MCP Smoke",
+	} {
+		if strings.Contains(admission, forbidden) {
+			t.Errorf("Code Admission workflow retains legacy context %q", forbidden)
+		}
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(admission, "paths-ignore:") {
+		t.Error("Code Admission must not suppress required contexts with paths-ignore")
+	}
+
+	notification := readWorkflow(".github/workflows/notify-wukong.yml")
+	if !strings.Contains(notification, "- CI") {
+		t.Error("Wukong notification must follow the renamed CI workflow")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(notification, "Code Admission — PR 合入门禁") {
+		t.Error("Wukong notification still follows the retired workflow display name")
+	}
+
+	coverageGate := readWorkflow("scripts/policy/check-coverage-gate.sh")
+	if !strings.Contains(coverageGate, `TARGET="${COVERAGE_TARGET:-100}"`) {
+		t.Error("coverage gate must default to 100% changed-code coverage")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(coverageGate, `OVERALL_TOLERANCE="${COVERAGE_OVERALL_TOLERANCE:-0}"`) {
+		t.Error("coverage gate must reject any reported overall regression")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(coverageGate, `--baseline-profile "$BASELINE_PROFILE"`) {
+		t.Error("coverage gate must evaluate the merge-base profile with the candidate checker")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(coverageGate, `--overall-profile "$ADDITIONAL_DIFF_PROFILE"`) {
+		t.Error("supporting changed-code coverage must not inflate candidate overall coverage")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(coverageGate, `go tool cover -func="$BASELINE_PROFILE"`) {
+		t.Error("coverage baseline must not use a different coverage calculator")
+	}
+
+	aiBehavior := readWorkflow(".github/workflows/ai-behavior-check.yml")
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"name: Code Admission — AI Behavior",
+		"\n    name: AI Behavior\n",
+		"context: 'AI Behavior'",
+		"pull_request_target:",
+		"pull.head.sha !== expectedHead",
+		"pull.base.sha !== expectedBase",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(aiBehavior, want) {
+			t.Errorf("AI Behavior workflow missing contract %q", want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	integration := readWorkflow(".github/workflows/multi-profile-e2e.yml")
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"name: Main Integration — 主干集成",
+		"\n    name: Multi-profile E2E\n",
+		"branches:",
+		"- main",
+		"workflow_dispatch:",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(integration, want) {
+			t.Errorf("main integration workflow missing contract %q", want)
+		}
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(integration, "pull_request:") {
+		t.Error("complete Multi-profile E2E must not run as a pull-request admission context")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestChangelogPRGateRejectsUnsafeChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	validRelease := `# Changelog
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17
+
+### Changed
+
+- Valid release note.
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01
+
+### Added
+
+- Initial release.
+`
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		changelog  string
+		mutate     func(*testing.T, *changelogGateRepo)
+		wantOutput string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:      "second changed file",
+			changelog: validRelease,
+			mutate: func(t *testing.T, repo *changelogGateRepo) {
+				changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "extra.txt", "extra\n", 0o644)
+			},
+			wantOutput: "exactly one in-place modification",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "invalid calendar date",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				validRelease,
+				"2026-07-17",
+				"2026-02-30",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "invalid calendar date",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "duplicate release heading",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				validRelease,
+				"## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01",
+				"## [1.0.1-beta.1] - 2026-07-17\n\n- Duplicate.\n\n## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-01",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "exactly one well-formed section",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "missing bullet",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				validRelease,
+				"- Valid release note.",
+				"Valid release note.",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "at least one bullet",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "placeholder",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				validRelease,
+				"- Valid release note.",
+				"- TODO: write release notes.",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "must not contain TODO/TBD",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "malformed duplicate unreleased heading",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				validRelease,
+				"## [Unreleased]",
+				"## [Unreleased]\n\n## [Unreleased] junk",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "exactly one heading",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "preamble change",
+			changelog: strings.Replace(
+				validRelease,
+				"# Changelog",
+				"# Release history",
+				1,
+			),
+			wantOutput: "only permits notes inside",
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "rename changelog",
+			changelog: changelogGateBase,
+			mutate: func(t *testing.T, repo *changelogGateRepo) {
+				if err := os.Rename(
+					filepath.Join(repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md"),
+					filepath.Join(repo.root, "CHANGES.md"),
+				); err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("Rename CHANGELOG.md error = %v", err)
+				}
+			},
+			wantOutput: "regular 100644 blob at head",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			repo := newChangelogGateRepo(t)
+			changelogGateWrite(t, repo.root, "CHANGELOG.md", test.changelog, 0o644)
+			if test.mutate != nil {
+				test.mutate(t, repo)
+			}
+			repo.commit(t, test.name)
+
+			output, err := repo.run(t)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unsafe change unexpectedly passed:\n%s", output)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(output, test.wantOutput) {
+				t.Fatalf("gate output missing %q:\n%s", test.wantOutput, output)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

test/scripts/package_script_test.go

@@ -33,6 +33,18 @@ var expectedPackagedSkillTargets = []string{
 	".hermes/skills/dws",
 }
 
+var expectedReleaseAdmissionContexts = []string{
+	"Lint",
+	"Test",
+	"Coverage",
+	"Policy",
+	"Edition",
+	"Interface Integrity",
+	"AI Behavior",
+	"CLI Smoke",
+	"Mock MCP",
+}
+
 func seedDistArchive(t *testing.T, path string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	file, err := os.Create(path)
@@ -630,12 +642,16 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowUsesDedicatedGovernanceIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 
 	const (
 		checksCall    = "github.rest.checks.listForRef"
+		paginatedCall = "github.paginate(github.rest.checks.listForRef"
 		immutableCall = `"GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/immutable-releases"`
 		governanceID  = `github-token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_GOVERNANCE_TOKEN }}`
 	)
 	if got := strings.Count(workflow, checksCall); got != 2 {
 		t.Fatalf("release workflow Checks API call count = %d, want one tag check and one preflight check", got)
 	}
+	if got := strings.Count(workflow, paginatedCall); got != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("release workflow paginated Checks API call count = %d, want one tag check and one preflight check", got)
+	}
 	if got := strings.Count(workflow, immutableCall); got != 2 {
 		t.Fatalf("release workflow immutable governance call count = %d, want one tag check and one preflight check", got)
 	}
@@ -651,6 +667,12 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowUsesDedicatedGovernanceIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 		for _, required := range []string{
 			"checks: read",
 			checksCall,
+			paginatedCall,
+			"run.head_sha !== sha",
+			"const missing = requiredContexts.filter",
+			"const nonSuccess = requiredContexts.flatMap",
+			"missing:",
+			"non-success:",
 			immutableCall,
 			governanceID,
 			"RELEASE_GOVERNANCE_TOKEN with repository Administration read permission is required",
@@ -659,6 +681,14 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowUsesDedicatedGovernanceIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Errorf("%s governance path is missing %q", name, required)
 			}
 		}
+		for _, context := range expectedReleaseAdmissionContexts {
+			if !strings.Contains(section, fmt.Sprintf("%q", context)) {
+				t.Errorf("%s governance path is missing exact Code Admission context %q", name, context)
+			}
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(section, "check_name:") {
+			t.Errorf("%s governance path must fetch all check runs in one exact-SHA query", name)
+		}
 		if strings.Contains(section, "contents: write") {
 			t.Errorf("%s governance path must not grant contents write permission", name)
 		}
@@ -666,6 +696,51 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowUsesDedicatedGovernanceIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Errorf("%s immutable governance path must not fall back to GITHUB_TOKEN", name)
 		}
 	}
+	if strings.Contains(workflow, "CI"+" Gate") {
+		t.Error("release workflow must not retain the retired aggregate gate name")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReleaseScriptRequiresExactCodeAdmissionContexts(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	scriptPath, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join("..", "..", "scripts", "release", "release.sh"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Abs(release.sh) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(scriptPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ReadFile(%s) error = %v", scriptPath, err)
+	}
+	script := string(data)
+
+	const checksQuery = `commits/$sealed_commit/check-runs?filter=latest&per_page=100`
+	if got := strings.Count(script, checksQuery); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("release script exact-SHA Checks API query count = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+	for _, required := range []string{
+		`group_by(.name) | map(max_by(.id))`,
+		`missing_contexts=""`,
+		`non_success_contexts=""`,
+		`"$context_state" != "success"`,
+		"Code Admission contexts are not all successful for sealed commit",
+		"missing: %s; non-success: %s",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(script, required) {
+			t.Errorf("release script Code Admission gate is missing %q", required)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, context := range expectedReleaseAdmissionContexts {
+		if !strings.Contains(script, "\n"+context+"\n") {
+			t.Errorf("release script is missing exact Code Admission context %q", context)
+		}
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(script, "check_name=") {
+		t.Error("release script must fetch all check runs in one exact-SHA query")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(script, "CI"+" Gate") {
+		t.Error("release script must not retain the retired aggregate gate name")
+	}
 }
 
 func TestReleaseWorkflowGovernancePreflightCannotPublish(t *testing.T) {
@@ -703,10 +778,10 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowGovernancePreflightCannotPublish(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Errorf("governance preflight must not contain publishing behavior %q", forbidden)
 		}
 	}
-	ciGate := strings.Index(preflight, "Require successful CI Gate on the preflight commit")
+	admission := strings.Index(preflight, "Require successful Code Admission contexts on the preflight commit")
 	homebrewCanary := strings.Index(preflight, "Verify Homebrew PR automation permission")
-	if ciGate == -1 || homebrewCanary == -1 || ciGate > homebrewCanary {
-		t.Error("governance preflight must validate the exact CI Gate before exposing Homebrew credentials")
+	if admission == -1 || homebrewCanary == -1 || admission > homebrewCanary {
+		t.Error("governance preflight must validate all exact Code Admission contexts before exposing Homebrew credentials")
 	}
 
 	mirror := releaseWorkflowSection(t, workflow, "  mirror-gitee-release:\n", "\n  repair-npm:\n")
@@ -724,36 +799,49 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowGovernancePreflightCannotPublish(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestReleaseWorkflowGiteeRepairUsesSealedReleaseAuthority(t *testing.T) {
+func TestReleaseWorkflowChannelRepairUsesSealedReleaseAuthority(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	workflow := readReleaseWorkflow(t)
 	dispatch := releaseWorkflowSection(t, workflow, "  dispatch-contract:\n", "\n  authorize-recovery:\n")
-	start := strings.Index(workflow, "  repair-gitee:\n")
+	start := strings.Index(workflow, "  repair-channel:\n")
 	if start == -1 {
-		t.Fatal("release workflow is missing the Gitee repair job")
+		t.Fatal("release workflow is missing the channel repair job")
 	}
 	repair := workflow[start:]
+	tagAuthority := releaseWorkflowSection(
+		t,
+		repair,
+		"      - name: Fetch and verify sealed release tag\n",
+		"\n      - name: Require successful Release workflow delivery\n",
+	)
 
 	for _, required := range []string{
 		"repair_gitee_version:",
 		`format('Release Gitee repair {0}', inputs.repair_gitee_version)`,
 		`REPAIR_GITEE_VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_gitee_version }}`,
+		"repair_oss_version:",
+		`format('Release OSS repair {0}', inputs.repair_oss_version)`,
+		`REPAIR_OSS_VERSION: ${{ inputs.repair_oss_version }}`,
 		"gitee_repair=0",
+		"oss_repair=0",
 		`test -z "$REPAIR_GITEE_VERSION" || gitee_repair=1`,
-		"npm_repair + gitee_repair + governance + recovery",
+		`test -z "$REPAIR_OSS_VERSION" || oss_repair=1`,
+		"npm_repair + gitee_repair + oss_repair + governance + recovery",
 		`echo "mode=repair_gitee" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"`,
+		`echo "mode=repair_oss" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"`,
 	} {
 		if !strings.Contains(dispatch, required) && !strings.Contains(workflow, required) {
-			t.Errorf("Gitee repair dispatch contract is missing %q", required)
+			t.Errorf("channel repair dispatch contract is missing %q", required)
 		}
 	}
 
 	for _, required := range []string{
 		"needs: dispatch-contract",
-		`if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.dispatch-contract.result == 'success' && needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_gitee'`,
+		`if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.dispatch-contract.result == 'success' && (needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_gitee' || needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_oss') && github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', github.event.repository.default_branch) && github.repository == 'DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli' }}`,
 		`github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', github.event.repository.default_branch)`,
 		`github.repository == 'DingTalk-Real-AI/dingtalk-workspace-cli'`,
 		"actions: read",
+		"contents: read",
 		`ref: ${{ github.sha }}`,
 		"path: tooling",
 		"persist-credentials: false",
@@ -766,17 +854,34 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowGiteeRepairUsesSealedReleaseAuthority(t *testing.T) {
 		"assetNames.length !== expectedAssets.size",
 		"new Set(assetNames).size !== expectedAssets.size",
 		`core.setOutput("tag_object", ref.data.object.sha)`,
+		`ref: ${{ steps.authority.outputs.commit_sha }}`,
+		"path: release-source",
 		"verify-github-tag-authority.sh",
+		`GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`,
 		"verify-release-workflow-delivery.sh",
+		`REPAIR_MODE: ${{ needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode }}`,
+		"repair_gitee) target=gitee",
+		"repair_oss) target=oss",
+		`--channel-repair "$target"`,
 		`DWS_RELEASE_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`,
 		"verify-release-artifacts.sh",
 		`--repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"`,
+		`if: ${{ needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_gitee' }}`,
 		`DWS_REQUIRE_GITEE: "1"`,
+		`if: ${{ needs.dispatch-contract.outputs.mode == 'repair_oss' }}`,
+		`DWS_REQUIRE_OSS: "1"`,
+		`OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}`,
+		`OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET }}`,
+		`OSS_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.OSS_ENDPOINT }}`,
+		`OSS_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.OSS_BUCKET }}`,
+		`OSS_PREFIX: ${{ secrets.OSS_PREFIX }}`,
+		"working-directory: release-source",
 		"working-directory: tooling\n        run: |\n          " +
 			`"$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/tooling/scripts/release/sync-to-gitee.sh"`,
+		`"$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/tooling/scripts/release/sync-to-oss.sh"`,
 	} {
 		if !strings.Contains(repair, required) {
-			t.Errorf("Gitee repair authority is missing %q", required)
+			t.Errorf("channel repair authority is missing %q", required)
 		}
 	}
 	for _, asset := range []string{
@@ -790,17 +895,29 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowGiteeRepairUsesSealedReleaseAuthority(t *testing.T) {
 		"checksums.txt",
 	} {
 		if strings.Count(repair, `"`+asset+`"`) != 1 {
-			t.Errorf("Gitee repair must require exactly one %s asset declaration", asset)
+			t.Errorf("channel repair must require exactly one %s asset declaration", asset)
 		}
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(repair, "contents: write") {
-		t.Error("Gitee repair must not grant contents write permission")
+		t.Error("channel repair must not grant contents write permission")
+	}
+	for _, forbidden := range []string{
+		"RELEASE_GOVERNANCE_TOKEN",
+		"HOMEBREW_PR_TOKEN",
+		"NPM_TOKEN",
+	} {
+		if strings.Contains(repair, forbidden) {
+			t.Errorf("channel repair must not expose unrelated credential %s", forbidden)
+		}
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(repair, "ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}") {
-		t.Error("Gitee repair must not check out a floating default branch")
+		t.Error("channel repair must not check out a floating default branch")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(tagAuthority, `GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`) {
+		t.Error("remote annotated-tag authority step must receive the read-only GitHub token")
 	}
 	if got := strings.Count(repair, "working-directory: tooling"); got < 4 {
-		t.Errorf("Gitee repair trusted tooling working-directory count = %d, want at least 4", got)
+		t.Errorf("channel repair trusted tooling working-directory count = %d, want at least 4", got)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -839,7 +956,8 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowRecoveryReusesGuardedJobs(t *testing.T) {
 		"dws-release-recovery run=%s tag-object=%s commit=%s",
 		"Public release is not bound to this exact recovery run.",
 		"Public recovery asset differs from this run's sealed artifact",
-		`ref: process.env.RELEASE_COMMIT`,
+		`const sha = process.env.RELEASE_COMMIT`,
+		`ref: sha`,
 		`path: tmp/trusted-release-tooling`,
 		`ref: ${{ github.sha }}`,
 		`step.name === "Require immutable published GitHub Release"`,
@@ -1058,7 +1176,7 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowPublicationBypassesSkippedDispatchButStopsOnCancellation
 func TestReleaseWorkflowDeliveryGateFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	workflow := readReleaseWorkflow(t)
-	gate := releaseWorkflowSection(t, workflow, "  release-delivery-gate:\n", "\n  repair-gitee:\n")
+	gate := releaseWorkflowSection(t, workflow, "  release-delivery-gate:\n", "\n  repair-channel:\n")
 
 	for _, required := range []string{
 		"name: Release delivery gate",
@@ -1073,8 +1191,8 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowDeliveryGateFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
 		"- publish-channels",
 		"- mirror-gitee-release",
 		"- repair-npm",
-		"- repair-gitee",
-		`REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT: ${{ needs.repair-gitee.result }}`,
+		"- repair-channel",
+		`REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT: ${{ needs.repair-channel.result }}`,
 		"require_publication",
 		`require_result release-contract "$RELEASE_CONTRACT_RESULT" success`,
 		`require_result release "$RELEASE_RESULT" success`,
@@ -1085,8 +1203,9 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowDeliveryGateFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
 		"workflow_dispatch:governance_preflight",
 		"workflow_dispatch:repair_npm",
 		"workflow_dispatch:repair_gitee",
-		`require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" success`,
-		`require_result repair-gitee "$REPAIR_GITEE_RESULT" skipped`,
+		"workflow_dispatch:repair_oss",
+		`require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" success`,
+		`require_result repair-channel "$REPAIR_CHANNEL_RESULT" skipped`,
 		"unsupported release mode",
 	} {
 		if !strings.Contains(gate, required) {
@@ -1335,10 +1454,10 @@ func TestReleaseWorkflowOpensHomebrewPROnlyForOfficialStableTags(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Homebrew PR permission preflight count = %d, want one default-branch preflight and one tag contract", got)
 	}
 	tagContract := releaseWorkflowSection(t, workflow, "  release-contract:\n", "\n  release:\n")
-	tagCI := strings.Index(tagContract, "Require successful CI Gate on the sealed commit")
+	tagAdmission := strings.Index(tagContract, "Require successful Code Admission contexts on the sealed commit")
 	tagHomebrew := strings.Index(tagContract, "Verify Homebrew PR automation permission")
-	if tagCI == -1 || tagHomebrew == -1 || tagCI > tagHomebrew {
-		t.Error("tag contract must validate the sealed CI Gate before exposing Homebrew credentials")
+	if tagAdmission == -1 || tagHomebrew == -1 || tagAdmission > tagHomebrew {
+		t.Error("tag contract must validate all exact Code Admission contexts before exposing Homebrew credentials")
 	}
 
 	start := strings.Index(workflow, "- name: Open stable Homebrew formula PR")

test/scripts/release_script_test.go

@@ -674,6 +674,257 @@ esac
 	}
 }
 
+func TestReleaseWorkflowDeliveryChannelRepairRequiresLatestAttemptCoreDelivery(t *testing.T) {
+	sourceRoot, err := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join("..", ".."))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Abs(repo root) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	binDir := t.TempDir()
+	fakeCurl := filepath.Join(binDir, "curl")
+	mustWriteFile(t, fakeCurl, []byte(`#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+for argument in "$@"; do endpoint="$argument"; done
+case "$endpoint" in
+  *event=push*)
+    python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+run = {
+    "id": 77,
+    "event": "push",
+    "status": "completed",
+    "conclusion": "failure",
+    "head_branch": os.environ["TAG"],
+    "head_sha": os.environ["RELEASE_COMMIT"],
+    "path": os.environ.get("RUN_PATH", ".github/workflows/release.yml"),
+    "repository": {"full_name": os.environ.get("RUN_REPOSITORY", "owner/repo")},
+    "run_attempt": int(os.environ.get("RUN_ATTEMPT", "2")),
+}
+runs = [run]
+if os.environ.get("DUPLICATE_RUN") == "1":
+    duplicate = dict(run)
+    duplicate["id"] = 78
+    runs.append(duplicate)
+print(json.dumps({"workflow_runs": runs}))
+PY
+    ;;
+  *event=workflow_dispatch*)
+    printf '{"workflow_runs":[]}\n'
+    ;;
+  */actions/runs/77/attempts/2/jobs*)
+    python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+commit = os.environ.get("JOB_SHA", os.environ["RELEASE_COMMIT"])
+core = [
+    "release-contract",
+    "Build signed release artifacts",
+    "Verify Apple Developer ID signatures",
+    "Publish immutable GitHub Release",
+]
+jobs = [{
+    "name": name,
+    "status": "completed",
+    "conclusion": (
+        os.environ.get("CORE_CONCLUSION", "success")
+        if name == os.environ.get("CORE_JOB", "Build signed release artifacts")
+        else "success"
+    ),
+    "head_sha": commit,
+    "steps": (
+        [{
+            "name": "Require immutable published GitHub Release",
+            "status": "completed",
+            "conclusion": os.environ.get("IMMUTABLE_STEP_CONCLUSION", "success"),
+        }]
+        if name == "Publish immutable GitHub Release"
+        else []
+    ),
+} for name in core]
+if os.environ.get("DUPLICATE_CORE") == "1":
+    jobs.append(dict(jobs[1]))
+required_steps = [
+    "Download and verify immutable GitHub Release",
+    "Verify immutable npm package without publication credentials",
+    "Inspect npm channel state",
+    "Verify npm channel delivery",
+]
+jobs.append({
+    "name": "Publish npm and mirrors",
+    "status": "completed",
+    "conclusion": os.environ.get("CHANNEL_JOB_CONCLUSION", "failure"),
+    "head_sha": commit,
+    "steps": [{
+        "name": name,
+        "status": "completed",
+        "conclusion": (
+            os.environ.get("CHANNEL_STEP_CONCLUSION", "success")
+            if name == os.environ.get("CHANNEL_STEP", "Verify npm channel delivery")
+            else "success"
+        ),
+    } for name in required_steps] + [{
+        "name": "Sync release artifacts to China OSS mirror",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "conclusion": os.environ.get("OSS_STEP_CONCLUSION", "failure"),
+    }],
+})
+jobs.extend([
+    {
+        "name": "Mirror immutable release to Gitee",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "conclusion": os.environ.get("GITEE_CONCLUSION", "skipped"),
+        "head_sha": commit,
+        "steps": [],
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "Release delivery gate",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "conclusion": os.environ.get("DELIVERY_GATE_CONCLUSION", "failure"),
+        "head_sha": commit,
+        "steps": [],
+    },
+])
+if os.environ.get("UNRELATED_FAILURE") == "1":
+    jobs.append({
+        "name": "Unrelated release job",
+        "status": "completed",
+        "conclusion": "failure",
+        "head_sha": commit,
+        "steps": [],
+    })
+print(json.dumps({"jobs": jobs}))
+PY
+    ;;
+  */actions/runs/77/*/jobs*)
+    echo "channel repair must inspect the exact latest run attempt" >&2
+    exit 91
+    ;;
+  *) exit 1 ;;
+esac
+`), 0o755)
+	script := filepath.Join(sourceRoot, "scripts", "release", "verify-release-workflow-delivery.sh")
+	tag := "v1.2.3-beta.1"
+	commit := strings.Repeat("a", 40)
+	run := func(args []string, overrides ...string) (string, error) {
+		cmd := exec.Command("sh", append([]string{script}, args...)...)
+		cmd.Env = append([]string{
+			"PATH=" + binDir + string(os.PathListSeparator) + os.Getenv("PATH"),
+			"HOME=" + t.TempDir(),
+			"DWS_RELEASE_OFFICIAL_REPOSITORY=owner/repo",
+			"TAG=" + tag,
+			"RELEASE_COMMIT=" + commit,
+		}, overrides...)
+		output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
+		return string(output), err
+	}
+	repairArgs := func(target string) []string {
+		return []string{"--channel-repair", target, tag, commit}
+	}
+
+	if output, err := run([]string{tag, commit}); err == nil ||
+		!strings.Contains(output, "did not deliver") {
+		t.Fatalf("strict delivery accepted a failed tag run: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(repairArgs("oss")); err != nil ||
+		!strings.Contains(output, "failed exact-tag push run 77") {
+		t.Fatalf("safe channel repair delivery was rejected: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"CORE_CONCLUSION=failure",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "required job 'Build signed release artifacts' did not succeed") {
+		t.Fatalf("failed core release job passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"CHANNEL_STEP_CONCLUSION=failure",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "required channel step 'Verify npm channel delivery' did not succeed") {
+		t.Fatalf("failed npm delivery proof passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"DUPLICATE_CORE=1",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "expected exactly one latest-attempt job 'Build signed release artifacts'") {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate latest-attempt core job passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"JOB_SHA="+strings.Repeat("b", 40),
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "is not bound to "+commit) {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong-sha release jobs passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"UNRELATED_FAILURE=1",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "unrelated job 'Unrelated release job' failed") {
+		t.Fatalf("unrelated failed job passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"IMMUTABLE_STEP_CONCLUSION=failure",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "immutable GitHub Release verification did not succeed") {
+		t.Fatalf("failed immutable release verification passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("gitee"),
+		"CHANNEL_JOB_CONCLUSION=success",
+		"OSS_STEP_CONCLUSION=success",
+		"GITEE_CONCLUSION=failure",
+	); err != nil || !strings.Contains(output, "channel-repair authority verified") {
+		t.Fatalf("single failed Gitee mirror was rejected: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"CHANNEL_JOB_CONCLUSION=success",
+		"OSS_STEP_CONCLUSION=success",
+		"GITEE_CONCLUSION=failure",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "OSS repair requires") {
+		t.Fatalf("Gitee-only failure was accepted as OSS evidence: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("gitee"),
+	); err != nil || !strings.Contains(output, "channel-repair authority verified") {
+		t.Fatalf("skipped Gitee backfill was rejected after upstream OSS failure: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"GITEE_CONCLUSION=failure",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "expected exactly one failed downstream channel job") {
+		t.Fatalf("two failed downstream channels passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"DELIVERY_GATE_CONCLUSION=success",
+	); err == nil || !strings.Contains(output, "must end in a failed delivery gate") {
+		t.Fatalf("successful terminal gate on a failed run passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"RUN_ATTEMPT=1",
+	); err == nil || strings.Contains(output, "channel-repair authority verified") {
+		t.Fatalf("non-latest run attempt passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"RUN_REPOSITORY=other/repo",
+	); err == nil || strings.Contains(output, "channel-repair authority verified") {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong-repository release run passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"RUN_PATH=.github/workflows/other.yml",
+	); err == nil || strings.Contains(output, "channel-repair authority verified") {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong-workflow release run passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+	if output, err := run(
+		repairArgs("oss"),
+		"DUPLICATE_RUN=1",
+	); err == nil || strings.Contains(output, "channel-repair authority verified") {
+		t.Fatalf("ambiguous failed release runs passed: err=%v\noutput:\n%s", err, output)
+	}
+}
+
 func releaseChangelog(sections ...string) string {
 	text := "# Changelog\n\n## [Unreleased]\n\n"
 	for _, section := range sections {
@@ -1060,6 +1311,7 @@ func TestReleaseMirrorUsesChannelSpecificPointer(t *testing.T) {
 				"OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test-key",
 				"OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=test-secret",
 				"OSS_ENDPOINT=https://oss.example.com",
+				"OSS_REGION=cn-test",
 				"OSS_BUCKET=test-bucket",
 				"OSS_PREFIX=dws",
 				"OSSUTIL="+fakeOSSUtil,
@@ -1130,6 +1382,7 @@ func TestReleaseMirrorFailsClosedWhenPointerCannotBeRead(t *testing.T) {
 				"OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test-key",
 				"OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=test-secret",
 				"OSS_ENDPOINT=https://oss.example.com",
+				"OSS_REGION=cn-test",
 				"OSS_BUCKET=test-bucket",
 				"OSS_PREFIX=dws",
 				"OSSUTIL="+fakeOSSUtil,
@@ -1166,6 +1419,7 @@ func TestReleaseMirrorRepairsHistoricalAssetsWithoutMovingNewerPointer(t *testin
 		"OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test-key",
 		"OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=test-secret",
 		"OSS_ENDPOINT=https://oss.example.com",
+		"OSS_REGION=cn-test",
 		"OSS_BUCKET=test-bucket",
 		"OSS_PREFIX=dws",
 		"OSSUTIL="+fakeOSSUtil,